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Unnatural Disaster: The Political Economy of Famine in Guatemala
Abstract
Disasters have traditionally been thought of as acts of god. The reality is that they are 
acts of man, through the socially created conditions of vulnerability that expose people to 
hazards and limit their ability to cope with the impact of those shocks. Globalization, as 
a process of integration into a global economic system, is a human made construct that is 
making the majority of the earth’s population increasingly vulnerable. It exposes people 
to new threats and limits their capacity to respond to them, or even survive.
Guatemala is a specific case that illustrates how increasing immiseration and 
concentration of wealth occur simultaneously with the integration of a country into the 
global economic system. This integration takes the form of orienting national production 
and development towards exports, while increasing its dependence on imports of both 
basic needs and luxury goods. The process is championed by the national economic 
elites that benefit from this globally integrated development. They promote and effect 
this orientation of the national political economy through their control over resources, 
particularly land, production, exchange and the state. This ‘dependent’ orientation of the 
economy towards export led development and the grossly inequitable socio-economic 
structure that is its foundation have systematically deprived the majority of Guatemalans 
of their very means of subsistence and survival. It has appropriated their means of 
production and destroyed their entitlements, resulting in widespread hunger and famine. 
The actual famine that occurred in 2001 was simply a system of this systemic crisis that 
has placed millions in Guatemala at risk.
This thesis shows how the political economy of the country is inequitably structured, how 
it concentrates wealth in the hands of a small economic elite while actively 
impoverishing the majority. It shows how this structure is based on an export led model 
of development, which itself serves the ‘core’ of the global economic system -  Northern 
consumers, producers and transnational corporations. It shows how this structure and 
orientation resulted in the 2001 famine and further shows how this famine was not an 
exception event, but simply the normal state of affairs for millions of poor, rural and 
indigenous Guatemalans. It was a symptom of the much larger, constant and silent 
disaster that globalization has wrought upon the vast majority of people who do not 
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The Political Economy of Disaster
“apessimist is simply an optimist who’s well informed”
- Mario Benedetti, Haiku 213 
INTRODUCTION
The disaster of famine today stalks people around the globe. In spite of popular belief, 
famine has only disappeared from the sight of those who do not face it as part of their 
daily life. In reality, it has become the norm for millions of people around the world. 
Recent crises in Southern Africa, the Horn of Africa and North Korea have once again 
drawn media attention to its existence. The fact is that chronic and acute hunger 
continues to destroy lives and livelihoods throughout the so-called ‘Third World’. The 
wealth produced by economic growth and globalization has not ‘trickled down’. It is 
exactly this concentration of wealth that is one of the principal causes of hunger, poverty 
and vulnerability. Such is the case in Guatemala, a ‘Middle Income Country’ with 
sufficient wealth and resources, unlike other countries experiencing famine in Sub- 
Saharan Africa, to more than sustain its population.
This thesis is concerned with dispelling a number of popular, and erroneous, beliefs. 
These beliefs are, in and of themselves, factors in reproducing the problems that they 
supposedly explain. The first of these beliefs is that disasters are natural. The second is 
that famine is simply an event that occurs. The third is that famine is somehow separate 
from endemic hunger. The fourth is that hunger, poverty and vulnerability are 
themselves ‘naturally’ occurring conditions.
This thesis shows that disasters are not natural, but are anthropocentric crises that result 
from socially constructed situations. It shows how famines evolve from underlying 
causes that go much deeper than ‘triggers’ such as drought or war. It shows how the 
causes of endemic hunger are inseparable from the causes of famine. It shows how elite 
actors and the structures they dominate create poverty and vulnerability. It accomplishes
all of this by showing how a disaster is constructed, through the social creation of 
vulnerability and exposure to threat, all through the normal functioning of the political 
economic system. As such, this thesis is a study of ‘structural violence’; of how the 
global economic system and the socio-economic structure of nations integrated into it 
cause poverty and vulnerability; of how these structures create hunger and form the 
mechanisms that are the foundation of the famine process. This is a study of how the 
wielding of power and wealth create disaster.
Famines are the most prominent disaster in all of human history.^ They have not abated 
with time or ‘development’, having claimed more lives in the twentieth century than in 
any other in history.^ Like all disasters, famine is the result of multiple and 
interconnected dynamic factors which affect a community. In all cases of famine and 
disaster, the social element of vulnerability is necessary for the catastrophe to occur. 
Drought, floods, market failure, communications problems, civil strife, to name a few, are 
each linked to famines, but are neither necessary nor sufficient as explanations for why 
famines actually occur. They are each items on a long list of ‘triggers’ that can 
precipitate crisis only when they interact with underlying vulnerability -  exposure to the 
threat and incapacity of the community to cope or adapt. This is to say that disasters do 
not occur without pre-existing vulnerability. And vulnerability is a particular social or 
‘man-made’ condition resulting fi-om the collective economic, political and cultural 
actions of humankind within a specific environment.
While the number of deaths due to disasters generally, and famines specifically, peaked 
in the middle of the century, the incidence and numbers of people affected by both have 
increased geometrically throughout the last century. At the same time, attention has 
narrowed on Sub-Saharan Afifca as the only area still affected by famines. While this 
focus of attention is absolutely warranted, it has neglected other parts of the world such 
as North Korea, southeastern Europe and, the focus of this thesis. Central America.
While widely recognized as being a disaster prone region, famine is not included with 
hurricanes and earthquakes as one of the disasters that plagues Central America. This 
study seeks to correct this error of omission.
It also sets out to advance a number of different yet, as we shall see, related alternative 
and critical positions. Foremost of these is that disasters, of which famine is but one 
kind, are not natural. They are caused by the actions and inactions of humanity, which 
create conditions of vulnerability for people. These conditions of vulnerability are 
largely based on the distribution of power and wealth in a society. This structure is the 
political economy of a country, which is where the dynamic forces of development (in 
this case capitalist development) converge. The principal dynamic in this structural 
balance is the polarization of an unequal society, where wealth is concentrated amongst 
the few and the many are concentrated in conditions of poverty. This active process of 
impoverishment is the process of immiseration, which accompanies the regular working 
of the capitalist global economic system.
What this thesis does is connect the various elements of this causal web through a case 
study that clearly demonstrates how they are all connected and integral to one another. 
The study comprehensively explains the case itself -  the 2001 famine ‘event’ that 
occurred in Guatemala. By showing how this ‘event’ was but a symptom of a larger 
famine process, due to systematic immiseration, we see how the disaster was socially 
constructed and, therefore, how it can be addressed. The process of immiseration itself is 
based on Guatemala’s incorporation into the expanding global economic system. This 
integration consists of the orientation of the national political economy towards 
production for export and the import of basic needs and luxury goods. It is overseen by a 
national economic elite that profits inordinately from its, and hence the country’s, 
participation in the neoliberal project of globalization.
THE CASE
Between August and October 2001, 123 rural, poor and indigenous Guatemalans died due 
to famine.^ In total, international aid agencies considered 134,000 people to be ‘at risk’ 
of starvation due to the famine/ One year later, on World Food Day 2002, the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations announced that two and a half million 
Guatemalans were ‘at risk’ due to food shortage/ By spring 2003 this number had grown 
another 300,000, to 2.8 million undernourished people.^ In February (2003) the National 
Institute of Statistics (INE) announced the results of its national census, undertaken 
between November 24 and December 7*̂ , 2002. The result was a national population of 
11,237,196, more than half a million less than the projected population.^
Separately, each of these facts requires explanation. Together, these facts indicate a 
larger situation of crisis. The aim of this thesis is to provide a clear understanding of the 
actual and ongoing situation of crisis in Guatemala, with a complete explanation of its 
causality. It responds the question ‘Why did this famine occur?’ In doing so, it shows 
that what is occurring is in fact a disaster, and an unnatural one at that. Further, it reveals 
that this disaster is both more widespread and deeply rooted than the 2001 famine. The 
famine event was itself a symptom of the larger structural disaster -  constant, silent and 
unrecognized -  that results from the country’s political economy.
The distribution of power and wealth in the country is among the most extremely 
inequitable in the world. The disparity is so severe in and of itself as to be considered “a 
serious barrier to economic development” by the UNDP.* This concentration of wealth is 
due, in the first instance, to the historic pursuit of export agriculture, and therefore the 
control of both land and production by an agrarian elite. This dominion over land and 
production is maintained by an oligarchic state, where shifting fractions of the elite rule, 
with the military governing on their behalf.
The pertinence of Guatemala as a case study stems from exactly this inequitable 
distribution of wealth and concentration of power. It serves to demonstrate the impacts 
and consequences of a path of development that both tolerates and even promotes such
inequity. Given how capitalism, especially in its neoliberal (or neo-mercantile) guise, 
effectively promotes inequality as the ‘natural outcome’ of free competition, it is 
important that we clearly recognize the very real consequences of the simultaneous 
immiseration and concentration of wealth that characterize and accompany ‘free 
competition’.
The case is illustrative of the disastrous consequences of the latest global phase of 
capitalist expansion. There is clear understanding and consensus that the internal 
inequality in Guatemala is the main source of its problems and conflicts. Therefore, it 
demonstrates how famine can happen in the midst of wealth and excess, when there is no 
equity, justice or redistribution of the national surplus. Further, all other ‘external causes’ 
(including the cynical position that the Guatemalan civil war was fought against a 
communist insurgence) are distinguishable from the systemic norm o f ‘business as usual’, 
or readily identifiable as part of it. Finally, unlike the famines previously mentioned in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and North Korea, there are no immediately apparent ‘particular’ 
causes (such as drought, civil unrest, the sale of the national grain reserve or dictatorship) 
to explain this disaster.
THE PROBLEMATIC
Events of the last two years around the globe, but particularly in the African regions, 
have brought famine back into the spotlight of development programming, policy and 
research. The aim of this thesis is to apply some of that spotlight on another region, 
country and people that are and have been continuously marginalized as well. This fact is 
ironically attested to by their non-inclusion in the scholarly consideration of the ‘New 
Famines’ presently on the humanitarian agenda. By remedying this neglect, this thesis 
also seeks to highlight a number of other key connections and relationships between 
fields of thought and action, namely political economy, food security and disaster 
prevention. The problematic of this thesis is to explain the causes of the famine of 2001. 
Through answering the question ‘Why did the famine occur?’ we are able to evaluate the 
different theories of disaster and famine, as well as the tentative framework that this 
thesis proposes to explain the crisis.
The famine was not an exceptional event -  except for being reported as such -  but rather 
an indicator of the extreme state of vulnerability, poverty and hunger that is the normal 
situation for millions of marginalized poor, rural and indigenous Guatemalans. Nor are 
the disastrous conditions new -  1570 saw the first major famine caused by Guatemala’s 
insertion into the global economic system, through elite domination of the indigenous 
(peasant) population for the production of a primary commodity (cacao).^ As such, we 
are dealing with the disaster of famine as it is produced by the normal functioning of the 
socio-economic system. This system is one that it extremely unequal, with a grossly 
disproportionate concentration of wealth in the hands of a very small elite, based upon 
their exploitation of the majority.
If the concept of immiseration were in some way novel it would to some degree mitigate 
the condemnation deserved by a system that produces such human tragedy. However, it 
is not. Therefore, what is novel is to hold those who control these political, social and 
economic systems, both locally and globally, responsible for the consequences of their 
operation and accountable for the deprivation and destruction that they cause. Further, to 
approach the entire issue of the political economy as a disaster, using the language and 
logic of disaster reiterates the fact -  the reality -  that it is a disaster, which kills individual 
humans on a regular and methodical basis. In this way we see disaster as an issue of 
power -  a social and economic process -  and not simply an ‘act of god’.
On this basis, there are a number of distinct yet highly (interjrelated ideas and arguments 
that this thesis advances. While they will be further elaborated in Chapter 2, it is worth 
highlighting them at this point.
• Disasters are (hu)man-made, not reified acts o f  God
• Disasters do not simply have natural causes; they are created based on human 
vulnerability;
• Disasters are anthropocentric events -  there is no disaster without an impact on 
human communities;
• This creation of disaster is based on the social construction of vulnerability, 
which exposes people to natural and man-made hazards is an entirely human- 
caused act, generally
• Vulnerability arises as a result of socio-economic processes and therefore is a 
consequence of the functioning of the political economy;
• Natural hazards, such as volcanic eruptions, floods, hurricanes and the like are 
simply natural phenomena and only become, or ‘trigger’, disasters when they 
impact upon human communities;
• Famine is the ultimate ‘socially caused’ or (hu)man-made disaster;
•  The logic of disaster prevention is appropriate to examining hunger as a 
constructed reality, placing it clearly within the sphere of the functioning of a 
system; and
• Understanding the social construction of vulnerability shows us how a disaster is 
actually created, and therefore how they can be prevented.
As such, this thesis explicitly promotes the application and adherence to a political 
economy approach to understanding famine, hunger and disasters but also in terms of 
creating appropriate policies for addressing and above all preventing them. It clearly 
advocates an interdisciplinary approach to several concepts and issues that are generally 
considered separately, given the nature of academic disciplines, hence also arguing their 
integral connection and indivisibility.
This logic, in turn, brings us to a series of positions and definitions regarding the political 
economy, both international and domestic, which are being advanced as the relevant 
processes of the social construction of vulnerability. The first of these is that the global 
economic system is nothing other than the world capitalist system that is currently being 
advanced by the agenda of neoliberal globalization. In this sense and for the purposes of 
this study, globalization is the process (and agenda) of integration into this global 
division of both labour and power. Integration can be understood as the degree of 
insertion, of interdependence or dependence on the global economic system, and the 
extent to which the domestic economy is oriented to servicing it (i.e. producing for export
markets and importing basic needs). Immiseration, then, is “The process by which 
poverty and misery are produced by the ordinary operation of a social system.” *̂’ 
Domestically, this process is seen in the control of resources, particularly land, 
production, exchange and the state by particular classes and class fractions, and the 
distribution of wealth amongst those groups.
Finally, it is incorrect to exclude Latin America from the annals of historic, 20*'’ century 
and present day famines." One of the aims here is to rectify this error of omission and 
include Latin America with Africa and Asia as an area affected by famine. That famines 
actually transpire in Latin America is an initial point that requires reiteration, as the 
region is generally and historically considered to be free of such afflictions.
EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOCUS
In disciplinary terms, the focus of this investigation is on the very interdisciplinary field 
of (so-called) ‘food security’ -  including hunger and famine studies -  each possessing its 
own particular literature, proponents and even epoch. However, 1 approach this field 
from the political economy perspective, in particular applying the analytical focus used 
by the school of disaster prevention studies.'^ This particular approach to disaster studies 
is a structural one that focuses on the social or human construction of vulnerability as the 
fundamental factor in creating vulnerability and, hence, risk and disaster. The argument 
is that "hunger [i]s a function of poverty and poverty [i]s a function of fundamentally 
inequitable power structures both within and between nations."" Thus hunger, in many 
cases, has political economic causes; it is an effect of social organization and wealth 
distribution.
Political economy provides holism both in the approach to development and in the 
conception of what is in fact the object of s tu d y . T h e  political economy approach 
provides more than a mere static contextual analysis, but a fuller dynamic and historically 
informed conception of a situation that accounts for power, vulnerability and change in 
these factors and their distribution amongst actors." This includes both micro, meso and
macro levels of analysis and their interaction with each other, connecting global 
processes to local realities and vice versa.
This study addresses the central issues of development -  poverty and hunger, and more 
specifically their causes. Instead of exploring the relationship between the two, this 
thesis is approaching both conditions, together, as a systemic disaster. In this sense, it is 
a vertically integrated case study of the global, national and local levels that very clearly 
demonstrates the immiseration caused by the normal fimctioning of the global economic 
system and the regular action of the agents that both administer and benefit from that 
system. Only by understanding the fundamental causes of poverty, hunger and 
vulnerability can they truly be alleviated. This study is not simply concerned with 
remedial action or the alleviation of symptoms, but with exposing their causation so that 
those causes may be fully and finally addressed, for a development that is equitable, just 
and sustainable.
This thesis is based upon the Marxist thesis of immiseration -  the impoverishment caused 
by the regular functioning of the capitalist system. Therefore, it also embraces the 
analysis of class and of the subsequent division of labour and distribution of wealth as the 
key areas of examination for understanding how this particular disaster in Guatemala has 
been generated. It further shares the same motivations underlying a variety of schools of 
critical thought. This includes Welfare Economics, the critical theory of the Frankfurt 
School and the economic anthropology of Karl Polanyi, all of which serve as theoretical 
foundations for interpretation and analysis. In addition to the key ideas and analytical 
tools that these theoreticians offer, and in spite of their many and significant differences, 
it is their unanimous identification of ‘the system’ as the problem (or source of the 
problem) that grounds this study.
There are three principal fields of thought informing this thesis -  the already mentioned 
hunger / famine / food security field, disaster studies, and the political economy of 
development. Each is a highly differentiated field, with deep technical and ideological 
divisions permeating them. They overlap one another to varying degrees, in terms of
their scope. There is a wide range of perspectives in each field, running from alternative 
and critical political economy approaches to the technocratic paradigms that dominate 
policy-making in each. It is this former perspective that I develop throughout this thesis.
METHODOLOGY
This case study*^ of the political economy of Guatemala demonstrates how the twin 
processes of integration into the global economic system and domination by national 
elites construct conditions of vulnerability in the country. As such, this case study is 
extending the thesis of immiseration to rural peasants in the third world, while 
synthesizing the theory of disaster studies, famine and hunger thinking and the field of 
the political economy of development as necessarily inter-related. Specific examination 
of the situation of ‘global vulnerability’ and the causes of the famine in the department of 
Chiquimula serve to illustrate the dynamic of the political economic processes and the 
immiseration they cause. The multifaceted confluence of factors stemming from 
integration and domination is then examined through the analytical framework of ‘global 
vulnerability’.̂ ^
In particular, the study combines quantitative and qualitative research by presenting the 
various data and statistics that reflect the conditions of reality and tying these indicators 
to the processes, causes, people and decisions underlying them. It is an idiographic 
study, given its interpretation of the famine in Guatemala. The study also makes 
nomothetic contributions to understanding famine and disaster as development issues, by 
developing valid generalizations fi-om structural realities examined.
My criteria for analysis in this study are principally oriented around the structure of the 
economy itself, the conditions of participation in that economy and the distribution of its 
surplus. The impact of the nation’s political economy is then examined using the 
framework of the holistic or global vulnerability of a ‘ community’. T h i s  global 
vulnerability model considers the dynamic and interactive factors involved in the creation 
of vulnerability for a community through examining the different yet interrelated angles 
of vulnerability. These angles are the natural, physical, economic, social, political.
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technical, ideological, cultural, educational, ecological, and institutional factors that 
together contribute to increase or decrease a community’s vulnerability. The specific 
concern will be to see how these different angles affect ‘access to food’, ‘availability of 
food and ‘utility of that food’ for rural Guatemalans.
This thesis makes use of a wide range of data from primary and secondary sources, many 
of which were collected in country at the time of the famine and the humanitarian aid 
campaign to alleviate it. As such, I make significant use of the reports and surveys 
produced by international and multilateral aid agencies as well as the statistics generated 
by government and multilateral agencies. Each of these sources are detailed here below.
The Secretario General de Planificaciôn (SEGEPLAN -  the General Secretary of 
Planning) is the principal body concerned with poverty issues in Guatemala. As such, 
they compile and publish the various statistics generated by the Instituto Nacional de 
Estadistica (INE -  National Institute of Statistics)*^. These include the National Poverty 
Maps and a recent Socio-Demographic study. There are now five main national socio­
economic surveys that underlie these studies and the statistics used by the government 
and international agencies for their calculations. These surveys are:
• The Encuesta Nacional de Empleo e Ingresos, ENEI (National Survey of 
Employment and Income) by MECOVI -  INE, imdertaken in May and June of 
2002, sampling 12,000 households;
• ENCOVI -  Encuesta Nacional sobre Condiciones de Vida (National Survey on 
Living Conditions) 2000, a survey of 7276 homes;
•  ENS -  Encuesta Nacional de Salud (National Health Survey) from 1986-87 and 
1989;
• ENSMI -  Encuesta Nacional de Salud Materna Infantil (National Survey of 
Maternal and Infant Health) from 1987,1995,1998-99; and
• ENIGFAM -  Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y  Gastos Familiares (National 
Survey of Family Income and Expenses) froml 998-1999, which surveyed 7500 
homes.
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Additional statistics include the population censuses of 1981,1994, and 2002, although 
only limited results of the latter are so far available. The final and perhaps central source 
for statistics, particularly for the economy, is the Banco de Guatemala and its annual 
Informes Economicos y  Memorias de Labores (Annual Reports), which detail the 
accounts and economic activity of the nation.
However, there is concern with the reliability and accuracy many of these surveys and the 
statistics derived from them. The Inter American Development Bank reflects an example 
of this concern in this commentary: “The last census was held in April 1994. Although it 
was completed, it was rejected by the municipalities affected by the armed conflicts that 
were ongoing at the time. This undermined the credibility of the results.” ®̂
There have been three agricultural censuses, in 1950, 1964 and in 1979. Supplemented 
by an agricultural survey in 1996, the results of these studies are available, in different 
formats, in various secondary studies. The shocking inequality that reveal, however, has 
cast a shadow over the collection of agricultural information, making it highly politicized. 
Although a full agricultural survey is currently in the process of being completed 
(Summer 2003), its results will not be available until December 2003. With regards to 
the agricultural data available, it is important to note that agricultural farm units are 
classified by size^  ̂and not in fact aggregated according to owner. What this means is 
that the very small number of large estates, occupying the majority of agricultural land, 
are in fact controlled by even fewer individuals or families than the statistics would 
indicate.^^ Conversely, the minifundia or small plots of land, which comprise the 
overwhelming majority of the quantity of farm units, and the vast minority of actual 
agricultural land, are in fact occupied by an even larger number of individuals or families 
then statistics indicate.
The above concerns, and the fact that most of the studies are in fact surveys that have 
been extrapolated over the wider population should be kept in mind when considering the 
data presented in the UNDP’s Human Development Reports for Guatemala, which are
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based on these materials. The national poverty maps and statistics are also derived from 
these surveys, as are virtually all socio-economic statistics.
A notable exception to this, and also of particular importance, are the national health 
surveys for undemutrition and malnutrition amongst school-aged children, conducted in 
1986 and 2001, by the Ministry of Health in conjunction with the World Food 
Programme and UNICEF. While these statistics are vital to this study, it is also 
important to note the degree of school absenteeism and non-attendance ^  that therefore 
impact directly on these data. The most vulnerable populations are automatically 
excluded from these statistics, as is so often the case, because these poorest and most 
marginalized children do not in fact attend school. "̂* Thus, while these statistics are 
indicative of situations, they are not necessarily fully representative of the realities in 
certain areas.
Furthermore, these institutions, along with the Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganaderia e 
Alimentacion (MAGA - Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food), are the principal 
sources of information on the actual famine, its evolution, events and the responses to it. 
In addition to these reports are the Vulnerability Analysis Mapping done by the World 
Food Programme (Gandarra and Associates) and the Zones of Risk analysis done by 
UNICEF. These two studies and their collected data serve as extremely important 
sources of data, covering all municipalities in the country.
The FAO is the primary repository of general data on agriculture, including volumes of 
production, area harvested, crop yields, quantities of imports and exports and food 
supply.^^ These data are assembled from national statistics, generally collected by 
MAGA and the Banco Central de Guatemala, and while there is some question as to their 
accuracy, they are generally reliable and certainly indicative of conditions and trends. 
MAGA also provides statistics on vital topics such as land concentration, although it has 
been some years since new or updated data has been developed -  possibly given the very 
extreme polarization they indicate. As well, the ministry has a registry of agricultural 
producers and companies, categorized by department and product, including the number
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of employees. While these records are detailed, they are incomplete, only representing 
the formal sector, and therefore only provide a snapshot of the sector at the time the 
information was collected. Given the instability found even in the formal sector, a wide 
margin of inaccuracy is both possible and likely.
For specific crops, such as coffee and sugar, I am relying on the information of the 
national producer associations of each. ANACAFE, the Asociacion Nacional de 
Caficultores (the National Association of Coffee Producers), has the most complete and 
detailed information regarding all aspects of coffee production in the country (area, yield, 
production, employment). This is complemented by global statistics and price 
information from the International Coffee Organization (ICO). Similarly, ASAZGUA, 
the Asociacion de Azucareros de Guatemala (the National Sugar Producers Association), 
has the definitive industry information for the country.
Generally, there are a number of problems with employment statistics in that they are 
largely statistical constructions. The only ‘official’ and as such empirically quantifiable 
statistics for employment are those for formal sector workers registered with the Instituto 
Guatemalteco de Seguridad Social (IGSS -  the Guatemalan Social Security Institute). 
However, the vast majority of the fewer than one million workers registered with IGSS 
are urban workers and furthermore, this number represents less than a quarter of the 
‘economically active population’ of the country and a mere 8% of the total population.^^ 
Alternatively, the International Organization for Migration has generated labour statistics 
for the coffee sector, based on the labour input requirements derived from the actual 
levels of national production of coffee as opposed to any kind of census of actual 
fornaleros’ or day labourers.^^
Given that a number o f  these surveys are increasingly dated, two o f  which were 
performed during the Civil War, there are any number of question marks surrounding the 
reliability and accuracy of these statistics. Even more problematic are the statistics 
derived fi-om these studies, given the clear failure of the statistical models applied to 
previous census data in accurately projecting the real state of affairs. I am referring to the
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national census completed at the end of 2002 that demonstrates an overestimation of the 
national population by 4.5% by these models. Such incongruence therefore casts long 
shadows over all such ‘derived’ statistics and the very models used in their extrapolation 
and production.
Furthermore, there is a fascinating and quite irreconcilable inconsistency between various 
statistics coming from different sources, particularly when comparing numbers provided 
by government ministries and agencies with those presented by international agencies. 
With this disclaimer in mind, this study relies upon data from the international agencies. 
General economic statistics come from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and Comision Economica para América Latina / Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (CEPAL/ECLAC), as well as the Banco de Guatemala. 
Where possible I am using these data directly from these international (and national) 
organizations. However, particularly for older statistics, I am relying on their 
presentation in secondary sources, particularly in the work of Brockett (1998), Barry 
(1989,1986), Paige (1997), Dunkerley (1988,1990), Vilas (1995), Painter (1987) and 
Handy (1984), to name but a few.
THESIS
The overall logic of this study is one of uncovering underlying causes, specifically those 
of hunger. It sees hunger as a symptom of poverty resulting from the immiseration 
caused by the normal functioning of the global capitalist system. This normal 
functioning includes two distinct yet interrelated processes. First there is the external or 
worldwide integration and incorporation of countries and their economies into the global 
economic system. Within this process countries are transformed into producers for the 
global market, while their self-sufficiency, or even their domestically oriented 
production, is systematically undermined. The internal dimension of this process of 
global (inter)dependency is the complicity of the country’s elites. They are in fact the 
agents of economic and political domination which advance the agenda of global 
integration, reorienting their national economies to export produetion at the expense of 
nationally oriented and subsistence production. They simultaneously concentrate the
15
accruing wealth in their own hands while further and continuously marginalizing the 
poor, particularly the rural and indigenous, of their country. This marginalization is 
centered on the dispossession of the poor of their means of production, most notably land, 
for their own subsistence. For what was a rural majority population, this systematic 
marginalization is the mechanism for the proletarianization and urbanization of the 
peasantry. The net result of these human processes is the creation and intensification of a 
situation of extreme ‘global vulnerability’ that is so extreme as to be disaster. My thesis 
is that the immiseration caused by the expansion of the global economic system, 
understood as these twin processes of global economic integration and national elite 
domination, is a ‘man-made’ disaster that results in the most unnatural disaster of 
famine.
Several arguments are advanced as an explanation for the famine of 2001. The first point 
is that, as anything but the most superficial examination will bring to light, this famine 
was not a discrete event, but rather part of an endemic process inherent in the political 
economy of the nation. By understanding famine as a process, as opposed to a discrete 
event, the underlying factors of the political economy that coalesce to create disaster can 
be examined as the fimdamental causes of the disaster. In this light, the shocks or 
hazards to which a population or community are vulnerable are seen as triggers for the 
‘latent’ or hidden disaster. This approach also allows us to understand that the triggers 
are certainly not sufficient and in many cases not even necessary to cause disaster -  these 
triggers simply draw attention to the reality produced by the normal functioning of the 
political economy. Through this reasoning we are automatically drawn to the structural 
realities in which people in crisis find themselves, and consequently the nature of those 
structures. This allows us to see the failure of the people themselves to adapt to or cope 
with the situation they are facing as principally a result of those structures to which they 
are trying to adapt. However, the analysis does not end by illuminating the situation of 
‘global vulnerability’, but further examines how and why they ended up in this situation. 
The answer to the critical question of why’ reveals who else is responsible for putting 
the vulnerable in that situation and who fails in helping them out of it.
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STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS ARGUMENT
This first chapter sets out the central issues of this thesis and the motivation for pursuing 
them. It outlines the case to be explained and interpreted, while providing the central 
definitions, working assumptions and epistemological grounding for the causal 
explanation and interpretation. The interdisciplinary thematic foci of disaster studies, 
food security and the political economy of development are highlighted. The political 
economy approach is explained in terms of its utility in examining the problematic of 
how hunger and famine are anthropogenic phenomena. The methodology and sources of 
data are detailed, noting the problems and concerns arising from them. The structure of 
the argument is then outlined, providing a synopsis of the eight chapters. The chapter 
closes with the thesis of the study.
The aim of the second chapter is to assemble both the tools for analysis and the relevant 
issues of discussion so as to proceed with an examination of how the global economic 
system has affected the poor of Guatemala. It begins by summarizing some key thoughts 
from different critical perspectives that all locate ‘the problem’ within the dominant 
(economic) system. The three main fields of thought are then examined -  disaster 
studies, the hunger / food security / famine literature, and the political economy of 
development -  noting their key ideas, thinkers and debates. The chapter concludes by 
demonstrating how ideas from the different critical perspectives are linked together.
From these linkages a tentative framework is elaborated for analyzing the structures that 
systematically impoverish people, making them vulnerable to famine and ultimately 
destroying both their lives and livelihoods through the ‘famine process’.
The third chapter provides an overview of the conflictual political economic history of 
Guatemala. It begins with a brief geographic overview and a summary of the social 
structure of the country. The centrality of agricultural export production from colonial 
times to the present is examined, along with the coinciding concentration of wealth and 
land by local elites. The accompanying process of dispossession, marginalization and 
pauperization of the indigenous rural population is examined in terms of socially 
constructed vulnerability. The bulk of this chapter focuses on the last twenty years of
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economic evolution and the‘integration’ of Guatemala into the global economic system 
under military rule. The role of the United States and its economic, military and food aid 
are discussed as particular tools for the transformation of agricultural production away 
from subsistence and self-provisioning, towards an export-led development that neglects 
and impoverishes the majority. The roles of specific regional initiatives and the programs 
of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in this economic orientation are also 
identified.
The fourth chapter expands on the historical context discussed in the previous chapter by 
focusing on the economic structure of the country and its evolution. It identifies trends in 
production and trade, showing the extent to which Guatemala’s economy is export 
oriented and fully dependent on these export markets. It also reveals Guatemala’s 
external dependence on imported goods for industry, agriculture and consumers. The 
concentration of ownership of land and the companies responsible for production, 
processing and exports are also outlined. The chapter details the substantive elements of 
the economy that provide both livelihoods and employment for Guatemalans. It 
demonstrates the extent and nature of the country’s food dependency, before concluding 
with an assessment of the economy’s overall vulnerability, and the global threats to 
which the Guatemalan poor are exposed.
The next chapter elaborates on the situation of ‘global vulnerability’ in Guatemala, in 
terms of the socio-economic and human impact of the political economic structure and 
history detailed in the previous two chapters. As such, it illustrates the degree and 
distribution of poverty, undemutrition throughout the country. It outlines other indicators 
of social vulnerability, linking them to the specific processes that underlie them. This is 
followed by a full discussion of the economic ‘externality’ of the environmental impact 
of Guatemalan development and underdevelopment. The chapter concludes with a 
summary of global vulnerability across the different departments of the country.
Chapter six examines the famine itself. It begins by detailing the scope and breadth of 
the events of 2001, as well as the explanations of the disaster. It then proceeds to review
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the value and limitations of these immediate trigger explanations by demonstrating that 
‘the event’ was part of the larger process stemming from the global situation discussed in 
the previous three chapters. The larger famine process and its continuation over the next 
two years is exposed. The chapter concludes by reiterating the links between the famine 
process with the political economic orientation, evolution and structure outlined in the 
previous chapters.
Chapter seven ties together the general state of human vulnerability in Guatemala, as well 
as the famine of 2001/food shortage of 2002, through the history of immiseration, to the 
process of dependent integration into the global economy. Based on the evidence 
presented in Chapter 4 and the context presented in Chapter 3, it discusses both of these 
in terms of the social construction of vulnerability, identifying the key factors of national 
domination by elites and integration into the global economy as they ‘create’ poverty, 
hunger and famine. This structural connection shows clearly and concretely how, in fact, 
a disaster is created by ‘globalization’ and how globalization is itself a threat to the 
survival of the world’s poor. This evaluation of the process of disaster and famine 
construction is used to demonstrate how the theoretical approaches to disaster studies, 
famine/hunger/food insecurity and the political economy of development are 
interconnected. It also serves to illustrate which of the perspectives introduced in chapter 
two are in fact most appropriate for the consideration of famine and hunger.
The final chapter summarizes my findings -  the underlying structural causes of the 
process of famine in Guatemala and how these causes simply became manifest with the 
crisis of mass starvation. On this basis it reiterates how the structural causes of hunger 
and disaster can in fact be analyzed so as to orient development that is in fact sustainable 
and aimed at preventing both famine and vulnerability, through development practice that 
is effectively directed towards ending poverty and misery.
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Chapter II
Constructing Vulnerability, Creating Hunger
Follow not the footprints o f the ancients; 
Seek that which they sought.
-  Matsuo Bashoo
INTRODUCTION
The expansion of global capitalism -  neoliberal globalization as we know it today -  is a 
disaster that has deleterious consequences for the poor that it marginalizes. It 
incorporates peripheral countries and societies, extending a world system that is 
dominated by ‘core actors’ and geographic centers while fostering human insecurity and 
mutual vulnerability.^* This insecurity and vulnerability are the results of a general 
process of immiseration that is a famine process for those that are materially 
marginalized. Through growing hunger, poverty, and vulnerability, this economic system 
slowly, steadily, methodically and, ultimately, kills.
The aim of this chapter is to assemble both the tools for analysis and the relevant issues 
of discussion so as to proceed with an examination of how the global economic system 
has affected the poor of Guatemala. To that end it examines three main fields of thought 
-  disaster studies, hunger / famine / food security and the political economy of 
development -  their key ideas, thinkers and debates. It then shows how these ideas are 
linked together and form a tentative framework for analyzing the structures that 
systematically impoverish people and make them vulnerable to famine. These fields are 
examined in the light of the tradition of critical social theory, which further informs the 
analytical perspective synthesized out of this review.
The field of disaster studies is particularly disparate. The divisions and diversity of 
approaches within disaster studies are largely reconciled within the ‘school’ for the social 
science study of disaster prevention. This particular approach, with its holistic and 
political economy understanding of how disasters are human-made events, provides the 
framework for demonstrating how vulnerability is constructed. It emphasizes
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vulnerability reduction as key to risk management and disaster prevention. This 
approach resonates and provides the analytical framework for the two subsequent fields 
of though, Hunger / Famine / Food (In)security and the Political Economy of 
Development. Before that, though, this section defines the key ideas of vulnerability, 
risk, hazard/threat and disaster to be carried through this thesis. It also details the 
analytical framework of the ‘global vulnerability’ model, which underlies global 
vulnerability mapping and vulnerability analysis mapping (VAM).^^
With the Hunger / Famine / Food (In)security literature I attempt to synthesize what is a 
truly massive and at the same time highly differentiated field. While it is debatable 
whether there are in fact three distinct fields on hunger, famine and food security 
respectively, they will be presented as such, in spite of their obvious connection. Many 
of the authors of these respective sub-fields do indeed differentiate themselves from each 
other. I continue to classify authors along the policy approach -  critical approach 
spectrum^® in order to make sense of the positions and debates on hunger, famine and 
food (in)security. At the same time I identify three trends or positions within and 
between these two schools -  a conservative neo-Malthusian pessimism, a range of liberal 
reformism, and the structural and radical reformist positions of the critical schools.
The final broad field is that of the political economy of development. This field 
addresses the central development issues and perspectives underlying the current body of 
critical development thinking. The political economy of development examines the 
system as the problem, carrying on the eritical tradition of the thinkers and schools that 
shape the epistemological foundations of this thesis. This literature synthesizes structural 
and post-structural perspectives, while providing greater definition and detail to key 
concepts and structural mechanisms like globalization, the international (versus global) 
division of labour (and power), capitalism and dependency in the global economic 
system, as well as class and domination. It also addresses such concerns class fractions, 
elite theory, and the role of the state -  all central aspects and tensions within political 
economy.
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The final section of this chapter then outlines my analytical approach, as assembled from 
the previous sections, as a ‘global’ political economy approach to the social (human) 
construction of vulnerability. It highlights and defines the terms and ideas that I am using 
in my analysis and restates the thesis of this study.
EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS
This chapter begins by examining the instrumental thesis that underlies this study, and the 
subsequent and related critical theories that share this orientation. The central concern is 
the thesis of immiseration, and the impoverishment and misery caused by the regular 
fimctioning of the capitalist system, as observed by Marx. Therefore, it also embraces 
the analysis of class and of the subsequent division of labour as the key areas of 
examination for understanding how this particular disaster has been generated in 
Guatemala. It does this by pointing out that the global division of labour, as opposed to 
the nationally bounded societal division of labour in Marx’s writing, is the most apparent 
unit of analysis for observing the progressive impoverishment caused by global 
capitalism.
Given the way that so many substantive economic costs are externalized by dominant 
neoclassical economic thinking, passing them on to the environment or society generally, 
the end of the line for that theoretical and actual ‘passing of the buck’ is the poor of the 
so-called ‘Third World’, and their environment. As they are at the bottom of the political 
economic hierarchy, there is no one or nowhere else for them to shift the costs of 
unsustainable mass production and consumption. Like indissoluble contaminants in an 
ecosystem, they accumulate at the bottom of that system and slowly work their way back 
up the chain, affecting it in its entirety, ultimately destabilizing the whole. Such is the 
case with capitalism with the appropriation of all surplus at the top, at the cost of 
progressively increasing poverty as one moves down the socio-economic and political 
hierarchy.
Complementing this analysis is that of the Welfare Economists, namely Keynes^* and 
Kalecki^^, with their explicit concern for the economy to provide full employment. The
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Keynesians find themselves in opposition to the elite theory^^ defense of capitalism that 
negates the possibility of full employment and in fact requires a level of disemployment^"* 
to maintain productivity and investment gains. Above all stands Keynes’ and Kalecki’s 
simultaneous ‘discovery’ of the concept of ‘effective demand’ This concept becomes 
of particular importance to poverty and hunger issues through the concept of entitlement 
(see below). Another central issue coming directly from Keynes is the irrelevance of the 
‘long-run’, upon which neo-classical economics, and the structural adjustment policies 
they inform, rely. As we are all dead in the ‘long-run’, and those suffering from hunger 
and famine even sooner, the ‘long-run’ is effectively a material fiction -  like tomorrow, it 
is always coming, but never arrives.
The Frankfurt School, or Critical T h e o r y a l s o  shares the common motivation of making 
the economy work for people, rather than people work for the economy. The School is 
“bent on social transformation” and the liberation of the masses through the dialectical 
application of reason to the “present social process”.̂  ̂ This is most clearly illustrated in 
the early work of the school, particularly by Horkheimer and his thesis that “the economy 
is the first cause of poverty”.̂ * The primacy of the economy in the dominant 
development paradigm is well displayed by this representative quote from a federal judge 
in Argentina: “Life and physical integrity have no supremacy over economic interests.”^̂  
According to Horkheimer, the socially constructed world (society) in which individuals 
exist is the world of capital, i.e. is the capitalist system. The bourgeois economy -  
capitalism -  necessarily polarizes society, concentrating wealth and power amongst the 
few and ‘material and intellectual weakness’ amongst the many. In an observation from 
seventy years ago that is equally relevant today, Horkheimer notes that;
“Production is not geared to the life of the whole community while heeding also 
the claims of individuals; it is geared to the power-backed claims of individuals 
while being concerned hardly at all with the life of the community. This is the 
inevitable result, in the present property system, of the principle that it is enough 
for individuals to look out for themselves.”"***
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In a stinging condemnation of what this thesis characterizes as technocratic thought, he 
observes that “For the kind of thinking which simply registers facts there are always only 
a series of phenomena, never forces and counterforces; but this, of course, says 
something about this kind of thinking, not about nature.”'’*
This study shares these normative foundations of Critical Theory and its dialectical 
approach, while adopting an empirical methodology in order to critique capitalism. It 
also heeds the contrast that Critical Theory makes with the positivist approach, which, for 
instance, focuses on households as entities unconnected to a larger structural reality.
Early critical theory emphasizes materialism and concerns itself with the well-being of 
‘humankind’ within the material sphere, considering economic conditions to be 
responsible “for the totality of the established world and comprehended the social 
framework in which reality is organized.” However, critical theory is not limited by the 
disciplinary parameters of economics, as it claims “to explain the totality of man and his 
world in terms of his social being.”"’̂  The position of Marcuse is that the theory of 
society is economic and material, united by two normative assertions: 1) concern with 
human happiness and 2) “the conviction that it [happiness] can be attained only through a 
transformation of the material conditions of existence.” This project of transformation 
(development) is pursued “by analysis of economic and political conditions in the given 
historical situation.”'*̂  These aspects of the Frankfurt school presented here encapsulate 
most of the actual perspective taken in this study.
The other key early thinker whose seminal work is o f particular import in orienting the 
analysis of this thesis is Karl Polanyi.^^ He is considered to have recombined politics 
and economics, recognizing their interactive and dialectical nature, into what has become 
international political economy and world systems.'*  ̂ His conception of the ‘substantive 
economy’, as distinct from the ‘formal economy’, sees the former as the total socio­
economic process, and the resource base that supports it, of human activity for survival, 
wealth creation and distribution, while the latter is the much more limited conception of 
the economy as the reified market.
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The ‘market’ is not in fact a reified entity, although it is treated as such in neo-classical 
economics. All of the above authors are clear in their criticism of the distortions caused 
by this reification of the market. They are also unanimous, in keeping with Lukacs"*  ̂and 
his analysis of capitalism and its tendency to reify, that the market is very much a social 
construction, based on human relationships. This critique of the reified market and a 
clear articulation of the relationships that are its real foundation are extensively 
developed by the Regulation School."*’
On these foundations and with this critical disposition, there are three areas of 
development thought that I am examining with regards to the problematic of systemic 
vulnerability, hunger and disaster in Guatemala. First is disaster studies, then the field of 
hunger / famine / food insecurity and the political economy of development.
DISASTER STUDIES
The field of disaster studies is itself far from homogenous or without divisions. 
Alexander"*  ̂notes six different schools of disaster studies - the geographical, 
anthropological, sociological, development studies, epidemiological and the technical. 
Other categorizations of the study of disasters are broader and perhaps more useful in 
limiting the field to three approaches or foci -  those of the natural sciences, the applied 
sciences and the social sciences."*  ̂ The natural science approach includes those from the 
disciplines of geophysics, seismology, meteorology, and geology, which focus on the 
study of the natural phenomena -  such as volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, hurricanes -  
which are associated with ‘natural disasters’. The applied sciences advanced the study of 
disaster a step further by examining their impact upon human society, particularly in 
terms of physical infrastructure. These applied sciences had two main concerns -  
improving building materials and techniques (to better withstand natural phenomena) and 
estimating potential damages caused by exposure to violent natural phenomena. The 
natural and applied sciences approaches form the dominant discourse in disaster studies 
and are principally associated with the various national and international disaster 
agencies. All of these institutions focus on disaster and risk management, which, for 
them, consists of preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery activities.
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Mary Anderson, a World Bank consultant, is perhaps the most prominent disaster relief 
author and distinguishes the economics approach to disaster studies from both the applied 
and social sciences ones. It is thanks to her work that we have the empirical evidence 
that disaster prevention is in fact much more ‘cost effective’ than disaster preparedness, 
response and reconstruction.^'^ She, however, pushes beyond the technical and economic 
delimiting of the field of disaster studies that typifies the dominant managerial approach, 
into the social and political issues of disaster prevention.^’
The technologizing nature of disaster management, as opposed to prevention, is well 
illustrated in any text, practice handbook or policy guide. For example, the government 
of Canada defines mitigation as “sustained actions to reduce or eliminate the long-term 
impacts and risks associated with natural and human-induced disasters; activities that will 
reduce an area’s vulnerability to damage from disasters.”^̂  The Canadian Government 
sees three approaches to disaster management -  Risk Management; Knowledge Creation, 
Dissemination and Use; and Empowerment -  Shared Risks, Choices and Futures. These 
are all technical and managerial approaches that in no way address the social and political 
dimensions of vulnerability. This is also a major drawback of the Northern domination 
of the disaster studies agenda, in that it ‘assumes away’ social and political ‘externalities’ 
which are very real and of overriding importance, particularly in the South.
Another such technocratic example comes from the 1987 US proposal for an 
International Decade for Natural Hazard Reduction, in lieu of the International Decade 
for Natural Disaster Reduction (1989-1999). Developed by the National Research 
Council, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and the U.S. National Academy of 
Engineering, this proposal casts disasters as purely acts of God that can only be addressed 
through scientific means. Their outlook is encapsulated in the following passage from 
their proposal:
“The scientific and technical applications useful in mitigating the effects of
natural hazards include: building structures to withstand the actions of the
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hazards, preventing or changing the characteristics of hazards, predicting and 
warning of hazards, and identifying and avoiding sites where hazards are likely to 
strike most strongly. In addition, social strategies can mitigate the effects of 
hazards: restricting land use; developing emergency preparedness measures; 
spreading economic losses over a large population through insurance, taxation and 
monetary grants; and restructuring a community so that it is less vulnerable to 
hazards.”^̂
It is within the social sciences approach to the study of disasters that we see all of these 
elements and considerations tied together with the human element. This is seen 
specifically in the contribution of social sciences to the refinement of the concepts of 
vulnerability and risk.̂ "* Vulnerability is the condition and degree of being exposed to or 
endangered by a specific natural or human threat. It also expresses the capacity of a 
community to absorb shocks -  economic, climatic, or otherwise - caused by threats and 
also to recover from that shock or the actual disaster that it produces. Risk is, most 
simply, the potential damage of the confluence of a hazard with a situation of 
vulnerability to that hazard, or the probability of such an occurrence. Hazard is used 
interchangeably with threat and as such represents the various human-made and natural 
phenomena that affect a community in a deleterious manner.
The vital contribution of the social science approach generally, and the ‘disaster 
prevention school’ in particular, is the thesis that ‘disasters are not natural’. The 
proposition that disasters are socially created through human vulnerability was first 
advanced by Ian Davis.^^ However, it was not until 1983 when Fred Cuny and Kenneth 
Hewitt published their respective works. Disasters and Development and Interpretations 
o f Calamity that the position entered into wider circulation. The decisive work that 
questioned the very ‘naturalness’ of natural disasters, however, came from Anders 
Wijkman and Lloyd Timberlake in 1984.^^ While others have been identified with this 
position,^^ the banner is most prominently carried by La Red, the Network for the Social 
Study of Disaster Prevention in Latin America,^* with its flagship 1993 publication, the 
edited volume Los Désastres No Son Naturales (Disasters are not Natural).^^
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There are a number of components to the above thesis, the first being that there is no 
disaster without human involvement or presence to make it a disaster -  that they are 
entirely anthropocentric occurrences.^® Related to this is that there can be no disaster 
without a ‘community’ being vulnerable to the specific hazard that triggers that disaster. 
Their key point, however, is that vulnerability is itself socially constructed, or human- 
made. There are even some members of the disaster prevention school that argue that a 
number of ‘natural’ phenomena, like flooding and drought, are actually pseudo-natural in 
that they are caused by humanity’s impact on the environment and, as such, are ‘man- 
made’ rather than natural disasters.®* It is also important to note that this position is 
increasingly accepted by the international disaster community, as seen by this quote from 
John Twigg, and more importantly, its inclusion in the ISDR’s Global Review o f  Disaster 
Reduction Initiatives'.
“Strictly speaking, there are no such things as natural disasters, but there are 
natural hazards. A disaster is the result of a hazard’s impact on the society. So 
the effects of a disaster are determined by the extent of a community’s 
vulnerability to the hazard (or conversely, its ability, or capacity to cope with it). 
This vulnerability is not natural, but the result of an entire range of constantly 
changing physical, social, economic, cultural, political and even psychological 
factors that shape people’s lives and create the environments in which they live. 
‘Natural’ disasters are nature’s judgement on what humans have wrought.”®̂
It is also important to understand the school’s focus on prevention, as the reduction of 
vulnerability, rather than on disaster mitigation®^, preparedness, response or recovery.
The disaster prevention school (La Red) sees the symptoms of underdevelopment as 
conditions of vulnerability and risk. This underdevelopment reduces the coping capacity 
and resilience of a population. Disaster prevention means addressing these conditions of 
underdevelopment, poverty, unemployment, malnutrition, ill health, and general social, 
political and economic exclusion. It is this struggle, for development that is sustainable
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and inclusive, that is the best way to reduce vulnerability, risk and therefore prevent
disaster.̂ '̂
Returning to vulnerability, the disaster prevention school makes a number of other key 
points. First, vulnerability is tied to a lack of development and underdevelopment. 
Poverty is not a synonym for vulnerability, but is rather a condition of it.
“Vulnerability is a pervasive socio-economie condition; it is the reason why the 
poor and disadvantaged are the predominant victims of disasters. The day-to-day 
vulnerable condition, comprising marginalization, poverty and deprivation, is the 
context and cause of vulnerability to rarer and more extreme hazards; which 
themselves exaeerbate vulnerability to the day-to-day condition in their aftermath 
-  a cyclieal process.”^̂
The disaster prevention people have also found that, statistically, disasters ‘ehoose’ their 
victims from amongst the poor, both globally and locally. A disproportionate majority of 
the poor comprise the population of those affected by disasters, of any type. They also 
stress that eaeh famine is unique in terms of its causation, resulting from a time and spaee 
spécifié combination of dynamic interactive faetors. This is in keeping with the dominant 
Pressure and Release Model of disasters, where a progression of vulnerability factors, 
from root causes through dynamic pressures to unsafe conditions, are exposed to hazards 
that results in the disaster.
With the close of the International Deeade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) in 
1999, the disaster prevention school has come to dominate the spheres of poliey and 
action around the world. The most notable testament to this is the new consensus on 
disaster studies emerging out of the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction (UN/ISDR). The emphasis on vulnerability as the key factor in creating risk is 
now aeeepted, thereby emphasizing the social, or human, element in disaster creation. 
While not ignoring or neglecting in anyway the real teehnical issues arising from the 
natural and applied sciences, it grotmds them clearly in social, economic, cultural and
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political realities. This consensus is best illustrated in the newly accepted definitions for 
disaster terminology put forth by the ISDR (see Annex 1).^’ It is clearly summarized in 
the statement that “Environmentally unsound practices, global environmental changes, 
population growth, urbanization, social injustice, poverty and short-term economic vision 
are producing vulnerable societies.” *̂
The final tool for analysis that I am drawing from the disaster prevention school is that 
of global (in the holistic sense) vulnerability.®^ ‘Global vulnerability’ examines a 
complex, dynamic and changing process from the point of view of various different 
‘vulnerability factors’. Wilches-Chaux outlines eleven different yet interrelated aspects 
or angles of global vulnerability -  natural, physical, economic, social, political, technical, 
ideological, cultural, educational, ecological and institutional. It is the aggregate of these 
factors and the dynamics of their interactions, including a community’s capacity or 
incapacity to adequately respond to a risk, that constitutes global vulnerability. The 
division of vulnerability into separate ‘angles’ is for heuristic purposes only and they 
should not be taken as static elements, but as dynamic and interrelated features of a larger 
system.^® Global vulnerability is a framework for the comprehensive consideration of 
disasters, but is not an ‘explanation’ of them; like entitlement and interdependence, it is a 
model that guides analysis. The explanation lies in the focus on vulnerability and the 
emphasis on its social construction, through the processes of the political economy.
HUNGER, FAMINE AND FOOD (IN)SECURITY
The extensive literature on hunger, famine and food security has gone through a number 
of phases, with a number of different positions being championed, throughout its very 
long history. While literature on food and hunger certainly predates him, Thomas 
Malthus is the first key figure in the discourse on famine. His shadow continues to loom 
over food and environmental issues in development, demography and population studies, 
and is generally associated with neo-classical economics. He returned to the fore of the 
food security debate in the 1960s and 1970s amidst the fear of food crisis that spawned 
the neo-Malthusians, most prominently represented by the Club of Rome, Lester Brown 
and the World Watch Institute, and Paul Ehrlich. At roughly the same time, a counter
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discourse arose in preparation for the World Food Summit of 1974. The earliest 
proponents of this critical position were Susan George, Francis Moore-Lappe and Joseph 
Collins.
The late 1970s and 1980s saw a further evolution of these positions and divisions, 
including the emergence of a dominant policy paradigm.^* Nef and Vanderkop^^ describe 
this dominant paradigm as generally neo-Malthusian and informed by neo-classical 
growth-oriented economics. There is a clearly identifiable range of opinion in this 
dominant policy group, from a conservative pessimism to a liberal reformist outlook. In 
addition to the Neo-Malthusians mentioned above, the group broadly includes such 
institutions as the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAQ), the World 
Food Programme (WFP), the World Bank and the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI), as well as the authors associated with them.
Many within the policy school do indeed cross the illusory boundaries that circumscribe 
the group of authors that I am classifying as liberal reformists. However, for the sake of 
classification, this dividing line is drawn according to institutional affiliation. This is to 
say that those authors who belong to the aforementioned institutions form the dominant 
policy school. Those that are not attached to these organizations and not explicitly 
opposed to their views are considered either neo-Malthusians or liberal reformists. Those 
that are opposed to the positions of the dominant school, or the limitations that they place 
on analysis and action, are hereafter considered as the critical school, of which the ‘New 
Famine School’ is a particular branch.
The critical school, taking a largely systemic or political economy approach to food and 
hunger issues, as opposed to the technical orientation of the dominant policy paradigm, 
flourished in the 1980s, albeit in the margins. However, by the time of the 1996 World 
Food Summit, this critical school was rather less prolific than previously, particularly 
given the expanded liberal reformist element of the dominant policy paradigm and the 
rising ‘human right to food’ approach. As well, the academic study of the Sahelian 
famines of the 1980s, and the continued occurrence of Sub-Saharan African famines in
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the 1990s saw the rise of the ‘New Famine’ school. Continuing in the critical and 
political economy approach tradition, although with no apparent connection to the 
previous proponents of the critical approach, this new group of scholars come largely 
from a humanitarian practice perspective and seem to be reacting, in large part, to the 
incompleteness of the analysis of even the liberal reformists in the dominant policy 
paradigm. All of these authors emphatically contest the definition of famine, particularly 
it being solely applied to mass mortality.
Malthus and the Neo-Malthusian Fear of Scarcity
The well-known thesis of Thomas Malthus in his 1798 Essay on the Principle o f  
Population is that the human population increases geometrically while our capacity for 
food production increases only arithmetically. As such, population control mechanisms 
are required to check population growth to keep them in balance with the productive 
capacity of the earth. Famine, along with war and disease, is such a check -  a 
purportedly natural one, which will occur when any population expands beyond its means 
to feed itself. Thus are we presented with the economic fear of scarcity and the inherent 
limits to growth imposed upon us by our environment. However, both of Malthus’ 
premises have been proven wrong. Food production, due to technology, is not limited to 
increasing arithmetically and famine does not actually curb population growth beyond the 
short term. Within two decades of the Chinese famine that accompanied the Great Leap 
forward, claiming 30 million lives, the population growth trend had not only recovered 
but increased. The 3 to 4 million lives lost in Bangladesh in 1973-1974 were entirely 
replaced within two years.’  ̂ Regardless of his false assertions, Malthus continues to 
inform the debate on famine and hunger in a number of ways.
The first impact of Malthus is less obvious, although far more widespread for its subtlety. 
As Alex De Waal^‘* explains, apart from the debate that Malthus initiated surrounding 
famine as the ‘great population leveller’ is his conception of famine as mass mortality 
starvation that has been even more enduring, distorting and difficult to defeat. De Waal 
considers Malthus to be the turning point in the English language with regards to 
solidifying the definition of famine, thereby ignoring the eomplexity and
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interconnectedness of hunger and poverty issues by focusing solely on but one of the end 
results of these processes -  death.
Malthus returned to the fore of the food security debate in the 1960s and 1970s amidst the 
fear of food crisis that spawned the neo-Malthusians, most prominently represented by 
the Club of Rome, Lester Brown and the World Watch Institute, and Paul Ehrlich. The 
1970s were filled with reports to the Club of Rome, pessimistically decrying the 
imminent doom facing mankind. Of particular note with regards to food were The Limits 
to Growth and Mankind at the Turning Point. The other doomsayer, and simultaneous 
champion of the green revolution is Lester Brown and his World Watch Institute. Garrett 
Hardin and his ‘lifeboat ethics’ was another key figure in the population crisis literature, 
while Paul Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb (1968) is a classic neo-Malthusian goad.
There are four main lines of argument, all stemming from population growth, that arise 
out of the neo-Malthusian camp. The first is that population growth creates excess 
demand that cannot be satisfied by production. The second is that ‘death control’ has 
outpaced birth control, creating demographic surpluses. The third is that population 
density becomes too great for the land to support and the final is that population growth 
outpaces economic growth, resulting in diminishing per capita returns. The result of all 
these demographic pressures caused by ‘surplus population’ is famine.
Oddly, the more salient points arising from these positions are actually advanced by 
critics explicitly opposed to Malthusian views. In proving each of them false, worthwhile 
insight has been gained, particularly with regards to points three and four. The issue of 
population density -  compare Holland with Sudan and its 8 people per square kilometer -  
is patently not the cause of famine. However, the concentration of land in the hands of a 
few makes this Neo-Malthusian argument ‘effective’ by tying a specific (poor) 
population to the actual land resources to which they have access for survival. This, then, 
is not a demographic issue but purely one of the distribution of power and wealth within a 
society.
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Further examination of how population growth undermines economic growth shows how 
there are valid points there as well. Firstly, a growing population, which is by definition 
younger, is also dependent on adults, without immediately increasing the labour and 
income generating force of the household. It can also lead to the fragmentation and 
micro-parcelization of land by peasants, which eventually undermines production.
Thirdly, it decreases the share of national income going to labour, while also increasing 
the surplus labour supply, which further dampens or reduces wages. However, none of 
these are simply demographic laws, but rather they are issues of the political economy 
and how it is structured.
Finally, famine and hunger policy that is informed more directly and exclusively by neo- 
Malthusian thought tends to be very Darwinian. Such policy positions include the ‘let the 
weak die’ position that is the unstated complement of ‘the survival of the fittest’. It also 
encompasses the ‘triage’ approach of aiding those most likely to survive and thrive. Also 
included is the ‘lifeboat ethics’ position, that trying to save everyone will only sink the 
boat, killing everyone instead of leaving a few to survive. The other non-Darwinian 
policy position stemming fi-om Neo-Malthusian thought is to reduce Northern 
consumption. This position, however, has the weakness of ignoring the problem of 
entitlement and effective demand, inherent in the capitalist global economic system 
emanating from the North.
The Dominant Policy Approach
The policy approach differentiates itself from the main line of Malthusian reasoning 
largely through its appropriation of the work of Amartya Sen and the entitlement 
approach (see below). This change in direction also represents a shift towards the more 
liberal reformist approach that dominates the policy paradigm. However, as will be noted 
in the criticisms from the New Famine School, this policy paradigm continues to be 
heavily influenced by the neo-Malthusians and in fact only represents a partial break with 
previous food supply concerns.
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This is in large part because the authors of food security’s dominant policy school, with 
their scientific, technocratic and very apolitical approach, are responding to the inevitable 
crisis foreseen by the neo-Malthusians. Their collective answer to Malthus is that 
technological innovation, such as the Green Revolution and now Genetically Modified 
Organisms (GMOs) and their associated industrial inputs, can produce more than enough 
food to meet demand. As such, their analysis is informed by supply side economic 
analysis, while Sen’s is largely demand side. The central institution behind this approach 
is the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), as well as the bulk of the 
organizations of the United Nations system, in particular the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and 
the World Food Programme. The most prominent authors circulating between these 
institutions and representing this approach include Alberto Valdes^^, Per Pinstrup- 
Andersen^’, Uwe Kracht, Manfred Schultz^^ and, especially, Joachim von Braun.
The orthodox common line of all these authors and institutions is that food security is a 
technical issue, which can be solved by science and technology. They have adopted the 
household and micro-level as their primary focus of concern, effectively co-opting the 
entitlement approach (see Sen below). The household is also the main level at which 
they acknowledge social and political concerns as being food security issues, especially 
the concept of gender. It is worth noting that increasing scholarship from within the 
dominant policy school has indicated that presumed disparities and vulnerability along 
gender lines and for children are generally false or that there is no universal 
generalization that can be made regarding specifically vulnerable groups, aside from 
pregnant mothers.*® For those that do in fact acknowledge structural issues of power 
beyond the household, they still fail to address them at the policy level. This household 
entitlement emphasis now complements the earlier (and continued, particularly for the 
FAO) focus on aggregate levels of food availability, usually measured in calories (and 
sometimes protein) available per person for the country in question. Previous 
mainstream acceptance of land reform as a policy option is strictly denied by the current 
dominant policy school.
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Other key figures and positions include Martin Ravallion*^ of the World Bank, who is the 
chief proponent of the thesis that market failure is the cause of famine. This is contrasted 
with the position of the Bank itself, which, since the mid-1980s, has considered hunger to 
be a problem of purchasing power. Also straddling the line between the dominant
policy school and the category of liberal reformism are the proponents of ‘food as a 
human right’, with Asbjom Eide*  ̂being the most notable representative. While 
technically and repeatedly enshrined and invoked in various United Nations charters, 
declarations and conventions, the right to adequate food and the right to be free from 
hunger continue to be ephemeral as there are no mechanisms for enforcement of that 
right. This is even the case for most of the twenty-two nations, including Guatemala, that 
have enshrined the right to food in their constitutions.
Liberal Reformists
No theorist on famine and hunger in the twentieth century looms larger than Amartya 
Sen. His Poverty and Famines (1981) represents the seminal work in this field and in 
large part shapes the dominant policy paradigm from that point on, differentiating it from 
the neo-Malthusians. With the opening lines of Poverty and Famines he dispels the 
Malthusian emphasis on food availability and makes hunger and famine issues of access 
to food. As he explains, “Starvation is the characteristic of not having enough food to eat. 
It is not the characteristic of there being not enough food to eat.” (Original emphasis) Sen 
effectively defeats the food supply emphasis of Malthus through demonstrating that 
hunger and famine are issues of ‘effective demand’ or access. Using the ‘entitlement 
approach’ he elaborates how people acquire food, or fail to do so, through four 
entitlement mechanisms: trade-based, production-based; own-labour entitlement; and 
transfer entitlement.*'*
The first involves selling or trading what one owns in order to acquire food, the second 
producing ones own food, the third working for wages with which one can then acquire 
food or working directly for payment in food itself, and the final being food that is 
willingly given to someone, through inheritance, aid, charity or other similar channel.
Sen further explains how these entitlements revolve around two concerns -  what one
36
owns (property, labour power, etc.) and what one can effectively exchange what s/he 
owns for, called exchange entitlement. He lists five “influences that determine a person’s 
exchange entitlement”:
1) whether he can find an employment, and if so for how long and at what wage 
rate;
2) what he can earn by selling his non-labour assets, and how much it costs him 
to buy whatever he may wish to buy;
3) what he can produce with his own labour power and resources (or resource 
services) he can buy and manage;
4) the cost of purchasing resources (or resource services) and the value of the 
produces he can sell;
5) the social security benefits he is entitled to and the taxes, etc. he must pay.”*̂
Thus, Sen is clearly concerned with market and exchange based economies and how one 
is able to satisfy their basic needs within those market-based systems.
Sen also states “Famines imply starvation, but not vice versa. And starvation implies 
poverty, but not vice versa.”^̂  It is in large part exactly this relationship that I am 
exploring -  how poverty leads to starvation and famine and therefore understanding 
famine as a result of the impoverishment of people. However, it is the process of 
immiseration that is of concern to me in this study, demonstrating how the ‘abstract’ 
workings of the political economy create poverty, hunger and death.
The importance of Sen’s work is several fold. He exposes the Neo-Malthusian argument 
of excess population exceeding ‘the means of subsistence’ as false and also dismisses the 
traditional conception of famine as a natural disaster due to food production failure. By 
demonstrating that access, rather than availability, is the key issue, he also:
1 ) “stressed the need to examine each famine in its own particularity” -  he presented 
not a general theory of famine but a framework for examining famines
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2) moved the object of consideration from macro populations to individuals and 
households
3) “focused attention on relationships. In order to understand starvation it is 
necessary to look at the structure of ownership relations and other forms of 
entitlement relations within any particular society.”*̂
Further, in addition to dealing with Malthusian pessimism, he also draws attention to the 
even more serious dangers of Malthusian optimism. “In focusing attention on the 
extremely misleading variable of food output per head, ‘Malthusian optimist’ has been 
indirectly involved in millions of deaths which have resulted from the inaction and 
misdirection of government policy.”** The underlying problem with such a macro level 
approach is the assumption that food supply is in fact distributed evenly, which, given the 
distribution of wealth and consumption patterns, we know is patently not the case.
With all of this. Sen disproves what he termed the Food Availability Decline (FAD) 
argument that characterizes the dominant policy approach, supplanting it with his own 
Food Entitlement Decline (FED) explanation of the causation of famine. While there 
have been many critics of Sen’s work (see the New Famine School below), he is 
responsible for revolutionizing the conception and study of hunger and famine. His later 
work has extended the entitlements approach further into the area of political economy by 
arguing for the role of democracy, through the accountability of free elections and a free 
and functioning press, as they together function as famine prevention measures.*^ 
Together with his collaborator Jean Dreze,^® Sen is the main representative of the liberal 
reformist approach to food security.
The Critical Approach
The critical school, taking a largely systemic or political economy approach to food and 
hunger issues, as opposed to the technical orientation of the dominant policy paradigm, 
flourished in the 1980s, albeit in the margins. Susan George and her work with the Trans 
National Institute^\ and Frances Moore-Lappe and Joseph Collins and their ‘Food First’ 
Institute for Food and Development P o l i c y S o l o n  Barraclough, the Land Tenure
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Centre and the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD)^^, 
both of which he at one time headed, represent this school into the 1990s, along with 
other authors such as Brewster Kneen, '̂  ̂James Bakker,^^ Jorge Nef^ and Keith Griffin^^. 
However, by the time of the 1996 World Food Summit, this critical school was rather less 
prolific, particularly given the expanded liberal reformist element of the dominant policy 
paradigm and the rising ‘human right to food’ approach. The rise of Genetically 
Modified Organisms has also supplanted the general issue of hunger in the debates, as 
this particular ‘cure’ brings with it an even wider array of biological, social, legal, 
economic and political problems.
The very political economy approach of these writers to hunger led them to either larger 
or more specific issues within the political economy of development, all of which were in 
some way related to hunger and famine, although this ceased to be their focus. Among 
the first tendency, George and Food First both have become increasingly involved in 
globalization and issues of transnational corporate dominance.^* Nef has continued to 
develop the idea of human securi ty.Along the other trend, Latin Americanist’s such as 
Barraclough (who did indeed begin in the agrarian field) and Brockett have focused on 
land and land tenure issues.
Barraclough offers a definition of food security that usefully expands on the official 
definition of the FAO. Their policy definition sees food security as “all people, at all 
times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food 
that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”*®®
For Barraclough and Scott, “Food security can be defined as assured access by all social 
groups and individuals to food adequate in quantity and quality, to meet nutritional needs. 
A food system offering security should have five characteristics:
1) capacity to produce, store and import sufficient food to meet current and 
expanding basic food needs for all;
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2) maximum autonomy and self-determination, reducing vulnerability to 
international market fluctuations and political pressures (without implying 
autarchy);
3) reliability, such that seasonal, cyclical and other variations in access to food 
are minimal;
4) sustainability such that the ecological system is protected and improved over 
time;
5) equity: meaning, as a minimum, dependable access to adequate food for all 
social groups.”*̂*
They also discuss food autonomy and self-determination, which they liken to 
dependency, in that they are concerned with “power relationships and the presence of 
alternatives”. This is seen through examining “the importance of food-system imports, 
such as food and other agricultural products, and of agricultural inputs in relation to food- 
system exports.”*®̂
Keith Griffin, the Oxford Economist, writes specifically to challenge the technocratic 
approach of IFPRI and their position “that accelerated growth of food production will 
suffice to eliminate malnutrition and acute poverty in the Third World.”*®̂ In a form 
reminiscent of Sen’s clarification of famine being the condition of not having enough 
food, rather then there not being enough food, Griffin makes the point that “there is no 
world food problem, but there is a problem of hunger in the world.”'®"* While related, 
food and hunger are not the same issue -  an increase in the amount of food in and of 
itself is never sufficient to fully address the issue of hunger. Similarly, self-sufficiency is 
not necessarily or even always the answer. His central position is that “The fundamental 
cause of hunger, then, is the poverty of specific groups of people, not a general shortage 
of food. In simple terms, what distinguishes the poor from others is that they do not have 




There is some overlap between what I am terming the “New Famine School”*®̂ and some 
of the authors mentioned above. In particular, I am referring to the role of Sen in 
providing a fundamental starting point for the New Famine School, and the quasi­
inclusion of Von Braun and Patrick Webb as the central famine theorists of the dominant 
policy school, which is where 1, and those of the New Famine School, continue to 
classify them. Amongst the identifiable tenets of the New Famine School is the position, 
in keeping with Sen, that each famine is unique. However, from there they diverge in 
terms of an actual definition of famine, noting Sen’s resistance to offer a definition. Von 
Braun has no such compunction, stating “A famine is a catastrophic disruption of the 
social, economic and institutional systems that provide for food production, distribution 
and consumption.” ®̂̂ In sorting through the multitude of definitions from the various 
literatures, Devereux proposes a definition from Walker as the most adequate to 
accommodate the complexity of the issue and diversity of opinions. Although it is an 
‘outsider’ perspective,’®* this definition sees that:
“famine is a socio economic process which causes the accelerated destitution of 
the most vulnerable, marginal and least powerful groups in a community, to a 
point where they can no longer, as a group, maintain a sustainable livelihood.”’®®
Thus, the alternative approach is in direct contrast and even opposition to the 
understanding of famine presented by Von Braun, in that famine is not simply an 
externally generated event that arrives and disrupts some natural state of harmony. As 
we will see, famine itself is the catastrophic product of the social, economic and 
institutional systems that provide for production, distribution and consumption. Their 
tendency is to disrupt access to food for the vulnerable -  the poor and marginalized.
The first key contributor to the New Famine School is Amrita Rangasami” ® who 
contested Sen by asserting that “mortality is not a necessary condition of famine but only 
its biological culmination. Famine should be seen as a protracted politico-social- 
economic process of oppression comprising three stages: dearth, famishment and
41
mortality. The culmination of the process comes long before the final stage of disease 
and death. If the process is halted before people die, it is nonetheless still a famine. 
Second, famine cannot be defined solely with reference to the victims. The process is 
one in which ‘benefits accrue to one section of the community while losses flow to the 
other’. To study only the responses or coping strategies of victims, while paying no 
attention to the action (or inaction) of the rest of the conununity is to miss what is going 
on.""'
Keen"^ picks up on this last point examining the beneficiaries of famine, and their 
strategies in his The Benefits o f  Famine: A Political Economy o f  Famine and Relief in 
Southwestern Sudan, 1983-1989. Jenny Edkins goes even further, stating that famines 
and their outcomes “are enormously beneficial to the perpetrators: they are a success not 
a failure, a normal output of the current economic and political system, not an 
aberration.’’"^ She is particularly radical in arguing that famines are “acts of mass- 
starvation committed” by persons that must be brought to justice for their 
responsibility,"'* differing from Devereux who merely contends that “famines occur 
because they are not prevented: they are allowed to happen.”"^ Again, Edkins position is 
that “It is also unfortunately the case that famines occur because they are made to 
happen.”"^ In keeping with the disaster prevention approach, she also believes that “[t]o 
treat mass starvations as political processes is to pay attention to them as processes that 
involve relationships between people (not just between persons and commodities, as in 
entitlements theory). Social relations are inevitably power relations.”' "  She concludes 
that:
“In many, if not most cases, they (famines) are the result of deliberate actions by 
people who can see what the consequences of those actions will be. If they 
(famines) are not produced deliberately, then they are often allowed to progress 
beyond the sate of ‘famishment’ to that of ‘morbidity’ through deliberate or 
negligent inaction on the part of those who could intervene to save lives and 
livelihoods.”"*
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Elsewhere, Edkins argues “that famines are a product of modernity and specifically a part 
of modernity’s transformation of political action and participation into biopolitics.”*
She defines this latter concept as the biological reductionism of technocratic approaches 
to hunger and poverty, which see food as nothing other than “fuel for the human 
organism”. It is a struggle for power where the object of politics is “the biological 
existence of human beings”.
Alex De Waal is another key figure in the ‘school’ initially questioning the definition of 
famine and the entire ‘northern’ or aid agency approach, which considered famine a 
discrete event, in favour of ‘local’ and much more appropriate conceptions of famine.*^* 
He explores in great depth the different conceptions and definitions of famine with the 
particular aim, in keeping with Rangasami, of detaching famine from its sole coneeption 
as a mass mortality event. He has subsequently proceeded along similar lines with 
Edkins in establishing that “famine is caused by failures of political accountability”.*̂ ^
He also makes the point that hunger, destitution and death are not simply “stages through 
which famine victims pass, but rather three eo-present aspects of famine, with complex 
interactions.”*̂ ^
The central figure of the New Famine School, however, is Stephen Devereux. His 
Theories o f Famine (1993) and “Famine in the 20*** Century” (2000) are the central 
compilations of famine thinking and incidence, respectively. His explanation of famines 
identifies two ‘explanation clusters’ -  those concerned with ‘trigger factors’ and 
‘underlying causes’, noting that most famines “can be explained as the complex product 
of a combination of both ‘technical’ and ‘political’ issues.”*̂"* In addressing the 
Malthusian ‘population monster’ he notes “rapid population growth and famine are 
linked more closely to their common causes, poverty and vulnerability, than to each 
other.”*̂  ̂ Another key observation that illustrates the complexity of famine as a process 
is that “Rationing food consumption is an immediate and universal response of the poor 
to livelihood shocks.”*̂  ̂ Finally, his conclusion is that “Any serious effort to reduce a 
community’s vulnerability to famine requires a more fundamental attack on the social, 
economic and political mechanisms which generate poverty and inequality”.*̂ ’ Along
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with De Waal and Edkins, Devereux sees famine as an intensely and inseparably political 
issue.
‘Hidden famines’ are another extremely important and particularly relevant concept 
discussed by Michel Garenne. He presents these hidden famines as revealed through the 
detailed examination of census and death records, noting that they can and do occur 
during peacetime, with no ‘exceptional’ circumstances (like drought or war), such that 
the famine is not ‘detected’ until after the fact, if at all. In his study of Madagascar he 
finds that liberalization of domestic food production and markets after state regulation 
was the underlying cause of famine, concluding “It seems that the combination of poor 
economic policies together with extensive poverty was the main immediate reason for the 
famine.”*̂ *
The third element in famine theorizing, in addition to definition and identification of 
components, is that of famine typology. Early typologies divided famines according to 
their causes -  economic, natural (environmental), political and social. De Waal also 
sees four types of famines in our current era -  pastoral, agrarian/smallholder, class- 
based/ occupational and wartime. Gazdar presents another useful classification of 
famines as pre-modem, modem and post-modem where:
“‘Pre-modem’ famine refers to the breakdown of modem administrative and 
market institutions, leading to a sharp decline in local food availability. Situations 
where food entitlement failures occur within the context of functioning modem 
institutions have been labeled as ‘modem’ famine. ‘Post-modem’ famine refers to 
excess mortality in spite of protected food entitlements but due to non-food crises: 
notably, the stresses of macro shocks on relatively sophisticated health and 
welfare systems.” '̂ *
Similarly, Sylvia Brunei offers a “Typology of famines in relation to intemational politics 
and the intemational aid business.
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1) famines ‘hidden’ by local political powers, primarily to avoid criticism of their 
own policies
2) famines ‘exposed’ by political leaders, in order to maximize the amount of food 
relief and intemational aid, which may also be used for other purposes
3) famines ‘created’ by political groups, in order to provoke intemational aid -  aid 
on which some guerilla movements are totally dependent”^̂ ^
All of these latter concepts extend and combine with the earlier work and ideas of the 
critical school, providing a useful and holistic link between the technical issues of food 
security and the stmctural factors arising from the political economy. As Devereux 
notes, the complexity of explaining famines, their interdisciplinary (or multifaceted) 
nature and the confusion surrounding triggers and vulnerability (or underlying and 
proximate causes) confounds famine theorizing. The retum to complexity and synthetic 
holism is both usefid and needed. However, given that these developments are lead by 
Von Braun, there is clear need for a non-apolitical approach to complex systems. In 
this way the disaster prevention school approach to vulnerability succinct, unified and 
politically informed framework for analysis. Thus, by combining the logic of disaster 
prevention, with the concepts from hunger, famine and food security, they can all be 
fruitfully tied together with the underlying elements of the political economy for the 
analysis of hunger and vulnerability.
Food Security in Conclusion
The main divisions between the different perspectives summarized above is not so much 
their conception or perception of hunger and malnutrition -  although there are and have 
been heated technical debates on various issues -  but rather on the levels of analysis at 
which they are addressing hunger and its causes, and correspondingly, the policies and 
strategies that they elicit to confront the problem. Regardless of the depth or extension of 
the political analysis on hunger, there are real technical issues, just as whatever the 
technical issues, there is a much larger and multifaceted context in which the concrete 
situation is located. The problem, or conflict of perspectives, stems from the delimitation 
of that context. That delimitation more often than not follows ideological lines, as there
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is no rational reason to limit the scope of analysis, although there are reasons of 
expediency for doing so.
This is particularly true when it comes to action -  it is always easier to mobilize to 
address symptoms of a problem than to identify its root causes and undertake the 
structural changes required to stop a crisis and further, prevent it from reoccurring. This 
generalization is also characteristic of development thinking and policy -  that which 
dominates is that which is most easily oriented towards concrete action. This has the 
political ramifications of maintaining the status quo, through patching the leaks where 
ever they spring up, as opposed to refitting the boat or changing its course so that it no 
longer suffers fi-om these leaks. The Washington Consensus (see below) is a clear and 
straightforward policy agenda that ignores larger or complex contextual issues, including 
the ramifications of its direct prescriptions in different settings. Similarly, the dominant 
food security approach is a one-size-fits-all, growth through new and increased 
technology answer that does not listen to the different questions that are asked. Even 
while this approach has become increasingly sensitive to local and cultural realities, it 
continues to willfully ignore the structural terrain and analysis presented by the more 
critical approaches. The policy people are at the tiller and refuse to change course.
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT
The political economy of development is considered by some “to constitute a synthesis of 
modernization and dependency approaches.”^̂"̂ As such it serves as both an approach to 
development and a field of thought in which the sum total of development thinking is at 
play. As a comprehensive review of the past half-century of development thinking and 
critical social science is somewhat beyond the scope of this both this chapter section and 
the entire thesis, I will here only touch on the key ideas and concepts that I am bringing 
to bear upon the structural causes of hunger and famine in Guatemala. These include 
political economy as an approach, and some of the larger issues of development as a 
western project of capitalist expansion and integration into the global economic system, 
including the blurry line between what is considered development and what is called 
globalization. More specifically, I outline the concept of the global division of labour
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and power, the interdependenee of the eurrent world system and the mutual vulnerability 
and insecurity that both generate.
Political economy provides holism both in the approach to development and in the 
conception of what is in fact the object of study. As Collinson explains, the political 
economy approach provides more than a mere static contextual analysis, but a fuller 
dynamie and historically informed conception of a situation that aceounts for power, 
vulnerability and change in these factors and their distribution amongst actors.*^^ This 
includes both micro, meso and macro levels of analysis and their interaetion with each 
other, connecting global processes to local realities and vice versa.
The field of politieal eeonomy, at least its critieal wings, sees ‘the problem’ as being or 
emanating from the system itself. The post-development literature*^’ is very clear in its 
condemnation of development as a Western or Northern project designed to incorporate 
the South into its global capitalist system.*^* This criticism is no less the case, and by no 
means any less emphatic, for the collected works of structural development thinkers, 
from Marx to the present, with their emphasis on economic domination by the eapitalist 
centre. From this Post-development group, Rist offers a very pointed definition of 
development:
“‘Development’ consists of a set of practices, sometimes appearing to eonflict 
with one another, which require -  for the reproduction of society -  the general 
transformation and destruction of the natural environment and of social relations. 
Its aim is to increase the production of commodities (goods and services) geared, 
by way of exchange, to effective demand.”*"***
The latter, particularly the dependencistas, have been equally clear in their consideration 
of development (as it has been realized in practice) as nothing other imperialism.*"** This 
has also been the thesis of more recent criticism against globalization.*"*  ̂ In the latter 
case, this position has the secondary implication of reducing globalization to the current 
‘state of capitalist development’ (i.e. the name of capitalism’s current stage, also called
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‘late capitalism’ or ‘monopoly capitalism’) and to some extent dismissing the 
‘development versus globalization’ debate*"*̂  as erroneous. Both these fields of literature, 
the Post-development and the structural, are also clear on the mechanisms of 
incorporation into the global economic system -  debt, structural adjustment, ‘free trade’, 
liberalization and privatization, foreign direct investment -  and their very negative 
impacts, particularly upon those that are already the most marginalized.
James Mittelman*"̂ "* presents us with the Global Division of Labour and Power (GDLP), 
where he elaborates beyond the core-periphery simplicity of the New Intemational 
Division of Labour̂ "^  ̂as well as overcoming its economism by integrating power and 
culture into the analysis. He focuses on the regional elements of ‘globalization’, 
disputing its totalizing influence by emphasizing its construction and promotion, led by 
the US, of regional blocs, following the neoliberal agenda, and thereby weaving a larger 
tapestry of globalization, one piece at a time. He also notes that, at certain levels, this 
new regionalism is also a reaction against globalization, however he is clear in asserting 
that both régionalisation and globalization provide spaces for US hegemony.
Specifically, the GDLP sees globalization as “a syndrome of processes and activities”*'*̂ 
consisting of an unequal global division of labour and power, ‘new regionalism’ and 
subsequent resistance that furthers an agenda of power and wealth, and their 
concentration in the hands of a transnational elite. Further, it is a phase of capitalism, 
sharing ‘continuities and discontinuities’ with past phases.*'** He presents the ‘courtesan 
state’ as a policy direction that has been adopted, or forced upon, most states, as they 
attend to the interests of transnational capital.*'*  ̂ This is coupled with the ‘polyarchy’ of 
institutionalist democracy and its elite oriented complementarity with neoliberalism 
where “[t]he liberal-economic conceptualization of globalization allows for tolerance of 
social inequality.. .”*̂** In keeping with the structuralist and post-development 
perspectives, he sees that “globalization is an attempt to achieve the utopia of freeing the 
market from social and political control.”*̂* One final concern that he voices is that 
“Sponsored by powerful interests as a form of cooptation, the concept of civil society 
may be promoted as an aspect of neoliberal ideology that constrains the state”. *̂ ^
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For Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye/^^ the political scientists that brought us the concept 
of ‘complex interdependence’, their understanding of ‘globalization’ is that of an 
increasing and diverse series of asymmetrical linkages. This ‘tapestry’ of 
interdependence -  which means mutual dependence (the quality “of being determined or 
significantly affected by external forces”*̂ '̂ ) -  creates both sources of power (leverage) as 
well as weaknesses for all parties. It is largely a critique on, or expansion of, realist 
conceptions of power based solely on military might, by illuminating other ‘liberal’ 
avenues of ‘power’ in intemational relations. Their model is very much an analytical 
one, as opposed to being interpretive,*^^ which provides us with the concepts of 
sensitivity and vulnerability (of nation states) in intemational political economy. These 
two terms express the relative severity of the negative impacts of interdependence. *
The result of the unrestricted growth of this interdependent capitalist world system 
however, is mutual vulnerability and human insecurity in both the north and south.*^’
Structural Adjustment
The best that can be said about stmctural adjustment, in terms of food security, is that 
“Food production has increased in some stmcturally adjusted economies.” This 
observation, and the studies supporting it, fail to demonstrate how stmctural adjustment 
in those economies have in fact contributed to that increase. It is more an issue of those 
production increases being in spite of stmctural adjustment. An equally erroneous 
observation is that “Stmctural adjustment can have positive effects on food security in the 
long run.”*̂ * When hunger and the famine process are impinging on survival in the 
present, the long-run is irrelevant. However, in spite of these observations by DeRose 
and her colleagues, they concede that stmctural adjustment is one of the main factors in 
creating food insecurity.
Courade,*^° on the other hand, is clear in his condemnation of stmctural adjustment and 
its policies of liberalization as a source of food insecurity. The socio-economic and 
political inequalities that adjustment and liberalization further exacerbate are, for him, the 
roots of both poverty and food insecurity. Even Pinstmp-Andersen concedes “that
49
adjustment policies either had negative nutritional effects or were unable to counter 
negative effects caused by other factors.”^̂ ’
Structural Adjustment and Neoliberalism in Latin America
The Washington Consensus -  first coined by economist John Williamson in 1989 -  is 
considered the guiding policy agenda of neoliberalism. While there is a lack of 
consensus regarding what exactly comprises the Washington C o n sen su s/th e  ten 
prescriptions that Williamson^^^ cites are representative of its scope and direction:
1) Fiscal discipline
2) Redirect public expenditure
3) Tax reform
4) Financial liberalization
5) Adopt a single, competitive exchange rate
6) Trade liberalization
7) Eliminate barriers to foreign direct investment
8) Privatize state owned enterprises
9) Deregulate market entry and competition
10) Ensure secure property rights
In spite of the economic, social, and political crises affecting Central America, this 
agenda, as advanced collectively by USAID, the IMF and the IBD, had been widely 
implemented in the 1980s. “Deliberate deregulation has been largely confined to prices 
and wages, the financial sector, and the surrender of control implied by privatization.”’̂ '̂  
Moves have also been made to simplify bureaucratic procedures, but overall deregulation 
has been sporadic and unsystematic. However, the problems arising from the subsidizing 
of Export Processing Zones (EPZs) and Non-Traditional Agricultural Exports (NTAEs) 
are being noted, even by members of the Washington agencies that are promoting the 
C onsensus .T here  are none, at least amongst those that concern themselves with the 
rigors of reality, which would deny that neoliberal structural adjustment has been, in the 
best of cases, problematic for Latin America. There are many that consider it to be an 
outright disaster.
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Class, Social Groups and Domination
With the attack on ‘the great narratives’ generally, and Marxism in any of its forms 
specifically, by both neoliberalism and post-modernism, class has been largely removed 
from or ‘toned down’ in intellectual discourse. Where it is seen, it is considered an 
indicator of the unreformed ideological allegiance of the author. Seabrook argues that the 
sterile ‘politically correct’ term that has replaced class is ‘inequality’ -  a statistical 
concept devoid of people and relationships. There has been a systematic, simultaneous 
mutually self-reinforcing attack on both the working class and the entire concept of class 
itself. This latter attack has used ‘identity politics’ as the principle mechanism for that 
attack.
Further, what remains of the (popular) conception of class has moved from Marx’s 
emphasis on production, through Weber’s emphasis on both production and consumption, 
to become purely an issue of consumption as the determinant of identity. At the same 
time, capitalism enshrines the insecurity of the class that depends on its own labour 
power, effectively ‘disappearing’ this issue from the realm of class considerations. 
Seabrook argues that there are two consequences of this shift to consumption and 
inequality. The first is that, tautologically, growth becomes the answer to the poverty 
found in inequality and globalization is dissolving national class structures and 
reconstituting them on the global level, where the generation of wealth is creating a 
global, yet fragmented, working class.
However, there are two specific issues of class that are of concern to this study -  the 
peasantry and its proletarianization, and the fractions of the bourgeoisie. Specifically, it 
is concerned with the class dynamics, particularly concerning these two groups, in an 
agrarian society. Although modernizing, the socio-economic and political hierarchy is 
entirely based and derived from the very vertical structure of this agrarian society. 
‘Modem’ class fractions continue to exist and function within the agrarian framework, 
even though they work to alter it, or at least, its composition.
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In terms of the bourgeoisie, this thesis is not eoncemed with the petit bourgeoisie -  the 
small capitalist class -  but rather the large capitalists of the industrial, financial and 
landed fractions. However, given the particularity of Guatemala, the latter of these three 
classical fractions is further disaggregated into the agrarian (traditional), agro industrial 
(modernizing) landed fraction. As well, a commercial and a military fraction must also 
be considered in order to accurately reflect the composition of the ruling oligarchy. This 
signifies a very complex ruling class, with constantly changing dynamics reflecting the 
changing strengths of these different fractions. These dynamics are usually consolidated 
in a concertacion, or elite accommodation, that they collectively establish, or fail to do 
so, in order to maintain the stability of their domination of a society.
The peasantry is an equally complex and highly differentiated ‘class’. By definition it is 
a rural and traditional social group, characterized by social and economic organizing 
around the household and dependence on the land for livelihood. It further includes 
traditional culture based on life in small communities and a subservient position in the 
agrarian socio-economic hierarchy. While this seems straightforward, any further 
examination shows that it is anything but. Peasant existence is predicated on autonomy 
and self-reliance. However, the entirety of rural populations by no means exist according 
to these definitions, particularly in a region like Latin America that experienced over 
three hundred years of colonialism and, arguably, is continuing two hundred more of 
quasi-feudalism. The conditions of the campesinado have changed little since its first 
incorporation into the global economic system -  they are still poor, agrarian based and 
subservient in the socio economic structure. Peasants can be differentiated between 
subsistence cultivators, sharecroppers, labour tenants, landless rural labourers, the rich 
peasant / agricultural entrepreneur and the other dimensions of the rural proletariat -  
seasonal workers, migrant workers.
This differentiation brings us to the even more complex issue of the multifaceted 
peasantry’s confrontation with modernity and capitalism. Proletarianization is not a 
painless, reified process. The transformation of the rural peasantry into a working class, 
for both urban and rural industry, is predicated on the destruction of their subsistence.
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Early development theorizing had little compunction about the real and human 
implications of the process of transforming the peasantry into a surplus army of labour, 
which would suppress wages allowing further capital accumulation for investment in 
industrial development.*^* ‘Bloodless’ economists of all political persuasions fail to 
comprehend the human elements involved in the destruction of rural subsistence in the 
name of proletarianization for development. A Guatemalan woman, whose husband was 
hacked to death by the military before her and her children’s eyes for the subversive act 
of teaching fellow campesinos how to raise rabbits, explains the structural inequality that 
underlies this development:
“the plantations down along the coast grow export crops that are owned by 
generals and rich men who control the government. A big part of their profit 
comes from the fact that we peasants are so poor we are forced to migrate to the 
plantations each year and work for miserable wages in order to survive. If we 
could feed ourselves, through raising rabbits or any other activity, we would never 
work on the plantations again. If that happened, the bosses would lose the source 
of their riches. So, given this system, helping peasants learn how to raise rabbits 
is subversive.”*̂ ^
This quote explains in very clear terms the systemic violence of modernization, 
demonstrating the issues of power and culture inherent in transformation that destroys 
‘pre-modem’ social, economic and political structures. This is evidence of both the 
methods and consequences of ‘proletarianization’, framing it as anything but a 
benevolent process. The options for peasants are to integrate themselves into ‘the 
market’ because of either direct violence or the indirect violence of hunger and 
deprivation. Another consequence of capitalist integration and its proletarianisation of 
the peasantry is urbanization.*’®
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
From reviewing the different literatures, it is clear that there are political aspects to all of 
them, which necessarily arise from extending analysis into the social sphere of human
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action. This makes it clear that ‘technical’ or science-only approaches, theorizing and 
literature, as relevant and important as they are and can be, are incomplete. This is the 
message and impetus -  to go further than symptoms and understand fully the causes -  
that stems from critical social science. It is, therefore, this thoroughness of theory and 
methodology that informs the framework for analysis and interpretation of this study.
My theoretical position is clearly informed by a political economy approach to 
development, and as such the structural issues and realities revolving around hunger and 
the creation of vulnerability. The entire thesis of immiseration comes from Marx’s 
analysis of capitalism (and its expropriation of surplus value), which is itself echoed by 
the welfare economists and the critical theorists. It is, ultimately, the same thesis that I 
am advancing in this both instrumental and intrinsic case study of famine.
The central ideas that I am drawing generally from the field of the political economy of 
development, in addition to those already mentioned, are dependency, interdependence 
the so-called ‘comprador bourgeoisie’ that is the national elite. I am choosing to use the 
first two ideas interchangeably, as it is the vulnerability of interdependence*’* that is my 
focus, and this is indeed the idea expressed by dependency. However, as a concept, I am 
using dependency literally to refer to the unhealthy and disproportionate economic 
reliance of a country or community on a particular (or very small set of) crop(s), 
product(s) or sector(s), as well as on a single (or very limited number of) market(s) or 
supplier(s).
The central theme that arises from the various literatures is that of vulnerability. The 
general consensus from both famine and disaster studies is that there are no constant 
factors other than that vulnerability. Triggers and hazards, while generally necessary, are 
particular, whereas vulnerability is more homogenous and apt to generalization. This is 
not to deny that vulnerability can be disaggregated, but rather that conditions of 
vulnerability to one threat are common to various other hazards, as is seen in the ‘global 
vulnerability’ model. This synthetic approach underlies my linking and uniting of 
literature that is normally separated by field, discipline and perspective, in order to apply
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their relevant components together. This theoretical synthesis can then be usefully 
applied to a holistic situation -  the case. The ease itself cannot be understood on its own, 
separated from its context and structural reality, or from only one perspective.
Hunger and poverty are conditions of vulnerability, just as they are aspects of famine. 
However, not all who are vulnerable are both hungry and poor; although this is often the 
case. Vulnerability and poverty are not synonyms. Thus, it is understood that when 
referring to hunger or poverty that vulnerability is implied, but not necessarily the 
reverse, while referring to famine implies both hunger and poverty. Similarly, famine is 
a disaster in and of itself, and is often a component of other disasters. In keeping with the 
disaster prevention school, the ‘New Famine’ school and the political economy approach 
generally, famines, like disasters, are processes and not simply the ‘discrete events’ that 
we observe, as ‘newsworthy’ for the media. As the WHO points out, those aspects of 
famine that we are able observe, like “Real weight loss, mortality and migration of the 
population tend to occur at a relatively late state in a nutritional emergency.”*̂  ̂
Furthermore, they are viewed as ‘man-made’ or socially constructed processes for which 
real and specific individuals, groups and their actions are responsible.
Famines, like all disasters, do not simply occur on their own, ‘naturally’. They are 
‘made’ -  socially constructed, in the same way that the economy and the market are 
social institutions built and maintained by human actors. What we see is that famines are 
a part of the economy, as they are a substantive economic phenomenon par excellence, 
eoncemed with the production and availability of food and people’s access to it. This 
latter measure is one of power, which clearly demonstrates the inseparability of the 
political from the economic. This is further, albeit somewhat tautological, justification 
for why this thesis takes a political economy approach -  because the issue it is examining 
is one of the political economy.
This thesis takes the global economic system to be a synonym for the global capitalist 
system -  the actual product of a half millennium of stages of eapitalist development and 
in particular the current stage of evolution of transnational monopoly capital with its
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neoliberal economic policies and pseudonym of globalization. As such, this thesis 
considers globalization to be, ultimately, the agenda of United States hegemony or 
imperialism. There are a number of specific mechanisms of incorporation that underlie 
this agenda (debt, structural adjustment, aid) as well as national and intemational actors 
that implement it (national elites, TNCs, IFIs, IGOs, USAID etc.). The GDLP model 
provides the specific analytical tools and categories, in keeping with the positions 
advanced by the Post-Development and stmctural thinkers, to examine the particular and 
evolving situation of a country in the context of globalization.
As such, I am approaching the Guatemalan famine as a stmctural issue of development, 
to which there are no simple technological or management solutions. While there is a 
role for technology and policy in resolving the ongoing and silent processes of famine 
and disaster, the fundamental problems are stmctural and that is where this thesis will 
look. The holistic array of components that comprise the reality of a ‘community’ and its 
environment, economy, polity, and society -  the institutions and organization of actors, 
the policies that they have applied or been subjected to, their capacities for analysis and 
action -  are the dynamic and interacting features that together dictate the conditions of a 
people. When those people live in crisis and constant disaster, it is to those factors we 
must look to both understand why and to truly address the situation, putting both an end 
to it and ensuring that it does not occur again.
Given the tendency to react to disaster and in particular famine after the fact,'^^ when the 
damage and destmction is in fact done or well underway, it is important to work 
preventatively. Hence the political economy-disaster prevention-New Famine school 
approach. It is preventative analysis that is required and that, by definition, requires the 
examination of stmctures. However, this thesis is not so much directed at finding the 
way to improve these stmctures, but rather to emphasize that these socio-economic and 
political stmctures are in fact the problem. Given that the dominant managerial approach 
to development and food security, it is necessary to show how the disaster is a systemic 
creation and, therefore, the complicity of all those that do not in fact act beforehand to 
prevent disaster.'’'*
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As class and class analysis are central to this thesis, and are a central element to all that 
has so far been reviewed, it is necessary to be clear regarding the definitions and concepts 
to be used. The classical Marxist division between bourgeoisie and proletariat is not 
appropriate in this case, masking the multiple fractions, divisions and cleavages both 
within and between these two classes. Instead, it is more appropriate to speak, on the one 
hand, of an elite*^ ,̂ or an oligarchy, which is highly differentiated. For the purposes of 
this thesis, oligarchy will be used to refer to the collective bourgeois class in Guatemala, 
while elite will be used to identify the various fractions within the oligarchy, namely the 
economic elite, as opposed to the political elite, which is similar the division between the 
ruling elite and the governing elite. The military elite, as separate from and yet member 
of both, must also be included, as well as the divisions within, in particular, the economic 
elite, between its landed and industrial fractions. As such, elites will be used to refer to 
the collected fractions mentioned here.
The complexity of what comprises the proletariat is also substantial. All the more so 
given that Guatemala is such an ethnically divided country, overlaying indigenous and 
mixed race dimension onto the class analysis. Further, as the emphasis is on the rural 
poor, and not the urban proletariat, we are here concerned with peasants, 
proletarianization and the semi-proletariat. While the vast majority of peasants are 
indeed indigenous, not all are. Similarly, the vast majority of indigenous are also 
peasants, but again this is not universal. Even more complicated is the issue that most 
peasants are not in fact simply peasants, but also engage in other productive activity and 
work as labourers, albeit generally on a seasonal or occasional basis. In the same vein, 
there is also a very substantial rural population that is in fact landless, or are 
sharecroppers, and although involved in agriculture are technically not peasants either. 
However, for the purposes of this thesis and simplicity, all of the above-mentioned 
groups will be considered as peasants, and it will be assumed, unless otherwise stated, 
that the peasants are in fact indigenous.
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The following four chapters are largely descriptions of the Guatemalan reality, organized 
within this framework. They are the ‘proof from the case that demonstrates the validity 
of this tentative framework while at the same time explaining the causes of the famine. 
Chapter three provides the historical context in which Guatemala’s grossly inequitable 
political economy has evolved. Chapter four shows the actual structure of that economy, 
how it is vulnerable, and whom it makes vulnerable within the country. Chapter five 
details the condition of global vulnerability -  the poverty, hunger and environmental 
destruction -  that this history and orientation have wrought. Chapter six then explores 
the details of the famine event, and cormects it to the larger ‘famine process’ resulting 
from the political economy.
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Chapter III
The Creation and Maintenance of a Vulnerable Political
Economy
“Latin America is a slave economy masquerading as postmodern: it pays African 
wages, it charges European prices, and the merchandise it produces most 
efficiently is injustice and violence."'
-  Eduardo Galeano, Upside Down 
INTRODUCTION
From colonial times Guatemala’s economy has been tied to the global economic system. 
Although its participation in the global economic system has changed over the centuries, 
becoming increasingly ‘inserted’ and (inter)dependent, it has always participated from a 
position of weakness. This is to say that its economy is dominated by export-led 
production, in particular of primary commodities. These non-processed agricultural 
exports have been losing their relative importance within the formal economy, in 
particular with the increase of light manufactures. However, they continue to be 
extremely important in absolute terms, and with regard to the livelihoods that they 
provide for, or have taken away from, so many Guatemalans.
The central aspect of Guatemala’s participation in and integration into the global 
economic system is the domestic agency behind that participation. Namely, national 
elites -  the oligarchy -  dominate the country and are the principle beneficiaries of their 
nation’s participation in the global economic system. This chapter shows how national 
elites in fact dominate the evolving national political economy by focusing on their 
control of four key elements. The first is their ownership and control of natural 
resources, particularly land. The second is their control of production, both agricultural, 
manufacturing and other primary resource extraction. Their control of exchange focuses 
on their control over trade, both national but especially intemational, concentrating its 
benefits in their own hands. The final area of domination is over the state, both 
controlling its actions and the policies that it pursues, all in the interest of the dominant 
class.
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The argument is that it is exactly this participation in the intemational market that is 
literally starving Guatemalan people. The interests of Western industrialized countries 
are those that guide and frame the global economic system. There are specific 
mechanisms that accompany a hegemonic ideology that makes Guatemala -  and all 
countries of the South -  a less than equal player in the global economic system. At the 
same time, there is a dialectic between the forces of ‘neoliberal globalization’ that seek to 
fully incorporate all comers of planet earth into one capitalist system* and the national 
elites of the south -  the comprador bourgeoisie of dependency theory -  that together 
make this system work. The coincidence of interests between global and national capital 
-  the global elites -  serves them each profitably. This profit comes at the expense of the 
vast majority of people who are put at risk and made increasingly susceptible to hunger 
and other threats through the normal working of this intemational capitalist system.
On the basis of this thesis -  that Guatemala’s increasing integration into the global 
economic system is in fact a process of immiseration that is leading to hunger and death 
for its people -  we will examine the two sides of this process as they effect Guatemala. 
The first being Guatemala’s place in the global economic system and the various 
mechanisms of its incorporation (or subjugation) and the second being the role of the 
national elites in participating in and enforcing that insertion while capturing virtually all 
of the benefits of that integration.
To elaborate this first process, we identify Guatemala’s role within the global economic 
system as a primary commodity exporter, primarily and certainly historically of 
agricultural products, and secondly of light manufactures. This will be followed by an 
examination of Guatemala’s regional integration, foreign debt and the role of stmctural 
adjustment in tying it to policies not of its own creation nor, in effect, in the interest of its 
poorest peoples. Other specific mechanisms of economic integration, such as Plan 
Puebla Panama and the Free Trade Area of the Americas, and the regional and global 
hegemon lying behind all such initiatives, are also surveyed to establish their role in
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Guatemala’s integration into the global economic system, and hence the orientation they 
thrust upon the nation’s economy.
This chapter is divided into five sections -  the environment, the society, political history, 
the economy and global integration. The first section outlines the central aspects of the 
environment in Guatemala, the country’s geography, ecology, natural resource base and 
predisposition to ‘natural disasters’. The second section, on society, provides an 
overview of the demographic evolution of the country and also addresses the issues of 
ethnicity and class in the classification and ‘construction’ of Guatemalan society. The 
political overview is oriented to the historical evolution of the nation, specifically the 
political regimes that have governed it and their economic and development policies. It 
also highlights the role of such key actors as the military and the oligarchy, and puts the 
civil war and the Peace Accords into context. The section on economy examines the 
structure of the Guatemalan economy and the domination of the means and materials of 
production and exchange by a small segment of the population. Intrinsically related to 
the previous sections is the examination of Guatemala’s place in the world economy and 
understanding the global context that includes living ‘...so close to the United States’. 
The final section concerns itself with the growing inequality that has accompanied the 
process of Guatemalan development and integration into the global economic system.
Together, these sections demonstrate Guatemala’s marginalization in the world, as it is 
reduced to a satellite producer and exporter of agricultural ‘cash crops’ and assembler of 
light industrial goods, all for Northern, particularly American, markets. Domestically, 
this export orientation has been accompanied by an extreme socio-economic 
hiearchization of the population. This effective immiseration has seen the poor -  largely 
rural and indigenous -  being marginalized and impoverished through the ensuing and 
active process of alienating them from their means of subsistence and forcing them into 
the ‘wage labour’ economy that does not truly exist (at least at the scale necessary to 
support them), where they are exposed to the whims of the intemational market and local 
elites, while food self-sufficiency is ‘forgotten’ by both.
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Having laid out these processes, this chapter concludes by showing how together they 
have increased the vulnerability of the majority of Guatemalans, particularly the rural and 
indigenous population - certainly the two poorest elements of the society. This will be 
done by showing how they have been denied resources and options in life, been 
marginalized from political participation and made bereft of the means of production and 
in fact been alienated from their very means of survival, which, in Guatemala, means 
land.
THE ENVIRONMENT
The word Guatemala itself means “land of trees” and as such is a very apt description of 
the country, also touted as ‘the land of eternal spring’ due to its constantly mild climate 
and lush verdancy. In spite of this, it is home to a diversity of geographic regions, 
climatic and life zones, which are and have been significantly affected by the last half- 
century of development. This section briefly summarizes the geography of the country, 
this ecological and climatic diversity and its natural resource base.
Guatemala has a total national territory of 108,889 square kilometres, making it slightly 
larger than the island of Newfoundland. It shares borders with Mexico, Belize, Honduras 
and El Salvador. Altitude ranges from sea level on the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts, as 
well as in the northern jimgle region of the Petén, to 4,220 metres above sea level at its 
highest point.*’* The country is generally considered to have three natural regions -  the 
coasts, the highlands and the northern lowlands. However, it is more exactly categorized 
into the southern coast or Pacific Slope, the Western and Central Highlands (running 
northwest towards Mexico), the East or Eastern Highlands, (running east towards 
Honduras and El Salvador), the Northern Transversal Strip -  the transition zone between 
the highlands and the final region -  the jungle lowlands of the Petén.
Guatemala has four major tectonic fault lines running roughly east to west, and has 38 
volcanoes spread throughout the Sierra Madre mountains running Southeast to 
Northwest, parallel to the Pacific coast. This makes Guatemala particularly prone to 
regular tremors and has caused a series of devastating earthquakes since colonial times.
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The Cuchumatanes are the second mountain range, running parallel to the Sierra Madre, 
yet further north, descending into the Northern Transversal Strip.
Geopolitically, the country is divided into nine different regions, named according to 
their orientation on the compass, with the Metropolitan region of the capital as the centre 
point. It is also divided into 22 administrative departments,***  ̂containing a total of 331 
municipalities. The capital is Guatemala City, located in the Central Highlands. It is also 
the largest city with a population of approximately 4 million, followed by Quetzaltenango 
in the Western Highlands with roughly 1 million people. The municipal governments are 
elected locally, with the municipal government of the departmental capital being the 
actual administration for the department, in spite of their being departmental governors 
appointed by the central government.
The different climatic zones of the country correspond with the geographic regions 
above, although great ecological and climatic variations occur within and between these 
regions. Of the 38 different 'Life Zones’ specified by the Holdridge*** ecological 
classification system, 14 are present in Guatemala. Rainfall varies between 500 mm per 
year in the Motagua Valley to more than 4000 mm on the coasts.**  ̂ The Verapaces 
receive rain up to 210 days of the year, while the departments of El Progreso, Chiquimula 
and Zacapa can see as few as 45 days a year.**  ̂ Finally, it has 60 different ecosystems, 7 
biomes and 9 eco-regions. It is home to more than 8000 kinds of plants and 1966 
different species of vertebrates.’*"*
Land is the primary resource of Guatemala, with it being a primarily forest based country 
-  some 79% of its surface area is naturally predisposed as forestland. With 10,843 
thousand hectares of total land area, 82% of the land is considered sloping hillside or 
mountainous and two-thirds of it have a high propensity to erosion. Therefore, only a 
small proportion of the land (21%) is naturally suitable for agriculture.’*̂  However, since 
1961 the agricultural frontier has almost doubled from 2,646 thousand hectares to 4,507 
thousand hectares in 2000. Of this increase, pastureland has seen the greatest rise in area, 
from 1,110 thousand hectares to 2,602 thousand hectares.’*̂  Forest cover has in fact been
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the primary loser in this advance of the agricultural frontier, falling from 77% of the 
national territory in 1960 to 26.6% by 1998.*^  ̂ While forestry is a notable sector of the 
Guatemalan economy, very little of this deforestation is due to direct economic 
exploitation by that sector.
Its volcanic soils in the highlands and pacific slope are very fertile, although highly prone 
to erosion. The shallow calcium rich soils in the lowland Peten region, while fertile, are 
very fragile, easily exhausted and also prone to erosion due to the heavy rains in the 
region. The subsoil mineral wealth of the country is less impressive, consisting of small 
yet significant (high sulfur) oil reserves in the Peten and nickel, in the highlands, as well 
as copper, lead, iron, silver and bauxite in exploitable quantities.*** Guatemala also 
counts on fish stocks and a sizable fishing industry on its pacific coast.
Guatemala has a history of ‘natural’ disasters stretching back to the time of the Mayas. 
Recent evidence indicates that the sudden and inexplicable collapse of the Classical Maya 
civilization was in fact triggered by complete environmental collapse stenuning from 
massive deforestation in the lowlands and the continuous drought that it induced by 
changing climatic patterns.**^ In addition to being highly sensitive to global weather 
patterns. Central America has always suffered the vagaries of El Nino, which mean 
droughts for most of the region, while La Nina brings heavy rains and flooding. As part 
of the Pacific Ring of Fire, the most recent of the devastating earthquakes hit Guatemala 
on February 4***, 1976, causing an estimated 27,000 deaths, injuring over 77,000 and left 
up to 1.6 million people homeless after damaging or destroying 384,762 homes. It should 
be noted that nearly all of these victims were poor and mainly indigenous, in both rural 
and urban areas -  industrial, commercial and higher-class residential areas in Guatemala 
City were virtually untouched.*^®
In addition to these natural hazards, Guatemala is also experiencing an increasing number 
of floods and landslides, generally as a result of deforestation throughout the country.*^* 
This litany of dangers is rounded out by seasonal Irosts in the highlands, forest fires 
(usually caused by agricultural burning that escapes control) and hurricanes. While
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normally visited by at least one hurricane per season, no ‘natural’ disaster has impacted 
Central America with greater malevolent force in the last century than hurricane Mitch in 
1998. While the destruction it caused was greatest in Honduras and Nicaragua, it had a 
lesser human toll in Guatemala due to the advance warning that saw over 106,000 people 
evacuated. However, the destruction it wrought amounted to 5% of Guatemala’s GDP, 
destroyed over one million quintales of unharvested maize and affected almost 100,000 
houses and nearly 700,000 people.
SOCIETY
Historically and in the present, Guatemalan society is structured along agrarian lines.
The basic division is between large landholders and peasant smallholders in what is 
typical of the bimodal agriculture of latifundistas and minifundistas, each dependent on 
the other. This interdependence revolves around client-based networks between the 
latifundista patron and the colonos (sharecroppers) that live on his land and work directly 
for him. This relationship is also extended to the campesinos (peasants) that live nearby 
his estate, or that travel seasonally to work for him. All of these peasants and agricultural 
workers traditionally depend on the patron for political and economic support, while the 
patron depends on them as the labour force for his agricultural estates. While much of 
this colonial system has eroded, much of it still remains and continues to be an important 
factor in understanding both development in Guatemala and the actors involved.
Demographics
The trends in Guatemala’s population have been volatile since the conquest. Equally, 
there has been great uncertainty regarding the actual measures, estimates and 
classifications of that population. The devastation of the conquest was wrought 
throughout the sixteenth century and saw up to 95% of the indigenous population in 
certain areas disappear. ‘Less affected’ areas o f  the highlands only lost 80% o f their pre- 
conquest population. By the seventeenth century Guatemala’s indigenous population 
slowly began to grow once more, but before independence had only recovered to 20% of 
pre-conquest levels*^  ̂which were thought to be over 2.5 million in the national territory.
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After independence in 1821, Guatemala had a population of roughly 595,000 people*̂ "* 
and “[ajccording to the 1880 census Guatemala possessed 1,244,602 people, 379,828 of 
them ladinos and 844,774 Indians.”*̂  ̂ By 1930 the number was up to 1.7 million'^^ and 
by 1950 -  over four centuries later - had re-attained pre-conquest levels. However, by 
this time population estimates and actual census results begin to diverge by significant 
margins. Mayorga Quiros*^^ reports 3,006,000 inhabitants in 1950,14% of whom were 
urban, and 7,262,000 by 1980, 38% of whom were urban. Census results, however, are 
more conservative, recording 2,790,868 ini 950 then 4,287,997 by 1964, some 5,158,075 
in 1973, then 6,054,227 by 1981 and 8,331,874 in 1994.*^* The current census indicates 
a population at the end of 2002 of 11, 237,196 -  more than half a million people fewer 
than official projections had in d ica ted .A p ar t  from the wide variety of problems 
underlying these disparities -  from methodological issues with the actual censuses and 
projections, to the real demographic impact of economic and political events -  they do 
clearly indicate an enormous increase in the population since the middle of the twentieth 
century. Population density has risen fi’om 25.8 people per square kilometer in 1950 
(using the conservative census result) to 105 people today, with the urban population 
standing at 38.6% of the total.
Race and Ethnicity
There are three major racial or ethnic divisions in Guatemala, spanning back to the 
conquest. At the top of this very clear and present social hierarchy are the criollos -  the 
descendents of the Spanish conquerors and the subsequent peninsulare (Spanish-born 
immigrant) administrators that served the Spanish crown. The mixed blood descendents 
of the criollos and indigenous are in Guatemala called ladinos and have generally formed 
the bulk of the middle class, although there are many ladino peasants as well. It should 
also be noted that the term ladino is generally used to refer to all non-Mayan peoples, or 
people that prefer to not consider themselves indigenous. This is to say that it functions 
as both a cultural and a racial classification.
The bottom of this social pyramid is comprised of the twenty-one different Mayan 
groups, plus the indigenous (non-Mayan) Xinka and the Afiro-Caribbean Garifuna
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population. This adds up to a total of twenty-four different linguistic groups in the 
country and, according to official statistics, an indigenous population in 2000 of between 
40.5% and 48.6%.^°* Added to this mix are important immigrant populations that also 
came to the country after independence. The most notable of these were the German 
colonists that settled primarily in the Verapaces region of the country. While many were 
expelled towards the end of the second World War, many were not and a significant 
number of those that were have since returned.
Table 1: Ethnic Division of the Population







Source: Van Den Berghe 196 3:515
Class
One of the central issues facing Guatemala has been the proletarianization of the 
peasantry that has accompanied ‘development’. All efforts at modernization, from the 
‘Liberal Revolution’ and including Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI), have 
considered agriculture as a source of savings for investment (albeit this corresponds only 
to the landowning elites). At the same time the peasantry have been viewed as the army 
of surplus labour that can (and must) be forced off the land in order to supply industry 
with cheap labour it requires for its profitable development. Part of the complication of 
understanding Guatemala’s peasantry is their ethnic correspondence with the indigenous 
Maya population.
The vast segment of the national population is the subsistence peasantry, at 44% of the 
population (and with a mere 6% of the land).^®  ̂ Other estimates put the rural population, 
or peasantry, at over 6 million, with between 50% and 59% of them being indigenous and 
the rest being ladino?'^^ Even more complicated is the issue that most peasants are not in
67
fact simply peasants, but also engage in other productive activity and work as labourers, 
albeit on a seasonal or occasional basis. In the same vein, there is also a very substantial 
rural population that is in fact landless,^®'  ̂or are sharecroppers, and although involved in 
agriculture are technically not peasants either.
While the technical and bureaucratic middle class has been present since colonial times, it 
grew from the 1970s into the 1980s, while the dominant elite has itself, at least in relative 
terms, been further concentrated.^®^ This oligarchy consists of various factions, including 
an economic elite, a political elite, a somewhat distinct governing elite, also differentiated 
from the ruling elite and the military elite. The economic elite is itself further divided 
between its landed and industrial fractions. Racially, the oligarchy has traditionally been 
criollo, with the German immigrants also finding themselves at home in this class. 
Wealthy ladinos have increasingly gained access to these ranks, while those few 
indigenous elites that have become sufficiently wealthy were first transformed into 
ladinos before joining the economic elite. The basic racial composition of the class 
structure, though, is a criollo (white) upper class, a ladino (mixed race) middle class and 
an indigenous (and black) lower class.
POLITICAL HISTORY
This section focuses on the historical developments that shaped the Guatemalan 
economy, and thereby the nations society and polity. It considers the various political 
regimes that have governed Guatemala and the development policies that they have 
adopted, as well as the institutions central to this development -  the state, the military and 
the oligarchy. It then provides a brief overview of the economic roots of the Civil War 
and of the 1996 Peace Accords that have ‘formally’ brought thirty-six years of violence 
to a close.
Political Regimes and the State
In the early years of Central American independence, the ladino president Jose Carrera 
imposed a conservative social, political and economic policy on the entirety of the region. 
This policy was relatively benevolent towards the indigenous and rural population in that
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it was passive and therefore largely neglected them. However, this changed with the 
Liberal Revolution of the 1870s. In 1876 the liberal strongman, president Justo Rufmo 
Barrios, re-implemented the system of mandamientos -  the colonial system of forced 
labour that obliged indigenous communities to work for criollo landowners -  through 'El 
Reglamento de Jornaleros’ (the Law of Labourers). In 1894 the mandamientos were 
replaced with forced work brigades for public projects, exempting those who either paid 
an annual tax of 10 pesos, were colonos (sharecroppers) on a finca (estate farm or 
plantation), were in debt bondage (for more than 30 pesos) or held a work contract (for a 
minimum of 3 months a year) on an export crop finca?'^
These laws and the mechanisms of debt peonage continued until the 1930s when another 
modernizing liberal strongman and president, Jorge Ubico, put an end to the them by 
adopting the ‘Vagrancy Law’ “which abolished debt peonage, canceled peasant debts 
[and] barred any legal prosecution by landlords to enforce debts after a two-year 
transition period.” ®̂̂ He was a major modernizing force for Guatemala, which in fact set 
him in opposition to the landed elite on a number of issues.^^^ As such, he saw debt 
peonage and colonos as backward institutions that inhibited national development by 
tying up a major part of the labour force that could be more effectively exploited if they 
were in fact more mobile. The Vagrancy Law, which in no way changed the lot of the 
campesino, simply saw their obligation shifted from the landlords to the state, who 
became their new patron, in keeping with Ubico’s centralization of power in the state, 
generally, and specifically within the hands of the president.^®  ̂ All that the Vagrancy 
Laws did was require campesinos to cultivate a minimum of land (which varied 
according to zone of the country) or show that they worked a minimum number of days 
on a finca using a passbook system. Given the illiteracy of the campesinos, this system 
was easily and widely abused by landowners (and their managers) for whom it was a 
concession granted by Ubico to ameliorate their opposition to his reforms. Failing to 
meet these obligations would result in forced labour on public works for peasants. The 
Vagrancy Law was also accompanied by the Transport Law, which levied a 2 quetzal 
(the national currency) tax on each male between the ages of 18 and 50 or face a similar 
labour requirement.^*® These laws lasted until 1944 when the October Revolution
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brought a three member military and civil junta to power. Their brief tenure only lasted 
until they had overseen the election of Juan Jose Arevalo and the transition to his 
administration, during which time they framed a new constitution.^**
The Guatemalan State has not been a simple ‘handmaiden of the elites’. Certainly under 
Jorge Ubico (1931-1944) the state was acting autonomously of the ‘immediate or short 
term’ interests of elites, in its pursuit of liberal modernization.^*^ Thus, there existed a 
modernizing state, largely allied with the German landowners who were concentrated in 
the Verapaces region of the country and were themselves the most economically dynamic 
sector of the both the country and in fact the region.^ *̂  However, with World War II, the 
exigencies of the United States’ government forced Ubico to abandon this elite faction, 
which supported his modernization efforts, and saw the bulk of German landowners 
dispossessed and expelled from the country. The Ubico regime saw the first systematic 
attack, through the Vagrancy Laws, on the landed class and the concentration and 
centralization of power in the executive branch of the state.̂ *"*
While the German expulsion was a severe blow to the economy, especially given the 
‘backward’ nature of the non-German elites in their agricultural and industrial 
endeavours, as well as the social hierarchy that they maintained, it also provided a sizable 
portion of the land subsequently used by the Arbenz administration in its land reform.
The subsequent undoing of the Arbenz land reform saw this land once again returned to 
the state until finally disposed of by Ydigoras, most of it going to friends or highest 
bidders, but 16 of the 78 German estates expropriated under Ubico were in fact returned 
to their original owners.^*^
The ‘October Revolution’ began the Ten Years of Spring, which saw progressive reform 
under first professor Juan Jose Arevalo and then Jacobo Arbenz, a captain in the army (at 
the time of the October Revolution) and member of both the junta  and the Arevalo 
cabinet. While Arevalo and his ‘spiritual socialism’ aroused the suspicion of the 
Guatemalan oligarchy, this was largely offset by his strong nationalism and unwillingness 
(or political inability due to a deeply divided congress) to institute structural or radical
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reform in the country. The ‘spiritual socialism’ combined with nationalism was a 
particularly obnoxious combination for the United States, who, lacking ‘concrete 
provocation’ did not intervene. Regardless, many social advances were made before 
Arbenz was elected president, with the congressional majority required to institute 
‘revolutionary’ change. The centre piece of this was the Agrarian Reform Law that saw 
917,659 acres of land expropriated from large estates and, along with state owned land, 
redistributed to over 100,000 families, representing more than half a million people. The 
reform was politically unpopular both at home and in the United States, the latter due to 
the expropriation of 372,000 acres of unused United Fruit Company land (of a total of 
550 million acres, of which it used at most 15%).^*  ̂ The redistribution of land itself was 
in fact a stable and economically successful process, which saw significant increases in 
basic grain production for domestic consumption.^*’ Furthermore, the entire agrarian 
reform was in keeping with the recommendations of the World Bank’s 1950 country 
assessment.’**
With the fall of Arbenz through the CIA backed invasion, the Ten Years of Spring and 
the progressive reforms that it had brought came to an immediate end.’ *̂  Colonel Carlos 
Castillo Armas, the ‘leader’ of the CIA organized invasion from Honduras and American 
appointee as president, immediately halted and reversed the agrarian reform. By 1956 he 
had returned and reclaimed over 99% of the land redistributed under Arbenz” **, leaving a 
mere 0.4% of the original reform beneficiaries, these being mainly church cooperatives, 
with their land.” * With the exception of purges, particularly of the military, this regime 
accomplished little else with such efficiency, except for unraveling the newly 
consolidated food self-sufficiency stemming from the agrarian reform. This food crisis, 
revolving around reduced com production, required the immediate and large scale 
provision of food aid from the United States, inaugurating the current period of external 
dependence on imports for basic food supplies.’”
As a result of internal feuding within the 'liberacionista’ camp, Armas was killed in 1957 
and replaced by General Manuel Ydigoras Fuentes. The Ydigoras period, in spite of his 
nationalist platform in the very ‘controlled’ elections that were to become the norm, also
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represents an era of increasing US involvement in the Guatemalan state, both in terms of 
funding and policy direction. It was at this time that the US effectively took control of 
the direction the Central American Common Market (CACM) was to take. This trend 
continued until the 1970s when military nationalism began to strain relations with the US, 
reducing its direct involvement in shaping new government policy. However, given the 
opening for foreign investment created by the CACM, this was to a degree acceptable, in 
particular given the rising perceived communist menace in the form of the renewed 
guerrilla insurgency in the countryside.
One of the consequences of military rule and the civil war, with the gross violations of 
human rights that characterized it, was that Guatemala was excluded from the world 
community and unable to accede to foreign credit, either private or from multilateral or 
bilateral sources. This imposed self-reliance meant that it was in fact largely debt free, 
certainly in comparison to its neighbours and the rest of Latin America, until 
rapprochement in the 1980s.^^  ̂ However, these external financial limitations were 
reproduced internally, particularly with the growing costs of the war, given the 
intransigence of elites and their principal representative at the national level, the 
Coordinadora de Asociaciones Agricolas, Comerciales, Industriales y  Financieras 
(CACIF, the Coordinating Committee of Agriculture, Commercial, Industrial and 
Financial Associations) “the supreme council of all the different business sectors”^̂"*. 
While the dictator Efrain Rios Montt was able to impose a tax increase on the elites, it 
was later overturned, as was he in a counter coup that was largely a result of this 
au d a c i ty r a th e r  than due to the fact that he was the bloodiest leader of the scorched 
earth campaign against the indigenous people in the highlands.
While the 1985 election of the civilian government of Vinicio Cerezo signaled the return 
to democracy in Guatemala, particularly for the Reagan administration, it was still very 
much a transition period for the military, which remained totally autonomous and in de 
facto control of the country. The elevation of Jorge Serrano to the presidency in 1990 
marks the sea change that saw the ruling elites become the governing elites, with many of 
his cabinet members coming from CACIF and the economic elite. These included Alvaro
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Arzu Irigoyen, the foreign affairs minister from one of Guatemala’s richest families, who 
later became president in 1996, at the head of the very pro-business Partido de Accion 
Nacional (PAN -  National Action Party). However, this neo-liberal tide has in many 
ways been checked, or at least stalled, by the current Frente Republicano de Guatemala 
(FRG -  Guatemalan Republican Front) administration of Alfonso Portillo, which is in 
fact led by Rios Montt. The open tension and conflict between this military oriented 
party and the CACIF plays itself out daily, particularly with national elections due in the 
fall of 2003. It has also meant that the great majority of the population and their suffering 
are entirely ignored as this feud between competing elite fractions is the focus of most all 
attention and resources.
The Military
The modernization of the military began under Ubico, and his work developing and 
professionalizing the officer corps. Central to this was the military assistance from the 
US, in the form of a new director for the Escuela Politecnica. The professionalism and 
pride thus inculcated into the military was profoundly impacted by the Castillo Armas 
invasion that drove Arbenz from power, without any opposition being mounted. These 
lasting impacts on the military have reconfirmed its autonomy and “both immunized the 
military against any serious reformist tendencies and engendered a form of shame that 
periodically rose to the surface in a belligerent institutionalism directed against the 
civilian right, and a reactionary nationalism that occasionally soured relations with 
Washington.”^̂ ^
This institutional autonomy has grown and the military has increasingly become a 
prominent political and economic force in the country. Its economic growth stems from 
the 1970s when it saw a number of national enterprises pass into its control, providing it 
with an economic base. The Banco del Ejercito is one example of its economic diversity, 
while its munitions factory and armoured vehicle plant show its productive capacity. As 
such, moves towards privatization and liberalization in the 1980s were opposed by the 
military, given that most of the national industries to be privatized -  electricity, 
telephone, the national airline and the international airport^^’ -  were under their control
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and did not directly belong to the state. The military had become an economic elite unto 
themselves and were defending their interests, just as the traditional economic elite has 
done through CACIF. Their private colonization of the Franja Transversal del Norte (the 
Northern Transversal Strip), made senior officers into a landed and agricultural elite, at 
the expense of denying land redistribution to many peasants and actually expelling 
others.
Managing the economic crisis of the lost decade of the 1980s was one very real incentive 
for the return to democracy. A much larger one was the lure of the US economic and 
military cooperation (aid) and returned investment, after the Carter administration had cut 
ties with the Guatemalan military dictators and their bloody human rights records. The 
Reagan administration was only too eager to support ‘democratization’ in Guatemala, 
especially given that so-called democracy untied its hands from the restrictions still 
carrying over from Car te r .H ow eve r ,  democratically elected governments in the 1980s 
in no way decreased the de facto control over the country exercised by the military. This 
power was certainly eroded in the 1990s and was in part co-opted by non-military 
economic elites, but the current Portillo and Rios Montt administration has reversed that 
trend and also opened divisions within the military.^^^ These murky relationships are 
likely to elicit a new elite compact, or concertacion, with this year’s elections. Failing 
that, it is probable that there will be a return to open conflict and repression, in concert 
with the current escalation in generalized violence and insecurity throughout the country.
Civil War and the Peace Accords
The 1960 military uprising against the corrupt Ydigoras regime, led by Captain Marco 
Antonio Yon Sosa and Lieutenant Luis Turcios Lima, is considered the beginning of the 
thirty-six year civil war. However, it was not until news of the hosting of the CIA’s 
Cuban invasion force sparked a military revolt in Zacapa in 1962 that the real insurgency 
began. It is also important to note that while the insurgency was developing in the 
departments of Zacapa and Izabal, it was in the department of Chiquimula that the initial 
massacres of peasants by the military took place in 1965 and 1969.^^° It is even more 
important to note that these massacres all took place in the municipalities of Jocotan and
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Olopa, which along with the neighbouring municipality of Camotan, are the three focal 
points of the 2001 famine.
After numerous set backs in the late 1960s and early 1970s that proved the failure of the 
foquista revolutionary model, the insurgency established itself in the Western Highlands 
and in the Verapaces and Peten in the late 1970s. It was mainly in these areas that the 
scorched earth policies of the late 1970s and particularly the early 1980s were carried out 
on the indigenous population, as opposed to the more ladino population of Chiquimula.
There is no questioning that the roots of the Guatemalan conflict lie in extreme 
inequality, specifically within the ambit of the political economy and with regard to 
access to land. As James Dunkerley states “Nobody in their right mind could plausibly 
refute the view that the Central American conflict is rooted in the economic structure of 
the region.”^̂  ̂ This ‘societal disequilibrium’ as the cause of conflict functions in 
accordance with the ‘cycle of violence’ model for “small, agriculturally based economies 
where landholding elites rule in alliance with professional militaries.”^̂  ̂ This cycle of 
violence revolves around social and class conflict over the modernization of agriculture, 
which is characterized by increased land concentration, forced proletarianization of the 
peasantry, decreasing basic consumption and reactionary terror. The cycles in Guatemala 
correspond with periods of ‘economic innovation and expansion’, there being three 
overarching cycles in the country’s history -  the conquest, the ‘Liberal Revolution’ and 
the military dictatorships with their ‘Liberal Restoration’
Although not at first, the Guatemalan civil war had extensive popular support. As such, it 
was exactly these popular sectors that were targeted by the violence. More than 200,000 
peasants, union leaders and political activists were killed or disappeared, more than
400,000 fled as refugees (although only 45,000 registered themselves as sucĥ "̂*) and up 
to one million were displaced internally.
The Oflcina de Derechos Humanos del Arzobispado de Guatemala (ODHAG -  Human 
Rights Office of the Archbishopric of Guatemala) and their project the Reconstruccion de 
la Memoria Historico (REMHI -  Reconstruction of the Historical Memory), led by
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Monsignor Gerrardi, and the Comision por Esclarecimiento Historico (CEH -  
Commission for Historical Clarification)^^^ have extensively documented the violence of 
the civil war. The REMHI documents 422 massacres (although it identifies 443) for 
which 90.53% of the responsibility goes to the Guatemalan military and its allied 
paramilitary organization, including the civil patrols and the right wing death squads. It 
lays responsibility for 9.3% of the violations of human rights it documents on the various 
guerrilla organizations.^^^ The CEH registered 626 massacres for which the state and the 
military were responsible.
This very bloody reactionary terror did effectively suppress the popular rebellion. As 
such, ‘the peace’, when it finally came in December 1996, was not so much the end of the 
conflict as a consolidation of the status quo. Edelberto Torres-Rivas provides the most 
succinct evaluation of the impact of the armed conflict and its resolution. “In Guatemala, 
the country lost the war; the right won the peace.”^̂ ’ “The end of the armed conflict 
involved a tacit acceptance of the existing economic and political system and in fact 
constitutes a contribution to the permanence of that system.”^̂ * “The peasantry remains 
largely landless. The essential class structure of an agrarian society has changed 
little.”^̂  ̂ In assessing the social impacts of the peace, he states:
“We are emerging from a period of conflicts with a weak state and a corporatist 
business class that has concentrated wealth and accumulated capital at the expense 
of the impoverishment of society. The middle classes are more divided than ever 
due to the economic crisis that has resulted for many in downward social mobility. 
The segmentation of popular class has been aggravated by the spread of the 
informal sector, instability in urban employment and rising unemployment. The 
peasantry remains mired in rural misery due to the lack of land and is awaiting 
new opportunities that peace is unlikely to bring.” '̂*̂
Unfortunately, the peace has not been particularly peaceful, even before the election of 
Portillo and the FRG. '̂̂ * The number of murders (separate from the violence of the civil 
war) recorded nationally peaked at 3657 in 1995. It declined to less than half that
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number in 1999, but this trend has since reversed, such that in the spring of 2003, weekly 
murder counts of more than 80 victims had been recorded. If this ‘trend’ continues, it 
will set new murder records by mid fall.̂ "̂  ̂ Similarly, the number offinca invasions and 
occupations has almost tripled to 60 at the end of 2002,̂ "̂  ̂in comparison with the 24 
noted at the time of the Peace Accords. '̂ '̂  ̂ The Economist^"*  ̂has gone so far as to rank 
Guatemala with Colombia in terms of civil unrest, violence and insecurity, as the FRG 
and Rios Montt seek to maintain their grasp on power.
This history all points to a fractured and internally incoherent oligarchy, that is still 
united the fact of lower class threats to its power. While state policies have never been 
perfectly and harmoniously meshed with all elite fraction interests, they have always 
served the dominant (ruling) fraction and the entire class and oligarchical structure 
generally. Into this structure has entered a military officer class that also functions as 
both an economic and a political elite, adding further complexity to the balance of 
fractions. In spite of fraction and middle class struggle, the agrarian structure of the 
society, stemming from colonial times, has been maintained. Although the state did in 
fact pursue its policies autonomously of the oligarchy, from the time of Ubico and even 
before, only under Arevalo and Arbenz did the development vision of the state consider 
or even favour the majority of the people, and in particular the peasantry, lower and 
working classes. All other governments pursued development strategies directly oriented 
towards specific elite fractions, actively excluding even the interests of those classes 
favoured by the Ten Years of Spring. '̂*^
INTEGRATION INTO THE GLOBAL SYSTEM
From colonial times, Guatemala has been the seat of political and economic power in 
Central America. This has largely been the case since independence, and the emergence 
of the United Provinces of Central America in 1823. In spite of its regional power, 
Guatemala has always been a peripheral part of the global system, politically and 
economically. Further, it has always been outwardly oriented, at least economically, 
producing for the ‘world market’, first with cacao, then cochineal and indigo, then coffee. 
Coffee has continued to be ‘king’ right to the present day, but has seen the rise and in
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some cases fall of other agricultural commodities, notably bananas, cotton, sugar and 
beef.
From the 1950s onward, stemming at first from the vision of president Arevalo, there has 
been a rise in the interest in and degree of regional integration. Regional integration and 
unity are traditionally a liberal platform and Guatemala is the traditional regional 
hegemon and promoter of this brand of unity. The Central American Common Market 
(CACM) was originally promoted as an alternative to US domination, first as an idea of 
president Arevalo and then by CEPAL with its push for regional import substitution 
industrialization. However, after CACM was formed in 1960, USAID officials bad their 
way and the Common Market took the form of a free-trade association, under increasing 
US influence '̂*’, which eventually led to its virtual disintegration by the early 1980s. '̂** 
However, the fall in exports to CACM member countries '̂*  ̂bottomed out in 1986 and has 
been reversed to such an extent that by 2001 these four other countries together represent 
the single largest recipient of Guatemalan exports, surpassing the United States.^^®
There is however, a qualitative difference in the process of integration currently affecting 
Guatemala and Central America. CACM was an ‘inward’ oriented process of integration, 
creating economies of scale for multinationals -  largely US -  to exploit. Subsequent 
‘neoliberal’ and globalization guided integration, however, has indeed been ‘outward’ 
oriented in the sense of creating a regional economy that is entirely ‘open’ (free of tariffs 
and duties) and therefore appealing to transnational capital.^^* Furthermore, the 
economic golden age of the CACM in the 1960s is considered by many to have been 
illusory -  most all of the phenomenal economic growth experienced was due to the 
export of cash crops, with very little role played by industrialization. Additionally, it saw 
a substantial reduction in government revenues from import duties while no 
corresponding additional taxes were implemented.^^^ That said, the majority of 
industrialization that did in fact occur under, or at the time of CACM did take place in 
Guatemala, who, along with El Salvador, gained the most from the trade arrangement. 
Qualifying this observation is the reality that many of these ISI companies were 
subsequently bought by American multinationals.
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As the importance of CACM faded in the early 1980s, the fiscal austerity of structural 
adjustment had already been imposed by the military government, given its lack of 
international credit and its internal revenue crisis. Therefore, it was not until the mid 
1980s that the majority of international financial institutions and aid providers (re)entered 
Guatemala. The World Bank has had Stand-By arrangements with the central 
government in 1988 and1992, although the latter was not used.^^  ̂ Another Stand-By 
arrangement was made in 2001, although again it was not used, but rather renewed for 
2002. So great is the IMF commitment to the country that it announced in the spring of 
2003 that it will open an office of permanent representation in Guatemala to monitor the 
government’s implementation of its new program with the IMF.^ '̂* The Inter American 
Development Bank never truly abandoned Guatemala and has been the largest single 
supporter of its economy in recent years, disbursing US $1.27 billion over the last 16 
years.^^ Other institutions, such as Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, MIGA, 
and the International Finance Corporation, IFC, are also present, the former having 
guaranteed two projects for a total of $123 million in the 1990s, while the IFC has 
invested $172 million in 13 projects.^^^
What underlies this international financial involvement is their support for the same 
agenda that they are promoting throughout the world. Specifically, it is geared towards 
export-led growth, promoting the maquila sector and the growth of non-traditional 
agricultural export production. The national business counterpart organization behind the 
promotion of these non-traditional export products is AGEXPRONT, the Asociacion 
Gremial de Exportadores de Productos No-Tradicionales (Association of Unions of 
Exporters of Non-Traditional Products). These directions and policies are also in keeping 
with the designs of the United States, the principal market for and benefieiary of these 
goods.
The United States and its Eternal Vigilance
Immediately following the coup the United States became directly involved in the 
internal administration of Guatemalan affairs. Departments such as agriculture, finance 
and public works were operated by officials fi"om USAID, the World Bank and
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representatives of Klein and Sak, while an entire parallel government was established, 
guiding policy into the 1970s.^^  ̂ The role of the US government and its agencies from 
the late 1980s to the present is once again difficult to overstate. USAID itself continues 
to formulate a number of the policies and action plans of the Guatemalan Congress and 
President.
The next major US intervention in Guatemala was closely linked to Cuba, with it being 
chosen by the Kennedy administration to host the CIA sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion 
force during its training. This Cuban connection also brings to light an example of the 
alliance (or at least ability and willingness to cooperate) of national elites with foreign, 
particularly US interests. The CIA’s Cuban invasion army was based on a finca near 
Retalhuleu belonging to the oligarch Roberto Alejos, who had previously worked for the 
CIA and United Fruit.^^^ The same Cuban force was also used in Guatemala to suppress 
the military uprising that news of its presence sparked.
The US has been behind or a major influence upon all directions that the Guatemalan 
economy has taken. The CACM created a reduced tariff economy of scale for US 
imports, as well as for the mainly non-durable goods produced by US investments in the 
region. USAID has perennially been a major promoter of all aspects of export 
agriculture, supporting the agro industrial producers of cotton, sugar and beef. After the 
Cuban revolution, the majority of the Cuban sugar quota was shifted to Guatemala. The 
move to non-traditional agricultural exports -  vegetables like broccoli, cauliflower, snow 
peas and the like, destined for the North Aunerican market -  has also received extensive 
AID support.
Through total direct economic aid to Guatemala from 1949 to 1998 amounting to $1690.7 
million^^® the United States has been able to promote the export-led development and 
regional free trade association that it wants. From CACM to the Central American Free 
Trade Area (CAFTA) currently under (re)negotiation, to Plan Puebla Panama and the 
Free Trade Area of the Americas the entire region is being pushed into the economic 
shape desired by the United States -  providing it with cheap primary commodities and
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doing its low value or ‘dirty’ assembly, while existing as a captive market for its own 
exports of manufactures, capital goods, services and, most especially, food. A region or 
country that cannot feed itself and that is wholly dependent on one supplier for that food 
is their effective hostage. This exercise of ‘food power’ has been embedded in US 
foreign policy for over half a century^^  ̂and continues to be a central element in aid and 
trade.^®  ̂ Since 1970, the United States has provided 90.1% of all food aid received by 
Guatemala.^^^ So successful has the transformation of the local diet, and the destruction 
of self-sufficiency in food production, that the United States is the de facto supplier of 
one third of the basic grains available in Guatemala.
INEQUALITY AND IMMISERATION
In addition to placing Guatemalan reality in context, this chapter has two principle 
concerns. The first was to show how the national political economy is in fact 
subordinated to the global economic system and in particular the global division of labour 
and power, as headed by the United States and constructed to conform with its largely 
corporate interests.^^"* The second was to demonstrate how this orientation of the national 
political economy is in fact governed by, promoted and profited from by national elites.
Guatemala’s economy, like all of colonial Latin America, has always been oriented 
towards resource extraction for the world market, specifically the dominant imperial or 
neo-imperial power. Two of the main problems arising from this export-led development 
model in Guatemala are that all of the benefits from it are captured by a very small 
economic elite, while the export production occurs at the expense of production of basic 
grains and other necessities for the domestic economy, coupled with the extreme 
exploitation of workers.^^^ With the fourfold increase in the population since 1950 and 
the increased concentration of land in the hands of the latifundistas of the oligarchy, land 
is something to which the majority does not have access. Those small producers 
{campesinos) that do have access to land are generally left with insufficient area for 
survival and very marginal land for cultivation. Further, many of these smallholders have 
very tenuous claim to their land, either squatting, renting or living as share croppers 
{colonos). The problem of landlessness affects another half million people.^^^ With no
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real possibilities for employment, simple survival is a problem for millions of 
Guatemalans.
The reality of Guatemala’s political economy is thus extremely dependent and polarized. 
The meaning of dependency, particularly in development theory, has been particularly 
elusive in terms of its specific meaning.^^’ However, if we consider the various aspects 
of what it means to be ‘dependent’ -  relying on a single (or very limited number of) 
product, sector, market or supply source. This is indeed the case for Guatemala, in both 
economic and political terms. Historically, dependence has been on coffee, which until 
recently was the single largest contributor to national GDP. With the increased, albeit 
highly limited, diversity of products in the post-World War II era, it was the agricultural 
export sector that became central to Guatemala’s economic well being and its 
participation in the world economy. Increasingly in the twentieth century, and 
particularly since World War II, the United States has been the principle market for all of 
these goods. Similarly, the United States has become the single largest importer of goods 
and services into Guatemala. It is the chief provider of development aid, military aid, 
basic grain imports, investment and if it is possible to separate its influence from these 
concrete (economic) factors, is the most important political counterpart of the 
Guatemalan state. If the language of dependency is problematic in categorizing these 
realities, that o f ‘interdependence’^̂  ̂shows Guatemala to be extremely ‘vulnerable’ (as 
opposed to merely sensitive) to both the United States and the whims affecting a very 
limited number of unstable and globally overproduced commodities.
At the same time, this incorporation into and participation in the global economy has not 
been a phenomenon without protagonists. In particular, it is the national elite -  one that 
continues to be dominated or at the very least beholden to the agrarian ffaction^^^ -  that 
has promoted this participation in the global economy, implemented it and profited from 
it. From the early independence coffee plantations right up to the present, and including 
all of the other agricultural commodities (sugar, cotton, beef, etc.) and the more recent 
non-traditional agricultural exports, it is this landed elite -  agrarian and agro-industrial -  
that has profited most and in fact centralized its control over all such economic activity.
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This concentration has been so extreme as to virtually eliminate small and peasant 
producers to a marginal or insignificant level of participation in the production of these 
crops. The ‘modernization’ of agriculture has further concentrated land-holdings within 
the elite class and progressively dispossessed the peasantry of its land, forcing them into 
the very unstable process of proletarianization without providing any economic outlets 
for employment so that the dispossessed can in fact support or sustain themselves.
Private and state oppression, both under elite direction, has sufficed to silence the bulk of 
such peasant and landless worker opposition. In this way, the Guatemalan political 
economy has been oriented towards supplying the global market and integrated into the 
global economic system as a peripheral producer and westernized consumer of both basic 
needs and luxury goods. Internally, this orientation is managed by an oligarchy that 
profits from it, given their control over resources, especially land, as well as production, 




The Political Economy of Vulnerability
When the United States sneezes, Latin America catches a cold.
-  Latin American saying
INTRODUCTION
This chapter details the structure and orientation of Guatemala’s political economy. The 
characterization of it as dependent on a handful of primary commodities continues to be 
apt, although in need of qualification. Its dependence on a single market for imports and 
exports has clearly made it vulnerable to ‘fluctuations’ of both supply and demand from 
the United States. What makes it even more vulnerable than a simple lack of economic 
diversity is that the products it depends on are, and historically have been, notably 
volatile on the world market. The damage and danger of this volatility, particularly with 
coffee, has been experienced a number of times before, particularly during the Great 
Depression and during World War II.
As though this structural orientation of the economy was insufficient cause for concern, it 
is coupled with the very severe situation of declining terms of trade. The importation of 
necessary capital and consumer goods and a general lack of real production for the 
domestic market, as the national economy is predominantly service oriented, exacerbate 
the terms of trade by increasing the trade and current accounts deficit. This chapter 
provides an overview of these issues, as well as a review of Guatemala’s growing debt.
Its focus, however, is on the substantive elements of the nations political economy such 
as employment, ownership and redistribution -  specifically the contentious issue of taxes 
and government spending. Particular attention is given to the nation’s food supply and 
the degree to which the country produces for its own domestic needs. It concludes with a 
summary of the fragility, vulnerability and dependence that the national political 
economic structure engenders.
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Guatemala’s economy grew substantially throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The Lost 
Decade of the 1980s was devastating for the country, with virtually all aspects of the 
economy contracting until the middle of the decade. Gross Domestic Product was 
reduced by a fifth its size from 1980 to 1986, while the external debt tripled between 
1980 and 1985. Imports and exports each ‘bottomed-out’ in 1986 and 1987, respectively. 
Other economic indicators such as investment, open unemployment, inflation, and real 
wages also hit record lows in 1986.̂ *̂* It was also in this year that the CACM countries 
cut their common external tariff (CET) to less than half, while eliminating non-tariff 
barriers,^^* further ‘opening’ their economies while reducing central government revenue. 
In 1985 Guatemala untied the quetzal from the US dollar, resulting in rapid and 
overwhelming devaluation. The only positive aspect of the crisis was the reduction of 
non-essential imports.
STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY
Against this economic background, agriculture has fallen to become the second largest 
contributor to the national economy today (as a share of GDP), after ‘wholesale and retail 
commerce’. In 2001, agriculture accounted for 22.6% of Guatemala’s GDP -  a share that 
has been slowly decomposing from 28% in 1984 to 23% in 1999 and 22.8% in 2000. 
Manufacturing’s share in the national economy is also slowly shrinking, accounting for 
13.1% of GDP in 2001 (from 13.4% in 1999 and 13.3% in 2000)/^^ At the same time 
tourism has eclipsed coffee as the single largest income earner for the country, bringing 
in US$365 million in 2001, up from US$300 million in 2000.^^  ̂ As such, actual 
production, which is itself largely bereft of any added value, given its reliance on primary 
commodity production and the assembly of unfinished goods in maquilas, is declining in 
the face of an increasingly service oriented economy.
Since their inception in 1982, maquilas have steadily grown as the central component of 
national industry. From the initial three (two of which were American owned), the 
number exploded to 235 by 1991 By 2000 the number of maquilas in the country 
was 866 and increased to 937 in 2001 In these two years they generated $373.8 
million and $396.2 million in export revenues, respectively,^’  ̂surpassing both coffee and
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tourism. Virtually all clothing and textile exports go to the United States. However, this 
is a one-way relation of dependence as Guatemala provides only 2.41% of US textile and 
garment imports, by volume, and 2.84% by value.^^’ Thus the US market is all important 
to Guatemala, while Guatemala is utterly insignificant to the US, especially given the 
multitude of other ‘third world’ export processing zones competing for the US market.
There is more to the utter irrationality of export-led development based on the maquilas. 
They represent an even greater substantive net loss to the Guatemalan people and 
economy, given that all imports of raw materials, machinery, equipment and spare parts 
for the maquila sector are duty free and exempt from the national value added tax 
( I V W h e n  combined with the ten to twelve year holidays on income revenue taxes, 
the sector provides little more to Guatemala than the 46 cents (US) an hour minimum 
wage jobs they ‘create’.
Additionally, as Table 2 (below) indicates, the single largest import for Guatemala are 
primary and intermediary products for industry, valued at $1,735.8 million, representing 
31% of all imports in 2001. Given the declining role of national industry generally, none 
of which is heavy industry or concerned with consumer durable manufactures, and the 
maquilas’ increasing role within this sector, we can only assume that a significant portion 
of these imports are indeed destined for the maquilas. This means that they are an 
economic drain on the countries current accounts. The actual value of the apparel exports 
provides an interesting breakdown. According to VESTEX, 28% of the export value of 
clothing and textiles is covered by raw materials that originate in the US itself, 45% are 
raw materials from other sources, a mere 1% of raw materials are Guatemalan. The 
remaining 26% is the Value Added of assembly in Guatemala.^’  ̂ This is all without even 
considering the import of capital goods to supply the growing ‘installed capacity’ of the 
maquilas.
Another real, although older, drain on the national economy is located in the area of 
investment. With the economic crisis of the 1980s, capital flight saw national elites 
exporting some US $1.1 billion dollars in the first half of that d e c a d e . T h i s  trend has
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not halted and has actually increased such that flows of net investment are negative. In 
2000 and 2001, $407.3 million and $396.2 million, respectively, exited the country while 
$181.7 million and $276 million entered.^** This represents a total loss of $345.8 million 
in just two years, coming from exactly the segment of the national population that is most 
able to productively invest in the country. By comparison, the ‘economic refugees’ that 
fled the country in order to find work in the North sent remittances back to Guatemala 
worth a net US$524.3 million in 2000 and US$571.3 million in 2001. This represents 
substantial growth in what had been a steady increase from the $465 million that was 
remitted, on average, in the years between 1988 and 1993.^*  ̂ The only other mechanism 
balancing the net losses from the industrial and financial sectors that are supposedly 
developing that nation are the private donations entering the country, worth a net 
US$402.6 million in 2001 .^
What this economic structure shows us is that Guatemala is not simply another peripheral 
country in the New International Division of Labour. It is not entirely dependent on 
agriculture as a revenue producing activity, although the manufacturing sector is 
predominantly basic light industry. Like the North, it is the services sector that is the 
largest in the economy, a heterogeneity noted in the Global Division of Labour and 
Power. The diversity of financial services and even hi-tech pharmaceutical industries are 
contrasted with the ‘Brazilianization’ of labour that typifies other production activities, as 
demonstrated by the enormous informal sector, which accounts for 71.5% of employment 
in the country.
TERMS OF TRADE
As is clearly seen in the import and export tables below, Guatemala faces a serious trade 
deficit from the unfavourable terms of trade, which affect all its economic sectors. This 
is the case even with the agricultural commodities that are exported and imported. For 
instance, the amount of agricultural products that Guatemala has imported since 1961 has 
increased by 14 times, while the value of those imports have risen 37.5 times over the 
same period. Conversely, both the total value and total quantity of Guatemala’s 
agricultural exports have each risen by a factor of ten over the same period.^ '̂* This
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means that the real unit value of Guatemala’s agricultural exports has at best remained 
constant, while its imports have almost tripled in their real unit value. These are exactly 
the unfavourable terms of trade that cripple southern economies and their current 
accounts.
However, this disparity is only in terms of agricultural products and does not even 
address the truly enormous disparities in the terms of trade revolving around 
manufactured and capital goods. It also illustrates that the comparative advantage of 
producing agricultural commodities for export to gain foreign currency with which to 
import food crops is a regressive proposition, as even the imported food costs more (in 
the aggregate) than what is locally produced. These negative trends have only become 
more extreme in the 1990s, when imports almost tripled in quantity and more than tripled 
in value, while exports more than doubled in quantity, but rose by only 48% in value.^*  ̂
Trade is literally bleeding the economy through what Khor has described as the single 
largest mechanism for the transfer of wealth from the south to the north -  the unequal 
terms of trade.^^^ In absolute terms, Guatemala’s exports in 2001 were US$2,468.2 
million, down 9% from 2000, while its imports totaled US$5,606.6 million, up 8.4% over 
the previous year.^*’ This US$3 billion annual trade deficit is growing (at 27.6% between 
2000 and 2001) and is entirely unsustainable.
Imports
There are two primary considerations regarding Guatemala’s imports -  the country’s of 
origin and the kinds of goods themselves. Examining Guatemala’s trade partners 
demonstrates this first aspect of the economy’s general lack of diversity.^** The structure 
of imports in 2000, by country of origin, is representative of previous years. The United 
States is by far the largest supplier of goods and services to Guatemala (see Figures 1 and 
2). The five percentage point drop in its share of imports in 2001, to 35%, represents an 
absolute decrease of $110 million. However, it is important to note that much of the 
trade between CACM countries -  the main beneficiaries of the change in import shares -  
involves local subsidiaries of US based transnationals. This reliance on the United States 
for imports, particularly of manufactured and durable goods, as well as consumer non-
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durables like food (see below), is enormous. Finally, it indicates the destination of 
Guatemala’s foreign currency reserves.
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Source: BANGUAT 2001
While there are notable year over year changes, particularly with smaller importing 
partners, the structure of importers has been fairly stable in recent years.^^^ However, 
over the past two decades, there have been two notable trends -  a relative reduction of the 
importance of imports from the United States and a relative increase of the share of 
imports from CACM countries.
Figure 2: Share of Imports by Country of Origin 2001
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The second consideration -  the actual goods imported -  is detailed in the table below. 
The trends that it indicates are an increasing reliance on imports for luxury and basic 
consumer goods, as well as the industrial inputs for virtually all sectors of the economy. 
In particular, there are the maquilas which are simply assembling unfinished textile 
products, as well as other light manufactured goods and even electronics, that have been 
fabricated elsewhere.
Table 2: Structure of Imports (%) and Total Value (CIF millions US$)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
CONSUMER
GOODS
28.1 29.5 28.1 27.8 31.8
Non-durable 21 20.8 21.1 21 24.2





37.5 34.9 33.4 34.4 33.4
For Agriculture 3.7 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.5
For Industry 33.8 32.4 31 32.1 31
COMBUSTIBLES 
& LUBRICANTS
7 6.1 7.1 10.5 10.6
CONSTRUCTION
MATERIALS
3.2 3.2 2.7 2.8 2.8
CAPITAL GOODS 24.2 26.3 28.7 24.6 21.4




17.4 18.7 20.8 18.7 15.6
For Transport 5.7 6.2 6.8 4.9 4.8
Total US $ 3,857.9 4,650.9 4,560 5,171.40 5,606.60
Sources: BANGUAT 1998 -  2002.
The nature of Guatemala’s imports makes clear its absolute dependence on trade for 
practically all elements o f  modernity. The country produces virtually no durable or 
capital goods, meaning that all of these must be imported. Further, even those non­
durable consumer goods that it does produce, especially food and textiles, are entirely 
insufficient to satisfy domestic demand. Even other primary products that it is able to
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produce, like timber and wood products, are also imported. A clearer picture of exactly 
what Guatemala does produce emerges as we examine the country’s exports.
Exports
Coffee was the central pillar of Guatemalan production and exports up until 2001. It was 
joined by sugar, cotton and beef in the 1950s and 1960s as the other principal exports that 
fuelled the over 5% annual economic growth, that continued into the 1970s. While beef 
exports have virtually ceased, the stock of cattle in the country is at its highest level in 
history, currently over 2.5 million head.̂ *̂̂  From being the worlds third largest cotton 
producer, and second highest yielding one, Guatemala’s cotton industry collapsed in the 
1980s and virtually disappeared in the 1990s. Sugar, although it too has experienced 
volatility over these years, is the only other major ‘traditional’ export that continues to be 
significant in Guatemalan trade.
Table 3: Structure of Exports (%) and Total Value (FOB millions US$)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
PRINCIPAL
PRODUCTS
49.1 45.6 42.3 43.5 38.6
Coffee 26 22.8 226 21.1 12.3
Sugar 10.8 12.2 7.5 6.6 10.5
Banana 6.8 6.9 5.7 6.9 7.8
Cardamom 1.6 1.4 2.3 2.9 3.9
Petroleum 4 2.3 3.2 5.9 4.1
OTHER
PRODUCTS
50.9 54.4 57.7 56.6 61.4
CENTRAL
AMERICA
2&6 29.2 31.7 30.1 42.9
REST OF 
WORLD
223 253 26 26.5 18.5
Total US$ 2,390.6 2,562.7 2,492.8 2,711.20 2,468.20
Sources: BA ^GUAT 1998 -  2002.
These numbers represent a decrease in Guatemala’s dependence on traditional 
agricultural exports, firom 84% in the early 1960s, to 56% in the late 1970s^^* to little
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more than a third today. However, this understates their continued overall importance to 
the economy, first in terms of providing employment and second, in their particular 
volatility, which exposes the country and its workers to external shocks. This second 
point is part of the global structure of agricultural production, which is also the case for 
production generally. In the Global Division of Labour and Power, all of the countries of 
the South are competing in the same race to the bottom, producing the same commodities 
as each other.
This is the structural reality that lies behind the collapse of ‘traditional’ export crops like 
cotton in previous decades, as well as the current coffee crisis that has seen prices fall 
from $3.27 a pound in 1997 to $0.97 in January 1999 and $0.41 in September 2001. 
Guatemala depends on the US and Germany for over 60% of its coffee sales. Their 
imports of Guatemalan coffee (hy value) fell 15 and 21% respectively in 2001,^^  ̂
accounting for a part of the decreased export earnings. The most telling feature, though, 
is the decrease in average price received, per quintal, in 2000 and 2001 - $90.60 and 
$56.84 respectively.
The coffee crisis has had a profound economic impact on Guatemala, as it has for other 
coffee producers in countries throughout Latin America, Africa and Asia. Since 1996, 
annual exports have been in excess of 5 million quintals (46-kg bags) and earned an 
average of $605 million each year, until 2001. Even though the volume of exports 
totalled 5,758,000 quintales in 2001, the third highest quantity ever exported by 
Guatemala, they earned a mere $338 million.^^^ Unfortunately, this increased volume of 
production has occurred globally, with output up to 106 million 60 kg bags in 1998 and 
global exports of 83.5 million bags. Surplus inventories in both coffee producing and 
importing countries have remained above 32 million bags and by 2001 surpluses had 
grown to a record 48.5 million bags. While total exports had grown to 89.7 million bags 
a year by this point,̂ "̂̂  it was the manipulation of surpluses, rather than simply increased 
exports, that has caused the drop in prices for unregulated coffee production.^^^
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Compensating for Guatemala’s coffee losses were sugar exports which increased by 
almost 5 million quintales to 31.38 million, while its average price rose from $6.75 to 
$8.27. Similarly, cardamom saw its quantity exported rise from 315,400 quintales to 
331,600, with a price increase from $252 to $290. Banana exports rose by 0.84 million 
quintales to 16.963, while average prices decreased marginally to $11.38. The one-third 
drop in oil prices, exports fell by over quarter of a million barrels to 7.1 million in 
200T%*
Within the country there is a geographic distribution of production. Coffee, while 
creating seasonal migration for employment that affects all departments, especially the 
Western Highlands,^^’ is produced in 20 of the country’s 22 departments. The two that 
do not engage in coffee production are Totonicapan and El Peten, while the level of 
production in Izabal is practically negligible.^^* Sugar production occurs in 10 
departments, although 97% of that output is concentrated in three. Escuintla alone 
accounts for 72% of all sugar production in Guatemala. Similarly, four departments are 
responsible for 98% of the country’s banana production -  Izabal, Escuintla, San Marcos 
and Quetzaltenango. The first of these alone produces over half of the national output. 
Finally, 94.1% of cardamom comes from three departments -  Alta Verapaz, 
Huehuetenango and Quiche. Alta Verapaz alone accounts for 74.3% of national 
production.^^^ The importance of this productive distribution, and its correlation with 
concentration of land ownership will be discussed later.
Figure 3: Share of Exports by Country 2000
Export Partners 2000
2 .3 ^  18.9
B U S
b c a c m
□  Mexico
□  Germany 
B C anada  
B Jap an
B Panam a
□  All Others
Source: BANGUAT 2001: 72
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In terms of export partners, in 2000 Guatemala traded with 129 countries, with the United 
States again being the largest single trading partner, receiving 36% of exports, followed 
by the CACM countries at 30.1%, and the other countries shown in the graphic above. 
The remaining 118 other countries received a combined 18.9% of total exports, 
representing significant export diversity.^®® In 2001, however, there were significant 
changes, as exports went to 122 countries, displayed in the table below. CACM countries 
emerged for the first time as the largest export partner, receiving 43.9% of Guatemala’s 
total exports, replacing the United States in top spot.







□  South Korea






Source: BANGUAT 2002: 73
The ten percentage point drop in the US importation of Guatemalan goods accounts for 
the entirety of the almost $250 million reduction in total exports between 2000 and 2001. 
Thus, in spite of the diversity of trading partners, this is a clear demonstration of the 
extreme vulnerability present in the structure of Guatemala’s economy. Furthermore, 
considering that 90% of the decrease in exports stemmed from a reduction of its principal 
exports -  most of which go to the United Stateŝ ®* -  we see how product and market 
dependence combine to devastating economic effect. In fact, the entire loss is due to the 
drop in coffee prices and revenues, with the decrease in coffee earnings ($267.5 million) 
actually larger than the total drop in export earnings, indicating that other sectors
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compensated for coffee losses. However, given coffee’s overwhelming importance, it is 
impossible for these other goods and sectors to offset more than a fraction of the damage 
to national accounts, for at least the foreseeable future.
GOVERNMENT REVENUE AND SPENDING
The various interest groups that oppose duties and taxes always complicate the challenge 
of revenue generation for any government. Under structural adjustment and 
liberalization, taxation is increasingly difficult given the restrictions placed on what is 
considered acceptable and appropriate to tax and what is not. It is also an administrative 
challenge, hampered by the lack of efficient and effective processes and systems for 
revenue collection. However, who is taxed and to what degree is also an indicator of a 
sectors importance to or power over the government, as they all seek to reduce taxes 
imposed upon them. As already mentioned, the CACM eliminated most of the central 
government’s capacity to levy duties, leaving it with two principal sources of funding -  
taxes and borrowed credit.
Government spending is accepted as the ultimate indicator of its priorities. Spending is 
the action of a government, along with tax treatment, that demonstrates its priorities, 
beyond any rhetoric as to what they may be. In the case of Guatemala, those priorities 
have almost never been social ones, but have centred on the military. The Peace Accords 
stipulated a reduction of the military budget from 1% of GDP in 1995 to 0.67% by 1999, 
a level not to be exceeded thereafter. The Arzu administration adhered to these 
budgetary goals.^®  ̂ However, these budget targets were immediately disregarded by the 
Portillo administration, which further overspent on the military beyond the elevated 
budget allotments they passed through congress. In 2001 this additional spending 
amounted to 88.3% of the approved defense budget, totaling over $200 million for the 
military. This overspending, or over-investment, can be contrasted with failure of 5 
social service ministries, including MSP AS, the Ministry of Public Health and Social 
Assistance.^®^
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Similarly, the credit and subsidies that the government offers to producers do not target 
small producers or peasants. They, as well as the credit programmes of ‘foreign aid’ 
agencies, particularly USAID, have gone overwhelmingly to large agricultural export 
producers. Originally this focused on cattle, cotton and sugar producers, but has since 
moved to non-traditional agricultural export producers, in particular the packagers and 
processors, most of which are in fact subsidiaries of US based multinational corporations. 
The maquila sector, which includes some of these latter processing plants, has been a 
recipient of both this government support and its advantageous tax options, which include 
100% revenue tax exemption for 12 years, and no duties on all imported inputs and full 
exemption from excise and value added taxes.̂ ®"̂
Taxes
Guatemala has one of the lowest tax rates in the world, a fact that is of concern to both 
the IMF and World Bank, who seek to see tax revenues increased. As a share of GDP, 
tax revenues in Guatemala are the lowest in the region. In 1955 they amounted to 8.5% 
of national income, dropped to 7.6% in 1965, rose to 9.5% in 1975 and fell again to 8.6% 
in 1980.̂ ®̂  By 1984 they had dropped even lower to 5.3%^°  ̂and had only risen to 8% by 
1996.̂ *̂  ̂ The Peace Accords, in particular the Fiscal Agreement, required the 
Guatemalan government to raise tax revenues to 12% of GDP by 2000. However, by 
1998 it had only reached 9.6% and regressed to 9.4% the following year. °̂® This revenue 
goal continues to hover below 10%, in spite of renewed commitments to meet the 12% 
goal coming from the Portillo administration at the Inter-American Development Bank 
Consultative Group meetings in 2002.
Figure 5: Tax Revenues as a Share of GDP (%)
Tax Revenue as Share of GDP
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Source: BANGUAT 2002: 141
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The principal taxation mechanism is the regressive value-added tax (IVA -  Impuesto de 
Valor Agregado), which accounts for 43.9% of all tax revenue. Given that 76% of all 
taxes are indirect, these revenues come directly from final consumers, disproportionately 
affecting the poor.
Since the 1961 CACM agreement new revenue generating measures have not been 
successfully developed. Economic elites have continuously blocked the efforts of 
governments since the 1954 ‘liberation’ to tax them, and have even rolled-back taxes 
affecting them, including those imposed by Rios-Montt in 1982.̂ ®̂  CACIF has continued 
to be the primary and clearly most effective source of opposition to any tax increases that 
affect the economic elite, and in particular their profits from exports or their import of 
luxury goods. This means that the poor are left with a disproportionate burden of 
providing tax revenue for the state, as wealthy individuals and corporations have either 
eliminated or significantly reduced their tax obligations. This limiting of central 
government revenues -  in 2001 taxes only provided for 78% of the central government 
budget -  has two main consequences.^*® It reduces state spending, which effects social 
programs first and foremost, and it forces the state to borrow from domestic and 
international credit markets, creating debt problems for the country.
Debt
The national public external debt, amounting to US$2,846.9 million at the end of 2001, is 
entirely the creation of the last two decades of neo-liberal globalization. In 1977 due to 
its exclusion from international credit circles, the national debt stood at $302 million. By 
1979 it had increased by almost half to $427 million. By 1981 it had almost doubled to 
$549 million and in 1983 stood at $1187 million, which was still the lowest national debt 
in the region.^* * The table below illustrates its growth over the past decade.
In terms of its internal public sector debt, it stood at Q9,281.5 million (roughly US $1.16 
billion) in 2001, an increase of Q651.9 million over the previous year. In relation to 
GDP, however, this is a decrease from 5.8% to 5.6%. Furthermore, this represents a 
significant relative decrease in the internal debt from 1992, when it stood at 8.6% of the
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GDP.^‘̂  What this serves to illustrate, in conjunction with the capital flight discussed 
above, is the existence of sufficient internal savings to fuel development, if they were in 
fact used for such. Loans to the government by the private sector (international or 
domestic) are, given the high domestic interest rates which governments are forced to 
support, acts of speculation on what is a guaranteed investment, rather than a risk-based 
investment in the productive sector. The debt trap is thus combined with the maintenance 
of high interest rates -  a condition of structural adjustment -  that end up serving 
speculative financial capital while further compounding government debt. It also affects 
the poor and small credit seekers, who see themselves forced to repay sums significantly 
larger than what they borrowed. They are further unable to benefit from these high 
interest rates, because they do not have sufficient savings to do so.
Table 4: Public Sector External Debt
Debt Debt/GDP Debt/Exports Servicing/Exports
Year Millions US $ % % %
1992 1,546.1 14.8 80.2 10.1
1993 1,489.7 13.2 72.4 8.6
1994 1,702.2 13.1 74.4 8.7
1995 1,726.7 11.8 61.2 6.3
1996 1,751.0 11.2 62.7 8.4
1997 1,926.4 10.8 60.4 5.2
1998 2,212.0 11.4 63.4 5.3
1999 2,504.4 13.7 72.0 5.7
2000 2,513.0 13.0 654 5.7
2001 2,755.6 13.2 72.2 8.2
BANGUAT 2002: 155. Note: Excludes the external debt of the centra bank, which was
3.2% of total external public debt in 2001.
EMPLOYMENT
Just as there is confusion regarding the population of Guatemala, there is also confusion 
regarding the Economically Active Population (PEA). The PEA for 2002 was 
4,923,640^*^ an unprecedented increase of over one million people from projections for 
the previous year.̂ *"̂  The proportion of this population relying on agriculture for its 
survival, although declining in relative terms, is still enormous. In 1950 the agricultural 
share of the total population was 67.3%, and by 1980 was 57.3%,^*  ̂which in absolute
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terms represents and increase of almost 2 million people, to a total of between 3.5 to 4.1 
million.^ Currently, 38.7% of population is involved in agriculture, 22% in commerce, 
15% in industry, 12.6% in services, 4.5% in construction, 2.2% in transport and 
communications, 0.7% in financial services, 0.3% in electricity and water, 3.9% in other 
activities.^ At the same time, the ENEI2002 indicates that 71.5% of the population 
work in the informal sector, leaving a mere 28.5% working in the formal sector. In rural
areas work in the informal sector comprises 79.5% of all employment.318
Minimum wages, in real terms, are currently two-thirds of what they were in the early 
1970s. Agricultural wages, which have always been and continue to be lower than the 
norm, have also followed in parallel the trend of non-agricultural wages. While there has 
been some marginal improvement since the mid 1990s, when agricultural wages in 
particular fell to less than half their level in the early 1970s, the fact is that the last thirty 
years have proved entirely negative in terms of income for workers.^ However, by 
carefully choosing the time fi-ame for comparison, a more positive interpretation can be 
manufactured. With 1980 as the base year, real wages had only fallen by a quarter in
1991, and by 1994 were once more on par with the 1980 level.320
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Source: PNUD 2002
The actual level of employment in the formal sector is recorded through an employee’s 
registration with the Instituto Guatemalteco de Seguridad Social, IGSS. The first figure 
below show the very slow growth of employment in the formal sector while the seeond
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illustrates its relative decline against the population recognized as working and looking 
for work.
Figure 7: Formal Employment as a Share of the Economically Active Population
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Source: PNUD 2002
Concretely, the legal minimum agricultural salary was Q4.50 as of 1988, and rose to QIO 
in 1990, while actual wages remained between Q4 and Q5, half for women. It must be 
remembered that the quetzal had last more than half its purchasing power between 1983 
and 1988.^^  ̂ In August 2001, the minimum agricultural wage was raised to Q25.08 per 
day, although reports of coffee pickers receiving QIO, Q4 and as little as Q2 a day were 
published in the national press.^^^
Before the coffee crisis ANACAFE estimated that 3.5 indirect jobs are created for every 
direct job in coffee production.^^^ By 1999 they reduced this estimate to 2 to 1. From an 
estimated 750,000 direct jobs in coffee production in 1999-2000, and the ensuing 1.5 
million indirect jobs, the coffee crisis has seen direct employment fall to a quarter of a 
million in 2001-2002. Thus, in addition to the half a million direct jobs that disappeared, 
the economic foundation for 1 million other jobs also ‘vanished’. That is 1.5 million 
livelihoods that the global market has erased in the space of two years. In terms of the 
wage bill in coffee production, it’s maximum range in 1999 and 2000 was between US 
$10-15 million,^ '̂  ̂a miniscule fraction of the $572 million its export earned in 1999, or 
even the $304 million in 2001.
1 0 0
ASAZGUA^^^ claims that the sugar industry provides direct and indirect employment for 
a quarter of a million Guatemalans. This would make it the second leading employer in 
the country, albeit representing less than 10% of the livelihoods provided by coffee. The 
other key sector for employment is the maquila, which employed 93,300 in 2000.^^^ 
However, given the feminization of labour, these jobs do not necessarily mean that 
additional families are being provided for, as work disappears in traditionally male 
dominated sectors.
SEGEPLAN has analyzed the source of livelihoods for the rich and poor and found that:
“Agriculture is the principal source of employment for the poor. Of every 
hundred poor people, 57 work in agriculture, 15 in the manufacturing industry, 
and 13 to commerce. Of the 15 remaining, 6 are employed in service related 
activities, 5 in construction and the rest in other services. In contrast, the non­
poor are not concentrated in one specific type of activity: 22.6% are involved in 
agriculture, 26.2% in commerce, 18.4% in the manufacturing industry, 10.2% in 
services and 17.2% in other activities.”^̂ ^
DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH
In terms of the ensuing distribution of wealth, the profile is extremely and increasingly 
skewed. In 1986 the bottom 25% of the income ladder earned less than a 6% share of 
total income, while the top 5% received just under 24% of national income. By 1989 this 
disparity had increased, with the bottom quarter receiving just over 5% while the top 5% 
now received over 26% of the national income.^^* By the end of the 1990s, this division 
of income by fifths of the population is presented in the table below.
While Guatemala’s Gini Coefficient for income was 0.59 in 1995 and estimated at 0.55 in 
1998, the disparity presented in Table 15 has only increased. In 2001, the bottom 
quintile’s share had fallen to 2.1% of national income, while the richest quintile claimed 
63%. For low and medium income countries, Guatemala has the third highest level of 
inequality in the distribution of income in the world.^^^ However, when we compare
10 1
income with assets, particularly as a function of landownership this already enormous 
level of inequity between the rich and the poor is demonstrably greater.
Table 5: Share of National Income, by quintile









Increases in land concentration must be considered in light of the availability of land and 
its natural predisposition for use, as discussed earlier.^^® With this in mind, at the end of 
the 18* century, 70% of the most fertile lands were in the hands of indigenous 
communities, albeit often without ‘official’ title.^^* Hence, the bimodal agricultural 
system of latifundia and minifundia that characterizes Guatemala was largely a creation 
of the post-independence Liberal Revolution of the 1870s.^^  ̂ It was at this time, with the 
rise of coffee plantations and production for export, that extensive land ownership 
became a major concern for Guatemalan elites. The expropriation of indigenous lands 
began, accompanied by various policies of forced labour for the indigenous population.^^^
In 1950 the Gini Coefficient for land concentration was 0.71.̂ "̂* By 1979 it had risen to 
0.72,^^  ̂with the top 20% of landowners controlling 90.1% of agricultural land, leaving 
the bottom 20% of landowners with 0.8%, for the highest concentration in world.^^^ By 
1982 the Gini Coefficient had grown further to 0.85 and “historical prolongation of the 
latifundium-minifundium scheme established in colonial times”^̂  ̂was truly unparalleled, 
both historically and globally. Yet the concentration became even more extreme such 
that by 1998,0.15% of agricultural producers -  those considered commercial -  controlled 
70% of all land. The next 3.85% of ‘surplus’ producers control 10% of the land, meaning 
that the top 4% of landowners control 80% of all agricultural land in Guatemala.
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Subsistence producers, representing 59% of all producers, own 17% of the land, while 
infra-suhsistence farmers, 37% of producers, control 3% of the land/^^ Thus while there 
is increasing concentration in ownership at the top, there is also a downward shift in 
landownership patterns at the bottom, as subfamily plots become microfincas. The 
polarization has been double, with an increased concentration of land at one end and of 
people at the other.
Table 6: Land Distribution by Farm Size
Number of Fincas 
(% of total number)
Area
(% of total hectares)



















































Sources: CEH 1999: 84; ^ainter 1987: 10 and Gam arra & Asociados 2000a: 14)
What this distribution of land means is that 88% of all ‘farm units’ belong to peasants -  
almost half a million families, or three million people. However, given that most of these 
plots are too small to support a family, as indicated by the categories of classification, 
this means that very few (10% at most) of these peasant families are self-sufficient.^^^ 
Therefore, the bulk of these peasants are in fact semi-proletarians, forced to work at least 
seasonally and support themselves through other ‘off-farm’ income generating activities. 
In addition to those that actually have access to land is the 37% of the agricultural, or 
rural, population that have no access to land. This level of landlessness reaches 40.8% in
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the central Region 6 (Sacatapequez, Chimaltenango and Escuintla) and 46% in the 
southwestern Region 7 (Solola, Totonicapan, Quetzaltenango, Suchitepequez, Retalhuleu 
and San Marcos). '̂^® These landless families total half a million Guatemalans.^"^^
Production
This concentration of wealth is not limited to land itself, but also includes both 
production and industry. As the land concentration data illustrates, the large landholders, 
hy definition the landed elite, cannot but be the primary participants (by volume of 
production) and hence principal beneficiaries of the export agriculture regime. This 
concentration of production amongst the wealthy was most extreme with cotton, where 
all cotton-producing farms were larger than 92 hectares. These large commercial and 
estate farms further accounted for 95% of sugar production, 83% of bananas crops, 70% 
of beef production and 68% of cardamom production. With the exception of sugar and 
cotton, these majority producers represent a small fraction of the total of all producers of 
these commodities.^'^^
This disproportionate control of production is even greater with coffee. In the late 1980s, 
83% of all coffee production stemmed from large fincas, representing 3651 of the total 
97,679 farms involved in coffee production. Over a decade later, coffee is still notable 
for this extreme disparity, with only 1507 large producers (operating on more than 45 
hectares) and only 2425 working between 10 and 45 hectares, of a total of almost
100,000 producers.^"^  ̂ These large and medium sized coffee producers are now 
responsible for 80.7% of national coffee production. "̂ "̂^
Guatemalan industry was originally based on the processing of its agricultural products. 
The construction of infrastructure was also oriented by the need to extract these 
commodities from the interior for export. At the beginning of the twentieth century, until 
Ten Years of Spring, transport and communications infrastructure, both seagoing and 
terrestrial, was almost entirely developed and operated by the United Fruit Company.
This was in addition to their monopoly on banana production in the country. The UFC 
finally sold the last of its interests in Guatemala in 1972 to Del Monte, which continues
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to own the local subsidiary BANDEGUA, the largest single private employer in the 
country, with half of the 10,000 people employed by the banana industry in their 
employ. "̂^^
Similarly, coffee processing became increasingly concentrated, with the number of 
beneficios in the country falling from 4,243 at the beginning of the 1940s to 1,334 just 
over a decade later. All of these that remained were on fincas producing at least 220 
quintales of coffee, '̂*  ̂which means that this necessary part of production was 
increasingly concentrated in the hands of larger producers. While the number of 
beneficios has returned to the 4000 mark, only 100 of these are ‘large’ operations, with a 
processing capacity of greater than 50,000 pounds per day. These 100 beneficios are 
responsible for processing 60% of all of Guatemala’s coffee. "̂̂ ^
Control of sugar processing has been concentrated as well. There are 17 ingenios in the 
country,̂ "** all of which are owned by major sugar producers (the only kind of producers 
there are, with all sugar production occurring on plantations larger than 92 hectares), by 
sugar producing families or other members of the oligarchy and their increasingly 
complex webs of finances and ownership.^"^^
Thus, while millions of Guatemalans are involved in the production of agro-export crops, 
the vast majority of them are marginal participants. Overall production, processing and 
export of all agricultural commodities are concentrated in the hands of the economic elite. 
With their absolute control over land, the elites are able to dictate what it produces. 
Overwhelmingly, those commodities are cash crops that are not consumed or of any use 
to the majority of Guatemalans. With the resulting insufficient domestic food production, 
other sources are required.
In terms of industrial production, including the maquilas, virtually all of this activity is 
concentrated in department of Guatemala. This one region accounts for 95% of all 
industrial production. The 3.4% of national industry in Izabal, and the 1.6% in Escuintla 
is principally comprised of the agricultural processing mentioned above.^^® This
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‘decentralized’ industry is tied to export and shipping, as Izabal and Escuintla are home 
to the main Guatemalan ports for the Atlantic and Pacific, respectively.
Specific ownership of the maquilas, in 1991, was 65% national, followed by South 
Korean’s, who controlled a quarter of these export-manufacturing facilities. The initial 
US investment in this sector had only risen to a total of 11 facilities at this time, while 
other foreign nationals accounted for 4.7% of maquila ownership.^^^ By the end of 2001, 
investment in the maquila sector had shifted overwhelmingly to South Korean capital, 
which represented 67%, compared with 22.9% national capital and 5.7% from the US.^^^
FOOD SUPPLY^^^
By the mid 1980s, Guatemala only had access to 85% of the calories required to 
sufficiently feed its population, without even considering the distribution of that food.̂ "̂* 
Using the UNESCO classification of necessary food requirements,^^^ by 2000 there was 
only enough food present in the country to feed 80% of the populace. The following 
table tracks the evolution of food availability in Guatemala.
According to World Food Programme estimates, the average daily intake of calories for 
Guatemalans in 2002 was 2074,^^^ indicating a further decline in food availability in the 
country. Apart from this obvious and chronic shortage of food indicated by the above 
table, the other apparent issue is the transformation of the Guatemalan diet. Maize is the 
traditional food of the Maya, with deep cultural and religious importance tied to the crop 
and its cycle of production. However, Guatemalan’s are slowly abandoning maize in 
favour of wheat, rice and other modem and processed food. In 2001, roughly one-third 
of the country’s maize supply was imported, while 97.7% of its wheat was imported.
Only in beans, the other traditional staple crop and food, particularly for the rural and 
poor population, is Guatemala reasonably self sufficient, producing 99.2% o f its domestic 
supply.
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Table 7: Food Availability





2000 2148 53.8 46.8 838 216
1999 2130 54.4 44.0 849 230
1998 2156 56.0 43.8 887 256
1997 2157 55.4 43.9 899 241
1996 2242 57.5 41.3 1047 209
1995 2303 57.8 42.4 1045 200
1990 2395 60.9 44.6 1145 179
1985 2238 57.6 39.9 1100 171
1980 2219 55.5 43.0 1033 211
1975 2186 56.4 39.8 1138 151
1970 2096 56.5 38.6 1146 144
1965 2033 55.5 37.3 1101 148
1961 1895 53.5 32.8 1088 137
Canada 2000 3178 104.4 126.8 19 650
World 2000 2805 75.7 76.3 152 527
Source: FAOSTAT -  Food Balance Sheets
The following table traces the evolution of the maize supply over the last four decades. 
From the 625,000 hectares of land cultivated in 1961, the area dedicated to maize 
expanded quickly to 676,000 hectares in 1965, after which it has slowly and steadily 
declined to 546,000 hectares in 1995. Since then it has recovered to 620,000 hectares in 
2002. The volume of production, on the other hand, grew steadily from 518,100 MT in 
1961 to 1,272,240 MT in 1990, after which it dipped then rose to a record 1,336,380 MT 
in 1993. It fell steadily, then precipitously to 860,000 MT in 1997 due to El Nino, after 
which it has held between a million and 1.1 million tonnes through to 2002. Over the 
same period, the volume maize imports rose rapidly and enormously, while their cost 
became increasingly substantial, passing half a million tonnes and worth almost $59 
million in 2001. According to FAQ trade statistics, the United States has repeatedly 
exported maize the Guatemala totaling more than 100% the amount imported shown on 
the table below. Additionally, exactly 90.9% of all recorded food aid to Guatemala since 
1970 has come from the United States.^^^
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1961 518,100 2,963 1,823 519,240 625,300 296 128
1965 645,661 11,208 586 636,284 675,800 1,130 1
1970 785,846 19,154 1,110 756,889 661,870 946 17
1975 933,542 57,701 1,983 939,260 558,500 9,314 3
1980 902,419 84,207 18,504 968,122 659,200 13,210 3,142
1985 1,088,400 2,815 5,617 1,086,104 659,600 501 1,059
1990 1,272,240 118,947 138 1,283,518 634,480 18,374 110
1991 1,233,250 135,763 1,002 1,283,011 668,710 21,437 213
1992 1,366,380 94,474 1,373 1,309,481 725,620 15,009 261
1993 1,294,780 153,655 3,319 1,405,116 699,650 23,991 337
1994 1,187,692 161,449 4,715 1,374,426 606,925 22,933 839
1995 1,061,583 185,634 56,562 1,270,655 546,204 24,980 7,957
1996 1,046,795 223,709 28,005 1,282,500 575,132 43,729 4,474
1997 860,936 260,097 94,945 1,152,088 576,170 38,371 24,305
1998 1,068,779 277,508 16,047 1,404,239 628,906 35,995 4,837
1999 1,024,860 339,502 50,100 1,398,262 589,750 38,279 14,095
2000 1,053,550 351,252 16,376 1,438,426 591,500 38,400 4,357
2001 1,091,480 515,912 6,321 1,613,713 592,900 58,996 3,884
2002 1,100,000 620,000
Source: FAOSTAT
The doubling of maize yields displayed on the above table has been achieved through the 
massive application of fertilizers, which were almost exclusively imported in ever-greater 
quantities. These imports effectively quashed the small domestic production of fertilizers 
by the early 1990s. Again, the source of these fertilizers is principally the United States. 








1961 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Source: FAOSTAT
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Wheat production, already substantial in the country, more than doubled from the early 
1960s to the 1980s, to almost 60,000 MT. However, it has steadily declined since the 
mid-1980s to under 10,000 MT by 2000. Imports have exploded during this period, from 
over 50,000 MT a year in the 1960s, to over 100,000 in the 1980s, to quarter of a million 
tonnes in 1991. This rise continued to as high as 459,000 MT in 1998, but subsequently 
fell dramatically, to climb once more to over 400,000 MT by 2001. Only a fraction of 
these imports have come in the form of food aid (39,000 MT in 2001), the balance 
costing Guatemala some $70 million. The United States and Canada are the two sources 
of these wheat imports, with the former providing the overwhelming majority.
Bean production, and the area dedicated to it, has fluctuated substantially over the last 
half-century. The area involved was 64,000 hectares in 1960 and 1980, compared with
160.000 in 1975 and 1985. The 1990s and first years of the new millennium have been 
more constant, averaging 130,000 hectares under production, (without double-counting 
for the two growing seasons). Variations in production, however, have not completed 
correlated with the area under cultivation. Generally, production tripled from the 1960s 
to the mid 1980s, arriving at a record 122,200 MT. These levels declined throughout the 
1990s, to 72,680 in 1997 and rising again to 94,700 in 2001.
Potato production has grown dramatically throughout the last half of the twentieth 
century, multiplying by more than tenfold, from over 15,000 metric tonnes in 1960 to
172.000 in 1990 and to 226,000 in 2001. This increase in production is due primarily to 
the intensification of production, as the area harvested tripled in the first 15 years but has 
remained relatively constant from the 1980s to the present. At the same time, exports 
have also risen dramatically, peaking at 45,000 MT in the early 1980s and at 76,000 MT 
in 2000, although earnings from these exports have been rather insignificant ($7.2 and 
$7.6 million, respectively, in both peak years). Imports have fairly consistently averaged 
between two and three thousand tonnes, passing the 6000 mark in 1975 and 2000. In the 
last 4 years these imports have varied between none to over 5000 MT in 2000.
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Rice production grew steadily from 8000 MT in 1960 to 28,000 in 1980. Since then it 
has fluctuated between 20,000 and 30,000 MT, while imports grew steadily from almost 
nil to 15,000 MT in 1990. By 1995 production more than doubled, and reached 43,000 
MT in 2000. The area dedicated to rice production has varied between 10,000 and
15,000 MT from the late 1960s to the present. However, since the late 1980s, rice 
imports from the United States have almost paralleled domestic production, reaching 
46,400 MT in 2000. During this last decade, virtually half of the rice available in 
Guatemala has come from the United States
Sorghum has been a significant staple crop in Guatemala since the mid 1960s, when it 
rose over 40,000 MT, continuing to expand to over 100,000 MT in the mid-1980s. The 
area involved during this time fluctuated from 48,000 hectares, down to 34,000 hectares 
and up to 66,000 in 1985. Since then, both area and total production dropped to roughly 
half in the early 1990s, stabilizing at 42,000 hectares and 50,000 MT by the end of the 
decade and into the new century. This is the lone food crop that is not a target of 
significant import or export activity.
If the market did in fact allocate ‘efficiently’, to meet peoples needs, it would provide 
sufficient food, the most basic of needs and hence the absolutely most demanded good 
(along with ‘water’) that exists. However, we see from the food supply table above, that 
the market does not allocate to meet needs, but only to satisfy effective demand. We can 
roughly estimate that merely four fifths of Guatemalans can exercise effective demand 
with regards to their food needs. But this is only if we assume that the effective demand 
is equitably met -  an assumption that cannot be made given that we know that at least 2.8 
million people (25% of the population) currently do not have sufficient food.
An even larger market distortion o f  food security was displayed during the period o f  
greatest demand for maize in Guatemala -  during the destruction of its harvest due to El 
Nino in 1997. This year saw the country export more maize than at any point in its 
history -  95,000 MT -  almost twice as much as it has ever exported, either before or 
after. This exporting of 11% of national production, during a period of greatest scarcity.
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shows how ‘effective’ demand is all that the market notices. As has occurred in virtually 
every major twentieth century f a m i n e , f o o d  has been exported out of a region in need 
to one where profits are greater. This is the ‘efficient allocation’ of resources that 
characterizes ‘the market’ and capitalist profit maximization. People and their needs are 
clearly not a concern, certainly when weighed against profits. Given Guatemala’s 
outright dependency for food on the United States, it is also worth noting that 1997 saw 
imports from the hegemon reduced to almost half of the amount imported in previous and 
subsequent years. This clearly illustrates both the volatility and unreliability of this pillar 
of the Guatemalan food system.
CONCLUSION
It is no so much the Guatemalan economy that is dependent on export agriculture and 
production, but rather the people of Guatemala who are dependent on those sectors for 
their survival. The political economy’s external orientation both excludes and ignores an 
enormous sector of its population -  particularly the rural poor and the indigenous. This 
simultaneously leaves them without any means of subsistence and without sufficient 
means in order to subsist.
As we have seen, agriculture’s importance to the formal economy is decreasing. Even 
industry’s share of the national wealth is decreasing. The problem with this ‘post­
production’ economy is that the majority of people were only ever tenuously incorporated 
into the pre ‘post-production’ economy in the first place. With their ‘pre-capitalist’ (or 
pre-modem) modes of production for subsistence incompletely destroyed, and their 
‘modem’ means of subsistence as wage labourers also evaporating, the majority of 
Guatemalan’s are left in precarious vulnerability. They have neither their traditional 
means for survival, nor the modem ones, and are ill equipped to participate in the 
services sector, beyond the informal activities to which most are driven, selling whatever 
they can by whatever informal means at their disposal. The problem is that this is not a 
viable economic strategy for any kind of human development. It is a strategy for survival 
in a world that increasingly alienates people from everything -  production, survival, 
stability, tradition, and even themselves.
I l l
Production no longer provides livelihoods for people. This is before even considering the 
structure of the global division of labour and power that sets the poor of the entire world 
competing against each other to assemble products for comparatively tiny markets. 
Domestically, there are simply not enough people of means -  the rieh, the landed -  to 
employ the remaining millions of Guatemalans, as servants or in any other capacity.
This means that the crisis is more than one of dependence. It is a crisis produced by the 
global economic system that is neither concerned with people nor the substantive 
economy. Livelihoods have no place in the global division of labour and power as it is 
currently oriented. Subsistence does provide for livelihoods. Production, when rationally 
distributed, can provide for livelihoods. Services can only provide for livelihoods when 
there is a substantive base from the other two sectors to sustain it. The problem in 
Guatemala is that it has neither of the first two, leaving people desperately trying to 
survive in the third. Therefore, as there is no capacity to absorb labour, because the 
political economy is fimctioning at a level that does not even begin to approach full 
employment, any change in any of the sectors is one that undermines livelihoods, 
requires greater coping and saps both assets and resources, intensifying vulnerability, 
while triggering disaster for those who are most direly exposed.
Adhering to my injunction at the outset regarding reification, it is not the Guatemalan 
economy that is dependent on the exportation of its eommodities and manufactures, but 
rather an enormous segment of the country’s population. They are dependent on that 
production and trade for their livelihoods. A second dependency inherent in this export 
dependency is the need for imported inputs in for both manufaeturing and agriculture. 
Furthermore, the goods upon which the people of Guatemala survive, their food, is to a 
significant degree imported. Even with these imports, there is still insufficient food in the 
country to feed all Guatemalans. This even without considering the estimated 15-30% of 
domestic production that is lost after harvest,^^^ and other handling losses. The next 
chapter details the impacts of this political economy on the people of Guatemala, 
illustrating the ‘human development’ that it supports.
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Chapter V
The State of Global Vulnerability
The heresies we should fear are those which can be confused with orthodoxy.
- Jorge Luis Borges, "The Theologians" 
INTRODUCTION
The history of development in Guatemala has, for the last 130 years, focused on 
modernization and the production of exports. For the majority of this time, these exports 
have been almost exclusively agricultural. The 1960s saw the rise of some light industry 
and the last two decades have also seen the rise of the maquila. However, in both cases, 
the production has been for export and they have both depended on a large and cheap 
‘unskilled’ labour force. This export led development model has revolved around land as 
the central issue in two ways. Land is the critical factor of production in agriculture and 
therefore has been concentrated in the hands of national and international capitalists over 
the past century and a half. This has meant the systematic dispossession of the rural and 
indigenous population that lived on that land. This process of dispossession that 
accompanied the concentration of land ownership in the hands of a very small agrarian 
oligarchy has at the same time produced an enormous workforce. The rural population 
has been thrust off the land, and thereby their means of subsistence, and into a market 
economy where all they possess is their labour. It is this single, yet dual faceted process 
of proletarianisation that underlies national development, through insertion into the 
global economic system as a producer of export goods.
While chapter three has outlined this historic process, and chapter four has detailed the 
structural changes and evolution of the economy to the present, this chapter details the 
impact of both the process and the structure on the people of Guatemala. These impacts 
include the absolute (and relative) growth of poverty and extreme poverty, and their 
extremely unequal distribution geographically, by race, class, level of education and 
gender. A second, almost inseparable impact is the growth of malnutrition and its 
concentration in rural areas. This distribution of inequity, between urban and rural, non-
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indigenous and indigenous, is also true of education, literacy and practically all other 
social development indicators and the actual provision of social services. This chapter 
links these different situations of vulnerability to each other, showing how one form of 
social exclusion begets another, creating underlying conditions of vulnerability, but also 
exposing people to very specific hazards and shocks. It shows how these chains, or webs, 
of vulnerability compound themselves, creating greater vulnerability, particularly as 
social exclusion fosters greater environmental degradation and hence greater exposure to 
natural and man-made threats. The chapter concludes by summarizing the particular 
vulnerabilities of the population and their distribution, as well as the situation of ‘global 
vulnerability’ that exists, based on the historic processes and political economic structure 
discussed in the previous two chapters.
The developing mainstream conception of vulnerability to disaster sees it has having four 
principal aspects or dimensions -  the economic, the social, the physical and the 
environmental. This study has already outlined the economic orientation of the 
Guatemalan ‘political economy’ and now addresses the impact of this material 
foundation on the lives and livelihoods of individuals. We begin with an examination of 
poverty, nationally, and its distribution.
POVERTY
Poverty, its definition and measurement are not straightforward issues. Different criteria 
for measurement reflect different conceptions. The two main methods for measuring 
poverty are according to consumption or by income. While both imply a market 
economy, the latter absolutely requires one. Subsistence, self-sufficiency and non-formal 
economic practices make the income measure of poverty inappropriate in those 
circumstances. The satisfaction of basic needs is a third approach to conceiving and, 
therefore, defining poverty. Other conceptions of poverty include such social indicators 
as education and health. Each of these different indicators of poverty is presented here, 
as indicators of ‘baseline vulnerability’.
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Poverty itself is not synonymous with vulnerability, but it is closely related. Treating it 
as a specific condition of vulnerability, from which other particular vulnerabilities to 
specific threats are engendered, allows us to see how vulnerability is socially created. 
Poverty generally diminishes both the capacity of a people to adapt to hazards and their 
ability to cope with them. In this way they become increasingly vulnerable to any 
number of hazards, given their poverty. Through their struggle for survival, they are 
constantly exhausting the resources and assets they have with which to resist and adapt to 
difficulty. At the same time, they try to balance immediate survival against future 
destitution, in attempts to cope that maintain their assets by foregoing present needs.^^*’ 
However, given the different dimensions of poverty and the particular kinds of 
vulnerability, each situation of risk is unique in its specific combination of causal factors. 
Poverty is an underlying factor in most situations of risk. By identifying who is poor, and 
in what regions, then we are able to better identify those who are ‘at risk’.
This overview of poverty presents all three measures, at the national and departmental 
levels, disaggregated according to the relevant variables of geographic region (urban or 
rural), ethnicity (indigenous and non-indigenous) and gender (men and women). As well, 
given the variation of these trends over time -  and the very incomplete picture that a 
sample of only the last ten years provides -  this section present historical data for 
comparison. While this does present inconsistencies and incongruence, generally due to 
methodological reasons, it does allow for understanding and representation of situations 
and trends. This is particularly notable, for example, in that levels of malnutrition have 
(or had until recently) improved over the last ten years, but are in fact still worse than 
they were thirty years ago. Ignoring this historic reality is a disservice to analysis and, 
ultimately, a political act that distorts and actively misrepresents the impacts of current 
development policies and trends.
We saw in the previous chapter that the two aspects of wealth -  income and assets, are 
highly concentrated in Guatemala. What we did not see was that this wealth is 
concentrated in the urban areas and amongst criollos, as opposed to the ladinos. The 
indigenous peoples are at the bottom of this socio-economic hierarchy. Furthermore,
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women suffer from this disparity, at all levels of the ethnic and class hierarchy, to a 
greater extent than men.
As a middle-income country, Guatemala has a per capita GDP, by Purchasing Power 
Parity (PPP) of $3770 in 2000.^^* This figure has been slowly rising throughout the 
1990s, from $3410 in 1995.^^  ̂ While this figure is significantly higher than Honduras 
($2433) and Nicaragua ($2142), Guatemala still has the highest levels of infant (41 per 
1000) and child (52 per 1000) mortality in the region, as well as illiteracy (32.7%), unmet 
basic, sanitary and health service needs and the lowest level of life expectancy (64 
years).^^^ While this serves to demonstrate that poverty and vulnerability are not one and 
the same, it also reveals the superficiality of per capita GDP measures as development 
indicators, particularly at the national level.
As the disaggregation of per capita GDP by department shows (see table below), no area 
of the country has an income anywhere near this amount. The exception, of course, is 
Guatemala City, with a statistical level of income of 4 times the national average. This is 
also misleading, as the entirety of the country’s economic elite -  approximately 0.5% of 
the total population -  as well as the other fractions of the oligarchy, and the bulk of the 
professional and bureaucratic classes, are based in the capital city. However, together 
they only total a quarter of a million people^^ -  less than 10% of the Metropolitan 
Region’s population. This means that slightly more than 2% of the entire country’s 
population have high enough income to grossly distort superficial income figures for the 
primate city, and the entire country of more than 11 million people. This is an 
accomplishment when the real per capita GDP (non-PPP) breakdown demonstrates that 
16 departments have per capita incomes of less than two dollars a day, six of which are 
below one dollar a day.
What becomes immediately clear from the table below is the correlation between 
indigenous populations, rural populations and poverty. While the absence of an 
indigenous population or lower level of indigenous population does not correlate with an
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ensuing low level of poverty, high proportions of the former, particularly together do 
correspond with high levels of poverty (according to the consumption basket).


















Guatemala 2,654,203 12.3 29.1 12668.2 11.73 1.34
El Progreso 141,193 2.1 72.4 2139.8 54.8 18.13
Sacatepequez 267,877 41.6 29.5 1731.5 33.45 4.62
Chimaltenango 437,649 77.7 58.4 779.9 57.92 13.46
Escuintla 489,227 6.4 62.9 907.9 35.15 4.32
Santa Rosa 325,479 2.6 75.9 1485.6 62.07 21.46
Solola 316,629 93.6 66.7 1000.7 76.36 3232
Totonicapan 369,349 94.5 89.3 804.4 8532 55.62
Quetzaltenango 694,590 59.6 60.2 1064.7 60.67 22.42
Suchitepequez 411,638 57.4 69.8 958 53.86 14.7
Retalhuleu 245,875 333 72.3 2227.2 57.57 14.93
San Marcos 863,164 42.5 87 501.8 86.66 61.07
Huehuetenango 906,033 618 85 583.8 77.85 37.15
El Quiche 602,383 83.4 84.8 601.7 81.09 36.75
Baja Verapaz 207,781 55.5 79.5 1453.5 71.56 31.01
Alta Verapaz 848,340 89 84.2 522.3 76.4 363
El Peten 346,805 26.2 73.3 1334.8 593 22.16
Izabal 340,532 22.8 80.2 1486.5 52.12 16.84
Zacapa 217,927 4.4 95 8 2229.7 43.78 12.53
Chiquimula 320,979 293 74.7 1682.3 49.27 13.91
Jalapa 277,486 37.4 72.7 1383.9 72.59 29.23
Jutiapa 391,272 5.1 7&7 1147.5 &L88 23.24
Total/Country 11,678,411 41.7 65 3626.3 54.33 22.77
Sources: (a) PNUD 2002; (b) PNUD 1998; (c) SEGEPLAN 2001a
To put these figures into a comparative historical context, in 1980 65% of households 
were in poverty and 33% were indigent. In urban areas poverty measured 41% and 
indigence 13%. In rural areas, poverty reached 79%, with 44% of households considered 
indigent. By 1986 this national poverty figure had risen to 68% - 54% urban and 75% 
rural. Indigence affected 43% of the countries households, 28% in urban areas and 53% 
of them in rural ones. By 1990 rural poverty had eased further to 72% of the populace.
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while extreme poverty affected 45%.^^  ̂ When these figures from Rosenthal are 
compared with recent income poverty measures, they do indicate some measures of 
relative improvement. According to SEGEPLAN, at the end of the twentieth century the 
national poverty level was 56.7% and extreme income poverty was 26.8%. The urban to 
rural division was 7.1% extreme and 28.4% general, and 39.8% extreme and 75.3% 
general, respectively.^^^ Thus, there was a relative improvement over the twenty-year 
period in all indicators except for rural poverty which worsened. However, given the 
population increased by roughly half over the same period, the only absolute decrease in 
income poverty was in extreme urban poverty.
As we can see from the table, consumption poverty levels are slightly better than those 
using income measures. For 1999, general poverty measured 54.3% while extreme 
poverty measured 22.8%. This works out to 3.8% extreme poverty in urban areas and 
32.7% in rural areas. For general poverty it is 21.8% urban and 71.4% rural.^^’ What we 
cannot see in the table is that 238 of Guatemala’s 331 municipalities have poverty rates 
higher than 50%. Four of those municipalities actually have poverty rates above 98%. In 
terms of extreme poverty, 117 municipalities have rates of over 30%, 47 have rates above 
50%. There are even 3 municipalities in the country with extreme poverty rates -  levels 
of indigence -  of over 90%. These are the ‘normal’ conditions of poverty in Guatemala, 
as it can be measured by the formal economy. It is important to note that from this 
poverty data the national government identified 102 municipalities -  those with levels of 
poverty above 80% - as the focus of their emergency plan to overcome the ‘rural 
economic crisis’
A different substantive measure is that of the satisfaction of basic needs. In Guatemala, 
Unsatisfied Basie Needs (UBN) are measured on the basis of six criteria; quality of 
housing, sufficient personal space (number of people per room of living space), 
education, relations of dependency (heads of family without education and 4 or more 
family members per employed member of the family), access to water, and sanitation 
services.^^^ According to these criteria, 73.5% of the population has at least one
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Unsatisfied Basic Need. In urban areas those with one UBN equals 55.3%, while in rural 
areas it is 85.5%. The percentage of the indigenous population with one UBN is 85.9.̂ ^®
What is clear from all of the different measures and indicators of poverty is that it is 
concentrated in rural areas, amongst the indigenous population. Furthermore, it is 
specifically within the agricultural sector that we see the majority of the poor (57%) 
earning their meager livelihoods. There are also a number of consequences of poverty, in 
both rural and urhan areas. As El-Masri and Tipple note, “poverty increases the 
vulnerability of human settlements” by such factors as:
• “dangerous and marginal sites -  steep slopes, flood plains, industrial zones;
• inappropriate construction methods and building materials;
• overcrowding and squalid conditions;
• haphazard, uncontrolled settlement growth;
• lack of amenities and poor infrastructure;
•  lack of disaster planning and mitigation measures; and
• lack of adequate systems for prediction, early warning and emergency.”^̂ ^
As part of the process of proletarianisation of the peasantry, poverty is systematically 
created by the denial of subsistence. As rural subsistence is based on access to and 
exploitation of land, this de-peasantization is tied to the concentration of land ownership 
detailed in chapter four. One of the principal outcomes of the resulting subsistence 
poverty is increased migration to urban areas. This, in turn, heightens vulnerability and 
increases exposure to hazards in various ways. For instance, “urbanization induces 
natural disasters by upsetting the ecosystem.” Specifically, it causes:
• “Intense ecological modifications and various types of pollution;
• Land degradation, desertification, deforestation and loss of biodiversity;
• Encroachment and exploitation of natural resources;
• Overemphasis on industrialization, technological and commercial activities and 
ignorance of long-term effects.” ’̂^
119
Poverty is also a factor in malnutrition, at both the macro and the household level. The 
poor are unable to exercise effective demand, and are therefore unable to access food in 
the market. Because of their marginal social and political position, other entitlements 
that they could make use of given the failure of formal economic ones also disappear, just 
as traditional patronal obligations also erode with modernity and post-modemity.
Poverty is also directly correlated with education -  the poor have an average of 1.9 years 
of schooling, while the non-poor have an average of 5.4 years. Illiteracy is 44% amongst 
the poor and 18% amongst the non-poor.^^^ Poor families are also larger, having an 
average of six people while non-poor families have slightly more than four.̂ "̂̂  This web 
of mutually reinforcing vulnerability extends to undemutrition, as 46% of children of 
indigenous or uneducated women are stunted, while 24% of their children are 
underweight for their age.^^^
UNDERNUTRITION
The impacts of undemutrition and malnutrition are many and often permanent. The first 
clinical problem is that of Protein Energy Malnutrition (PEM), which, when chronic or 
occurring during key physical development stages of fetal development, infancy, 
childhood or adolescence, results in physical stunting. Acute protein deficiency results in 
kwashiorkor, while energy deficiency causes wasting, muscular atrophy and weight loss 
with marasmus as the extreme clinical condition. PEM makes people more susceptible to 
infections and parasites, while also slowing their recovery from any illness.
The three main micronutrient deficiencies afflicting peoples are those of iron, iodine and 
vitamin A. Iron deficiency is the most common, causing energy loss, anemia, and 
reducing physical and cognitive development. Iodine deficiency, the second most 
common results in goiter, while the physical and mental impacts of iodine deficiency, 
mainly cretinism (from gestation), is irreversible. Vitamin A deficiency occurs mainly in 
southern Asia, and can result in blindness. Other damaging deficiencies include those of 
niacin that results in pellagra, thiamine deficiency causing beriberi, vitamin C causing 
scurvy and vitamin D that causes rickets.^^^
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Undemutrition is the condition of insufficient consumption of food, resulting in either 
weight loss or stunting. It can be chronic or acute. Chronic undemutrition is generally 
measured through height to age ratios, particularly amongst children under the age of 5, 
as an indicator of the state of nutrition of the larger population. Acute undemutrition is 
the process of starvation, a result of recent weight loss, which is measured as the ratio of 
weight to height. A third measure of general or global undemutrition is the ratio of 
weight to age of a person compared to a set standard. Malnutrition is the condition of 
having an inappropriate diet, which while sufficient in terms of calories and proteins is 
insufficient in terms of other key vitamins and minerals. This can result in the different 
illnesses and infirmities mentioned above. It should also be noted that there is no 
consensus on exact nutritional needs, particularly in terms of setting a universal standard 










Non Indigenous 34.1 18.6 41
Indigenous 67.3 33.6 74
Urban Area 32.4 15.6 21.8
Rural Area 54.4 29.1 71.4
By Region:
VII: Quiche; Huehuetenango 692 33.4 79.2
II: Alta Verapaz; Baja Verapaz 56.7 19.4 75.3
VI: Quetzaltenango; Solola; 
Totonicapan; San Marcos; 
Suchitepequez, Retalhuleu
54.8 29.4 72.1
III: Zacapa; Chiquimula; Izabal; 
El Progreso
49.1 29.1 49.9
VIII: Peten 46.2 19.8 59.3
IV: Jalapa; Santa Rosa; Jutiapa 45.6 21.4 65.5
V: Sacatepequez; Escuintla; 
Chimaltenango
45.5 21.7 43.1
I: Guatemala 2&6 18.9 11.7
By Level of Education:
No Education 64.4 34.8
Primary Education 44.5 2Z5
Secondary Education or more 12.7 6.5
TOTAL 46.4 24.2
Source: Encuesta Nacional de Salue Matemo Infantil 1998-1999^'*
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The above table illuminates the geographic and demographic distribution of chronic and 
global malnutrition, as well as consumption poverty. It also demonstrates an overall 
increase in chronic undemutrition from 38% of the population, or 2.9 million people, in
1980.379
While there is conflicting chronic undemutrition data from 1986, the 2001 data 
demonstrates clear increases when compared with both 1980 and 1998/1999. Table 12, 
below, presents the findings from these different studies of stunting amongst school 
children. Comparing the INCAP study with that of 2001 there are chronic undemutrition 










Guatemala 20.3 35J6 31.9 12.8 11
El Progreso 26.4 40.4 30.7 30.1 25.1
Sacatepequez 41.1 57.6 45.0 21.3 16.4
Chimaltenango 52 65.5 602 362 31.1
Escuintla 25J 38 8 30.3 2&6 26
Santa Rosa 27.5 40.2 3&0 33 292
Solola 64.6 76.8 73.2 55.7 47.9
Totonicapan 60.9 75.4 73.2 50.2 43.3
Quetzaltenango 44.6 602 55.1 32 27.4
Suchitepequez 41.5 56.7 48.9 40.2 332
Retalhuleu 34.7 48.8 41.9 332 25.6
San Marcos 45.7 61.2 61.4 40.4 332
Huehuetenango 51.8 66.6 66.4 52.4 41.6
El Quiche 52.9 66.4 64.8 63.5 532
Baja Verapaz 383 54.1 51.7 50.3 41.9
Alta Verapaz 382 54.4 49.2 66.4 51.3
El Peten 29.7 54.1 39.7 40.9 31.6
Izabal 252 38A 332 362 31
Zacapa 24.1 3&6 33.1 33A 28.4
Chiquimula 33 j 49.1 47.7 47.5 392
Jalapa 37.5 52 52.3 44.4 362
Jutiapa 24.8 3&9 322 36.7 31.1
Total/Country 532 48.8 352 30.2
Sources: PNUD 1998, 2002
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Comparing just the Ministry of Education studies, there has been an absolute increase of 
undemutrition in all but 6 of the 331 municipalities in the country, between 1986 and 
2001, (including 9 of Guatemala City’s 22 Zones). In all of the other 315 municipalities 
there have been absolute increases, which nationally was more than threefold. The total 
number of children under five survey suffering from moderate and severe physical 
stunting equaled 186,057 in 2001, up from 58,316 in 1986. However, overall there has 
been a relative decrease in chronic undemutrition, at least according to the two Ministry 
of Education surveys, as the sample population increased by almost three and a half 
times, outpacing the incidence of stunting. That said, 97 municipalities registered 
relative increases in their levels of undemutrition. In spite of the relative improvement, 
171 of Guatemala’s 331 municipalities (51.6% of them) had undemutrition rates in 2001 
of over 50%. All municipalities register some degree of undemutrition, with 15% being 
the lowest. Thus, even the relative overall improvement still leaves the country in an 
abominable state of chronic malnutrition.
If representative, these studies mean that roughly half of the adult population of the 
country have suffered physiological damage due to malnutrition. Even if light, at certain 
sensitive times in human development, malnutrition can have serious negative impacts on 
physical and mental development. It also means that at least another generation of 
Guatemalan’s will continue to suffer from these impacts. This makes their escape from 




While virtually all education indicators have been steadily improving over the last 
decade, this is largely an indication of how poor the situation was to begin. By 2001, only 
85.1% of children began primary school, while 43.6% of youths entered secondary 
school and but 22% began post-secondary education. Levels of desertion continue to be 
high at all stages, as are the levels of repetition. The gender disparity is still significant, 
favouring boys, although this reverses at the post-secondary level. One of the major
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problems associated with the expansion of the education system, in terms of its 
incorporation of more students, is that the initially inconsistent quality of the education is 
further deteriorating.^**^
There are also a number of dimensions of vulnerability that are associated with levels of 
education. As shown in Table 11, children whose mothers have secondary education or 
greater are more than 5 times less likely to suffer from chronic and global malnutrition. 
However, in Guatemala, given the conditions of poverty and the other aspects of 
vulnerability, even education is not a guarantee against undemutrition. The size of 
Guatemalan families is also clearly correlated with the woman’s level of education. 
Fecundity is 5.0 per woman, nationally, 6.8 for a woman without education and 2.9 for a 
woman with secondary education or higher.^*  ̂ This, incidentally, represents an overall 
decrease in fecundity from 5.6 children per woman in 1987, although the patterns of 
change according to other variables are less clear.^^  ̂ ENSMI95 recorded a strong 
correlation between incidence of diarrhea in children under 5 and its effective treatment 
with area of residence (rural-urban) and level of education of the mother (none, primary, 
secondary and up) with the former in both cases resulting in higher exposure and risk to 
the children. It also recorded better nutritional conditions for children in every category 
when correlated with increased levels of education.^^^
Another social indicator that is correlated with education is adolescent pregnancy. In 
1994 it was significantly higher in rural areas (145.8 per thousand versus 85.6) and 
amongst indigenous women (140.7 versus 110.1). The difference is highest, though, 
when correlated with education -  179.4 for adolescent women with no education, 
compared with 19.7 for those with secondary education or more. The national level of 
adolescent fecundity was 122.7.̂ "̂̂
Literacy
Distinct from education, yet obviously closely related, is literacy. This is an indicator 
that has been increasing constantly over the past half century. In 1950 only 29% of the 
population were literate. By 1964 this had increased to 37%, growing to 43% by 1981.^*^
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By 1990 there were 2.1 million illiterate people in the country. By 2000 there was an 
absolute decrease to 2.0 million illiterates, leaving 68% of population as literate.^*^ There 
are, of course, differences in the distribution of literacy and illiteracy throughout the 
country, as noted above in Table 12. One of these inequities is found with the 
agricultural population, 40% of whom are illiterate.^*’ By comparing Table 12 with 
Table 10, we also see the strong correlation between levels of illiteracy and the 
indigenous population of a department.
Health Care
Apart from nutrition, most health indicators have also improved steadily over the last 
half-century. This is in large part related to the growing coverage of health services, and 
increased education. Mortality rates have fallen steadily since 1950, when they measured 
22.4 per 1000, down to 7.4 in the period of 1995-2000. Over the same period, life 
expectancies have risen from 42 years to 64, although the gap between women’s and 
men’s life expectancy has increased from 1 year to 6 years.*** Infant mortality rates have 
also fallen, from 141 per thousand in 1950 to 46 in the period of 1995-2000. There is, 
however, still a notable gap between male and female infants, the former having a 
mortality rate of 50.4 while the latter have 41.3.**  ̂ Maternal mortality has fallen from 
248 (per 100,000) in 1989 to 190 in 1995.*̂ *̂  A clear urban-rural disparity is also present 
Avith all of these indicators. One worrying issue that has not seen notable improvement is 
that 16% of infants are underweight at birth.*^^
Political Participation
Democracy, as Sen argues, is a defense against famine. As illustrated in chapter three, 
democracy does not have deep roots in Guatemala. Political parties are little more than 
vehicles for different elite fractions. This continues to be very mueh the case, with the 
possible exception o f  the URNG, the former umbrella organization o f  the guerrillas. 
However, since the signing of the Peace Accords in 1996, when it became a political 
party, it has been highly divided and largely absent from the national political stage. 
Testifying to national apathy towards formal democracy -  the ritual of voting -
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Guatemala has the lowest voter turnout for eleetions in Latin America, at a mere 
29.6%.̂ ^^
Most civil participation and political voice for the popular sector is to be found coming 
from civil society unions. The other voice is non-governmental organizations 
representing different civil society constituencies, as opposed to the populace at large. 
Both the unions and the NGOs are present in such arenas the Consultative Group. This 
body is the international forum, administered by the United Nations and the Inter 
American Development Bank, for the monitoring of the Peace Accords and the 
implementation of the development agenda stipulated therein.
The obverse of democratization is militarization. Increased military spending and 
increased participation in the military are both accurate indicators of the level of 
militarization of a country or society. Participation is by far the most significant of the 
two factors. It is high levels of militarization that cause low levels of democracy and not 
vice-versa.^^^ The history of the military’s control of Guatemala was sketched in Chapter 
3, and recent increases in its funding was noted in Chapter 4. The level of participation 
in the military extends far beyond the 40,000 soldiers that filled the ranks of the army at 
its height. It is the 900,000 members of the PAC, the Civil Self-Defense Patrols, which 
the military state mobilized in the 1980s that are the true indicator of the militarization of 
the country.^ "̂  ̂ While required to be fully demobilized under the Peace Accords, the PAC 
continue to be a considerable political and military constituency within the country.
Their political mobilization has increased considerably since 2002, reflecting the very 
fragile space for real democratic participation.^^^
Migration
The importance o f  remittances to the national economy has already been mentioned.
What has not been discussed are the people and migration that underlie that crucial 
source of income for so many Guatemala. This section outlines the issues behind 
migration, and identifies both the source and destination of migrants domestically and
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internationally. This allows us to see which regions are gravely affected by socio­
economic crises, given how migration acts as an indicator of local conditions.
With the rise of such concepts as economic, but particularly environmental refugees, 
migration is an issue of global concern. It is also a very clear indicator of conditions in a 
particular area. The term environmental refugee is itself a bit of a misnomer, firstly in 
that it hides the economic roots and dimensions of the environmental problem. As 
famine is not simply the condition of their not being enough food, but rather of people 
not having enough of it, it is not the destruction of the environment that is the issue, but 
rather the fact that people are unable to support themselves and survive in their degraded 
environs. This is not to deny the environmental destruction, but rather to focus on its 
relationship with the human community. Secondly, the environmental destruction often 
ignores the economic roots, understood as the human relationship with (or exploitation 
of) the environment for a community's survival. Environmental degradation does not 
always or simply occur on its own, especially where humanity is involved. Degradation 
and exploitation are inseparably linked processes, which often have the social and 
economic roots outlined in chapters 3 and 4, and discussed below in the section on the 
environmental impacts. The point here is that migration is an issue of survival. Outside 
of situations of civil unrest and warfare, this is generally a purely economic concern, in 
the broadest of senses.
The first dynamic of migration to affect Guatemala, since the conquest and colonization, 
has been that of urbanization, which was briefly outlined in Chapter 3. The enormous 
growth of Guatemala City in the last half-century is testimony to this, as the Metropolitan 
Region is the principal destination of internal migrants. The second destination has been 
the Peten, which has been treated as the last frontier for colonization for roughly the last 
thirty years. Aside from Sacatepequez, with the country’s capital of the tourism industry, 
Antigua, all other departments of the country are net sources of emigration.^^^
International migration is also a more recent phenomenon, largely occurring since the 
civil war. In addition to the estimated one million people displaced internally during this
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time, over 400,000 fled the country as refugees, mainly to Mexico, but also to Belize, El 
Salvador and Honduras. Numerous others fled further afield to Canada and above all the 
United States. By 1980 there were 63,073 registered Guatemalan immigrants in the US 
and 225,739 hy 1990, representing 78% of all international emigration.^^’ There are 
currently an estimated one million Guatemalans living in the United States, roughly a 
quarter of whom are there illegally. The departments of origin of these Guatemalan 
emigrants and their distribution throughout the United States are as follows:
Table 12: Guatemalan Migration by Origin and Destination
Department Percentage Share % of Dept. Pop. Destination State Percent
Huehuetenango 23 26.1 California 64
San Marcos 18 21.3 New York 12
Quetzaltenango 14 20.6 Illinois 7
Retalhuleu 12 49.6 Florida 5
Suchitepequez 10 24.7 Texas 4
Chiquimula 9 28.7 Georgia 3
Santa Rosa 8 25.0 Oregon 2
El Progreso 6 41.9 All Others 3
Source: OIM 20 01: 14-17 anc own calculations.
What makes the percentage of Guatemalans in the US from Chiquimula even more 
impressive is that, with the exception of Retalhuleu, all of those departments with a 
greater share of the emigrants have populations that are significantly larger (by at least
100,000 people) than Chiquimula, some more than double. These 90,000 Chiquimulans 
in the US represent 28.7% of the entire population of the department. While this pales in 
comparison with the equivalent of half the current population of Retalhuleu having 
emigrated to the US, it is indicative of the difficult situations in these departments.
Finally there is a seasonal element to migration, when people move in search of work. 
Contrary to what would ensure livelihoods and subsistence for peasant families, the 
period of the coffee harvest -  the main source of employment for peasant labour -  
coincides with basic grain harvests. The coffee harvest and related seasonal employment 
begins in November and extends until February. Maize and bean harvests, for 
subsistence farmers, while varying across the country, can extend from August to
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January.^^^ In addition to this conflict between subsistence and paid labour, there is also 
the six month ‘lean season’ between February and August, when peasant families have no 
possibilities for work and no hope for food production. They are left to survive on their 
production and earnings from the previous season. For most areas of the country, this 
food ‘deficit’ period is a regular yearly occurrence, regardless of the success of the 
previous years crops, given the limited area of land dedicated to production, and 
irrespective of the seasonal employment, given the low wages.
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
One of the clearest direct impacts of the last fifty years of ‘development’ in Guatemala 
has been the destruction, degradation and deforestation of the environment. These three 
outcomes are also part of the dialectic process of marginalization and exclusion, which, 
through the concentration of land, particularly prime agricultural land amongst 
commercial producers, has forced the ‘peasantry’ to exploit marginal and sensitive agro- 
ecological areas. The impacts of both commercial and subsistence economies has been 
overwhelming.
Weinberg^^^ discusses modernization’s systematic destruction of tradition and the 
elaborate and religiously imbued ‘culture of maize’ of the Maya. He cites the military 
colonization, as a reward, of the Northern Transversal Strip, as being a direct attack on 
peasants, while the cattle industry, generally, forced Mayan peasants off the land, 
breaking their spiritual and reproductive link with it. The counter-insurgency measures 
themselves both directly, through chemical warfare, fires and the like, and indirectly, 
through displacement, marginalization and cattle ranching, attacked the Guatemalan 
environment generally and its forests in particular. The complex interaction of all these 
different factors -  development, poverty and social justice, warfare -  and their destructive 
impact on ecosystems in Central America is forcefully detailed by Faber.
The table below illustrates these impacts through detailing current usage of land at the 
departmental level, the degradation of that land'*'’* and the remaining area of forest cover.
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Alta Verapaz 8686 55.8 4.2 39.4 29.7 40.1
Baja Verapaz 3124 27.7 0.2 72.1 35.6 47.5
Chimaltenango 1979 26J 3.2 70.5 43.9 38.4
Chiquimula 2376 59.1 0.7 40.2 67.7 16.4
El Progreso 1922 15.9 0 86.1 68.1 13.5
El Quiche 8378 42.4 10.5 47.1 20.1 16.9
Escuintla 4384 50.1 23.1 2&8 24 3.3
Guatemala 2126 8.8 4.8 86.4 77 19.8
Huehuetenango 7400 3&8 3.9 59.4 42.1 37.3
Izabal 9038 48.8 20.8 262 21.1 294
Jalapa 2063 47 53.1 0 77 11.5
Jutiapa 3219 6 5.8 883 623 3.6
El Peten 35854 70.1 12.7 16 14.5 48.9
Quetzaltenango 1951 49.1 10.8 40.1 52.3 24.8
Retalhuleu 1856 40.9 33J 25.4 33.4 0.3
Sacatepequez 465 52.1 4.2 43.3 30.1 24.1
San Marcos 3791 27.5 6.1 66.4 55.2 19.6
Santa Rosa 2955 8.4 13.9 77.8 60.5 5.9
Solola 1061 79.9 1.2 19 48.3 18.7
Suchitepéquez 2510 2T8 3fr9 41.3 3fr8 5.0
Totonicapan 1061 26.2 0 73.8 17.5 60.6
Zacapa 2690 44.6 0 55.4 64.2 21.2
Total 108889 31.5 35.5
Source: UICN 2001: 40 and PNUD 1998: 224
There are two main issues in the misuse of land resources in Guatemala that are leading 
to its degradation -  the grazing of cattle on land suited to agricultural production, and 
agricultural production on marginal land not suitable for cultivation. This cattle grazing, 
which now occupies 2.6 million hectares of land, over half of the agricultural frontier 
exposes land naturally suited to cultivation to increased erosion, while also compacting 
soils. This grazing land is further inappropriate in that it is incapable of supporting 
suitable grazing vegetation for more than a few of years, before being exhausted and 
requiring expansion into newly deforested areas. It repeats this cycle, leaving 
overgrazed, deforested, eroded and soil compacted land behind that is by this point 
unsuitable for cultivation due to the damage wrought.'^*’̂
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The cultivation of marginal lands is principally a phenomenon of poor and landless 
peasants. As they have no or insufficient land to produce enough for subsistence, due to 
the processes of concentration and appropriation of prime agricultural land in latifundia, 
they exploit whatever land remains. This survival strategy finds only marginal land, with 
poor or already depleted soils, usually on sloping hillsides, left available for exploitation. 
This land is therefore also sensitive to deforestation and erosion, which quickly 
compounds its marginality, eventually failing and forcing subsistence farmers to seek 
new areas to exploit. With no tenure to the land, or security over their usufruct rights, 
most peasant families are economically rational in not investing the time, labour or 
resources in maintaining or improving the land they exploit. Only when they have clear 
and unthreatened proprietary right to the land (not simply renting), do they maintain and 
improve it as an investment in their future subsistence and wealth.
Given the growth of the population, and the concentration of the majority of land in the 
hands of so few, the very determined defense of land that is claimed means that there is 
virtually no frontier left for expansion. All that does remain is in the Peten region (the 
Northern Transversal Strip having already been fully colonized). But this rainforest, with 
its shallow calcium based soil, is also very sensitive to erosion and easily exhausted by 
agriculture and cattle grazing.
The result is increased vulnerability of both the land itself and the people that survive on 
it. Both are now increasingly vulnerable to ‘natural’ hazards, many of which are 
significantly less natural, becoming pseudo-natural, due to human alteration of the 
physical environment. This changes the physical and biological dynamics creating 
greater exposure to, and hence risk from the destruction caused by flooding, erosion, 
desertification, landslides, hurricanes and the like. The very environment itself has its 
natural resistance to this hazards undermined, so that it is further degraded, while also 
impacting more severely on human settlements. The incredible destruction wrought by 
Hurricane Mitch is the prime example of this process, where deforestation exposed both 
land and communities to enormous damages, against which they were effectively 
defenseless.
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There is also the plethora of thus far unmentioned problems of monoculture. This mode 
of production has several times exposed key cash crops, like bananas and coffee to 
devastation by diseases. The inappropriate and excessive use of fertilizers and pesticides 
has wrought massive ecological destruction, as well as elevating human vulnerability and 
mortality through poisoning.'*®'* This is particularly the case with spraying along the 
Pacific Slope, where cotton and sugar production are concentrated, depending on the 
enormous application of these chemical inputs. The Peten has also suffered from this 
misuse of fertilizer where tracts of its soil have been ‘chemically burned’ beyond use and 
possibly even beyond recovery.'*®^
CONCLUSION: Vulnerability, Global Vulnerability and their Distribution
While not necessarily factors of vulnerability for all types of hazards or disasters 
(particularly technological ones), the dimensions of poverty, malnutrition, social 
exclusion and environmental damage discussed above are all relevant factors when it 
comes to famine. Famine and hunger do not affect the rich, especially in Guatemala 
where the rich are not simply ‘relatively’ so, but are absolutely wealthy, in any context or 
country of the world. Therefore, knowing who is poor, and where they are is important 
to understanding and combating both poverty and hunger. Similarly, those that are 
already suffering from malnutrition, both chronic and acute, are likely to become poorer 
and more vulnerable to future hunger. The malnutrition that affects the rich (obesity, 
anorexia, bulimia and the like) is of their choosing. The poor are undernourished not by 
choice, but of necessity. They have only one choice in a socio-economic system in 
which, by simply being poor, they do not exercise effective demand. They can choose 
between present hunger and future destitution. The debt, poverty, malnutrition, illiteracy 
and environmental degradation traps in which they find themselves are mutually 
reinforcing and regressive, each one compounding the other, as they all increase 
detrimentally with time.
The resulting political and economic weakness of the poor, the rural, the indigenous, the 
uneducated, those living in marginal areas, increases their vulnerability to practically all 
‘natural’ and pseudo natural hazards. It is furthered by the extent to which they are a
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semi-proletariat, effectively between worlds. This means they have lost or are losing 
both the social and technological means to survive and cope with threats, but also that 
they have not availed themselves of the protection of ‘modernization’ as they are not 
fully incorporated into the formal modem sector.
Given the limited nature of the modem sector, particularly in a peripheral export led 
economy, it is impossible for the masses of the rural poor, who in tum become the urban 
poor, to be incorporated. Economic development is not concemed with them, but rather 
with satisfying extemal markets. Further, this economic development is content to leave 
them in this ‘grey area’ of being a semi-proletariat, between tradition and modemity, as it 
sufficiently maintains both the labour market and the consumer market at a level 
acceptable to the dominant economic elite, without directly prejudicing their larger export 
interests. The difficulty of effectively developing and serving rural markets is understood 
and has been decided against in favour of the easier and more profitable (or at least 
perceived to be so) export sector. The pursuit of intemal development means absolute 
losses for the economic elite in the short term, and relative ones in the long term. From 
the actions of history, it is clear that any such elite impoverishment is not acceptable.
And so the poor, the rural and the indigenous of Guatemala find themselves exposed also 
to the vagaries of the global market, where the profits of their labour are privatized and 
captured by the economic elite, while the costs and losses, the instability of those markets 
is socialized and bourn by the poor. In this way peasants and workers, both rural and 
urban, are made economically vulnerable through their exposure to international markets. 
The volatility of agricultural commodities can be enough to take lives, but it is never 
enough to raise them out of poverty. Similarly, the assembly of light manufactured 
goods, particularly clothing and textiles in the maquilas, can maintain people alive 
(although not an entire family), but can just as quickly leave them with nothing. It is this 
volatility and the human disaster it causes that are explored in the next chapter.
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Chapter VI
Unveiling the Famine Process
"When I  give food to the poor, they call me a saint. And when I  ask 
why they have no food, they call me a Communist. "
-  Bishop Holder Camara (Brazil) 
INTRODUCTION
This chapter reconstructs the famine event of 2001, demonstrating the limited immediate 
perception of the ‘famine event’. After outlining what actually occurred during the 
famine, this chapter unveils its actual and underlying causes. By treating the famine as a 
process with historic and anthropogenic roots, it is clearly connected to the historical 
context and political economic structure of the country detailed in the previous three 
chapters. As such, we see that the famine is very much a process, that extends far beyond 
the camcula of 2001 into the past and that has continued and intensified to the present 
day.
We begin with an outline of the evolution of the famine, from the perspective of 
humanitarian aid and its early warning systems. Continuing from this perspective, the 
actual scope of the famine, its impacts and elements are detailed. From there the actual 
underlying roots of the famine are systematically unveiled, demonstrating the evolution 
of the crisis as a process itself and not a sudden rain-related impact event. From the roots 
of the 2001 famine we move forward to consider how the disaster has continued and 
intensified over the subsequent two years. The chapter’s conclusion reemphasizes the 
links between the famine process and the political economic processes of ‘development’ 
that are the foundations of the disaster.
THE FAMINE EVENT
The famine was officially recognized on September 3, 2001, when President Portillo 
declared a 30-day State of National Calamity. At that point, the focus of emergency aid 
became Chiquimula, the newly ‘discovered’ epicentre of the crisis. Problems in six other 
departments had been previously detected and were to varying degrees being addressed
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by international aid and humanitarian relief agencies. A total of nine departments were 
identified by MAGA and the as being most affected by the camcula. None of
these departments were Chiquimula. In fact, repeatedly in reports from July and August, 
Chiquimula’s crop production was considered to be virtually unaffected by the drought.
It was actually identified as a source of maize and bean production for export to the other 
affected departments, given that it is regularly the largest bean producer and second 
largest rice producing department in the country, while also providing surplus outputs of
com.407
The Drought
In their analysis of rainfall behaviour for May, June and July of 2001, INSIVUMEH 
noted that in the country “the rains began normally in terms of time, however variations 
in the volume, intensity and distribution of these rains have been observed, factors which 
have without doubt had repercussions in provoking alterations in the different areas of 
agricultural and cattle p r o d u c t i o n . A s  their analysis shows, rainfall was in fact normal 
or above normal throughout the country in both April and May. There was, however, a 
slightly lower than normal level of rainfall in May for the departments of Chiquimula, 
Jutiapa and Jalapa.
Table 14: Actual and Historic Average Rainfall (Litres/metre squared) for selected
April May June July
Department Normal 2001 Normal 2001 Normal 2001 Normal 2001
Guatemala 28 3 108 190 220 115 175 180
Quetzaltenango 42 8 116 212 152 75 96 101
Huehuetenango 50 14 100 222 208 115 107 216
Alta Verapaz 108 51 162 252 282 161 220 140
Izabal 145 308 164 186 265 306 421 251
Escuintla 18 0 140 150 282 153 107 216
Peten 50 111 112 191 180 256 185 131
Retalhuleu 145 151 384 390 474 293 434 250
Jutiapa 47 9 128 205 295 261 200 183
Zacapa 22 0 77 191 167 86 105 89
Chiquimula 48 50 160 142 328 119 260 380
135
Thus, as the rainy season drew towards its conclusion, and the famine crisis was 
becoming recognized, three departments actually experienced higher than normal rainfall 
during this period -  Izabal (56 L/m2), Huehuetenango (102 L/m2) and El Peten (162 
L/m2). Minor total deficits (of less than 29 L/m2) were experienced in four departments 
-  Quetzaltenango, Escuintla, Jutiapa and Zacapa -  and a significant deficit was recorded 
in Guatemala (43 L/m2 -  92% of normal). Enormous total rainfall deficits occurred in 
Chiquimula (105 L/m2 -  86% of normal), Alta Verapaz (168 L/m2 -  78%) and 
Retalhuleu (353 L/m2 -  75%).
However, it is the month of June that is critical for the main subsistence crops of maize 
and beans. In Chiquimula maize is planted at the end of April and throughout May and 
harvested at the end of August. Therefore, the rain in June, more than simply irrigating 
fields, also provides cloud cover that prevents crops from being withered in the field by 
the force of the sun. The most severely affected department in June was Chiquimula, 
receiving only 36% of its normal rainfall. Seven other departments received roughly half 
their normal rain in that month, while two actually received more rain than normal.
Table 15: Maize Production Projections and Losses: (for affected departments)
Anticipated Production Damages to Production % loss 
(volume)
Department Manzanas'"^ Quintales'*” Manzanas Quintales
El Progreso 3,380.0 212,963.86 2,847.7 85,380.0 40
Santa Rosa 5,070.0 257,597.57 4,008.15 38,040.5 14.8
Retalhuleu 28,730.0 1,895,183.46 14,929.2 490,930.0 25.9
Izabal 3,380.0 269,474.61 40.04 1260.0 0.467
San Marcos 28,730.0 1,964,812.87 5.72 88.0 0.00004
Suchitepequez 29,575.0 1,800,648.37 10,407.54 436,680.0 24.25
Jutiapa 4,225.0 123,977.44 3,575.0 75,075.0 60.55
Zacapa 6,760.0 304,025.75 431.86 7,560.0 2.49
Jalapa 9,295.0 688,763.57 3,131.7 81,571 11.84
Huehuetenango 19,435.0 802,777.81 98.81 2,514.9 0.31
Baja Verapaz 2,535.0 60,152.02 1,012.44 7,494.0 12.458
Alta Verapaz 38,870.0 1,691,924.74 161.59 4,299.0 0.25
Escuintla 16,900.0 1,483,137.55 87.23 2,572.0 0.17
(Country
Total^*^
845,000.0 23,226,800.0 40,734.98 1,233,464.4 5.31
Source: MAGA and PMA 2001
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The impact of the ‘drought’ was greatest on maize production generally, bean harvests 
being acutely affected in only a handful of departments. The initial estimates of MAGA 
on the camcula’s impact on both crops are displayed in these tables, above and below.
Table 16: Bean Production Projections and Losses (for affected departments):
Anticipated Production Damages
Department Manzanas Quintales Manzanas Quintales % Losses
El Progreso 637.00 7,662.78 3432 384.00 5.01
Santa Rosa 2,126.69 16,447.84 745.03 3733.00 22.70
Jutiapa 1,203.69 9,929.97 1072.50 8584.00 86.45
Jalapa 4,477.24 36,935.50 2838.55 18160.00 49.17
Huehuetenango 5,295.00 8,9790.55 9.01 74.20 0.08
Baja Verapaz 726.69 4,497.52 5.72 80.00 1.78
Country Total 182,000 2,006,600 4,705.13 31,015.20 1.55
Source: MAGA and PMA 200
Overall cereal production for 2001 was 9% lower than in 2000. It is also worth nothing 
that twice the area of com production destroyed by Mitch was lost in this first harvest due 
to the drought."**  ̂ The second harvest in 12 departments was also affected by the drought, 
but to varying degrees and generally to a lesser extent than with the first harvest. El 
Progreso was the most severely affected, with losses of up to 70% in some 
municipalities.^*'*
By volume in 2001, Chiquimula was forecast to be the seventh largest maize-producing 
department (1,400,675.1 quintales) in the country and the third largest bean producer 
(306,668.97 quintales). Yet there were no crop losses recorded by the MAGA/WFP 
forecasts from August, in spite of it being the clear centre of the June camcula in the 
INSIVUMEH data. Thus, none of the first 12,702 families identified as food insecure as 
a result of the ‘drought’ were in fact located in Chiquimula.
The Scope of the Discrete Event
By June the World Food Program (WFP) was warning of imminent famine conditions 
and in July MAGA announced that basic grain crops had indeed been affected by the 
drought. These two organizations began an initial food security evaluation in July,
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which was presented on August 7“* to various bilateral funding agencies, with a request 
for funding and food aid. By August 31^, the first food distribution to the identified 
12,702 food insecure families was under way, using food stores already present in the 
country.
By the beginning of September, journalists investigating the famine uncovered 41 deaths, 
while the WFP reported hunger crises in 49 of the country’s 331 municipalities.'**^ 
Portillo’s 30-day State of National Calamity to address the famine introduced an 
Intensive Action Plan to remedy the situation. On September 6*, the WFP announced the 
results of its Food and Nutritional Security Evaluation, raising the number of families at 
risk to 15,900, or 64,000 people.'**^
The first international bilateral responses came from Cuba and Venezuela, neither of 
whom were present in the August 7* WFP meeting. Cuba sent 27 doctors with tents, 
food and medical supplies to attend affected people in rural areas. Venezuela sent 17 
tonnes of food aid, along with trucks and military personnel to distribute it, as well as a 
number of health care workers.
By September 8*, private emergency relief fundraising campaigns were underway in 
Europe, lead by non-governmental organizations such as the Red Cross and Caritas. 
However, September 11 effectively ended both these campaigns and international press 
coverage of the famine throughout Central America. However, by late October, the 
International Federation of the Red Cross and UNICEF had begun new emergency 
fundraising appeals to address the still growing famine. In early November, the WFP 
began its second distribution of food, this time to 20,312 families. World Food Program 
numbers from December state the number of people at risk from food insecurity from the 
famine at 134,000. An initial study completed by UNICEF and the Ministry of Health at 
the time estimated of up to 100,000 children under the age of 5 as at risk of death due to 
malnutrition.'**^
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On January 12*, 2002, the first death due to the famine since October was reported. This 
two-year-old boy brought the reported death toll of the famine to 124; a number that grew 
to 126 by the end of the January.
The government acted on the basis of its poverty mapping, orienting its Intensive Action 
Plan to coincide with its Strategy for Poverty Reduction. This meant that it was only 
going to address the famine in municipalities amongst the list of 102 in the country with a 
poverty rate of 80% or higher. Unfortunately, the ‘famine’ was not so considerate as to 
limit itself to these 102 extremely poor municipalities, or even appear in many of them.
Initial acute malnutrition surveys carried out by UNICEF in September and October 
2001, in selected municipalities, demonstrated severe acute malnutrition in 14% of 
children under 5 in four different municipalities in Chiquimula -  Camotan, Jocotan, 
Olopa and San Juan Ermita. Numbers above 2% in acute malnutrition usually indicate a 
nutritional emergency or disaster situation.'*^^
In fact, the nutritional assessments undertaken in the wake of the ‘famine event’ 
(September to November) found other municipalities, entirely outside of the eastern 
highland region that the World Food Programme has christened part of the Central 
American ‘drought belt’, have even more extreme levels of malnutrition than those found 
in the affected municipalities of Chiquimula. Areas of Huehuetenango, Alta and Baja 
Verapaz and Quiche also had acute malnutrition levels ranging from 4.1% to 11.2% - yet 
none of these were the focus of substantial aid. A January 2002 survey of acute 
malnutrition amongst children in 129 municipalities, found acute malnutrition rates in 7 
departments ranging between 21% and 31%. One municipality had an overall acute 
malnutrition rate of 61%, where severe acute malnutrition of children under five was 
54%. This means that over half o f  these children weighed less than 70% the normal 
weight for their size."̂ ^̂
Food deficit estimates, based on total food production and consumption in a municipality, 
were performed to indicate how many months before the next harvest, in August, food
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supplies and resources would run out. In 9 of the 12 departments, families would run out 
of food more than three months before the next harvest, which is to say by May of 2002.
In El Progreso and Baja Verapaz, the deficit was four months, meaning supplies will last 
only until April. In Chiquimula, the deficit was six and a half months, meaning that food 
supplies for subsistence farmers were almost exhausted by the time this survey was 
undertaken in January.'* '̂’
THE FAMINE PROCESS
At this point it is worth reiterating that none of the official reports from any of the 
government or multilateral agencies record any mortality figures. As noted above the 
famine did not end in October 2001 but re-emerged in the press in January 2002, when 
three more famine victims were reported. By this time relief agencies were continuing 
aid operations and planning additional ones for the regular food deficit months until the 
next harvest. This all meant that the famine was far from over.
After initial state response in September 2001, which consisted mainly of seeds and 
fertilizer, it has been largely inactive in responding to the crisis. Many promises were 
made, but few delivered. School breakfasts and lunches are not being delivered, as 
supplies do not exist or are not being distributed by the government. By January 2003, its 
‘Plan de Emergencia Nacional’ was still waiting to be executed. This plan would see “20 
pounds of maize, beans and rice, one pound of salt and one gallon of oil” delivered to 
50,000 families for six months."*^* However, these families represent less than ten percent 
of the 2.8 million Guatemalans considered to be facing the food crisis by this point.
The Causes of the Famine
All of the various agencies involved in addressing the famine cite a list of causes for it 
quite separate from the drought. The coffee crisis is universally heralded as one o f  these 
causes, with the drop in price on the international market causing producers to scale back 
or cease their production. This has simultaneously reduced both employment and the 
wages for those still with jobs (seasonal or permanent) in the sector. Other general
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economic factors cited include a reduction of jobs in the maquila sector, as well as a 
reduction of income from tourism and from family remittances/^^
However, these are all proximate causes -  triggers -  that have unleashed the latent 
disaster inherent in the poverty and hunger of the country’s political economic structure. 
These structural or underlying vulnerabilities are centred on the situation of land -  its 
tenure and concentration, and its productive capacity. All of these trigger factors -  
drought, the coffee crisis, the recession, jobs losses, early warning systems and 
emergency response and land issues -  are discussed in detail below.
Drought
The camcula and the ‘drought belt’ should not be entirely dismissed, as they were 
proximate factors for the famine in some areas of the country. Chiquimula and the 
Eastern Highlands are the driest region of the country and frequently experience localized 
irregularities in rainfall that clearly affect crops. However, drought explanations must 
always be qualified as both proximate and partial. Rainfall was not an issue for the 
majority of the country, even those departments that suffered the greatest reduction in 
precipitation during the 2001 camcula, given that they regularly receive up to 4000mm 
annually. The other qualification is that it is not simply a generalized lack or reduction of 
rainfall that affects crops, and thereby agricultural livelihoods, but a lack of water, sun or 
shade for those crops at key moments in their agricultural cycle. Therefore, readymade 
answers, such as irrigation, only respond to one of these concerns, which represents only 
a fraction of the entire famine process.
However, the roots of the 2001 crisis stretch back to the entire political economic 
structure of the country. That said, other ‘proximate’ causes or triggers were already 
active in exacerbating the famine process. Before the drought ever became an issue -  
before the rainy season even began -  the coffee crisis had already imperiled the survival 
of thousands of families. With the quarter million job reduction in the 2000/2001 
harvest, up to 42,000 families saw their seasonal and permanent income vanish. The 
June camcula did not occur until four months into the ‘lean season’, when the previous
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year’s harvests were already exhausted or nearly so. Both the families that had lost their 
souree of income and those that did not were desperately waiting for the next harvest to 
begin in August in order to fill their empty stomachs. Even if the 2001 harvest was 
exceptional, it still would have come entirely too late for those already lost to acute 
malnutrition from the previous year.
The Coffee Crisis
The importance of coffee to the Guatemalan economy is clear. The impact of the coffee 
crisis has been devastating. Half a million jobs were lost within two years. More than 
$200 million in export revenues ‘disappeared’ in 2001. This enormous reduction in 
revenues with the drop in coffee prices has had a very direct impact on Guatemalan 
coffee producers. As a result of increasing unprofitability some 2% of small producers 
and 3% of medium and large producers'*^^ have completely shut down. That is over 2000 
coffee producers that have abandoned their operations. At the same time, a mere 10% of 
producers continue to operate at full capacity. Most producers are operating at half 
capacity, this being the case for 51% of small producers, 44% of medium producers and 
40% of large producers.'* '̂*
The direct impact of these closures and reductions in production is felt first and foremost 
by the unskilled labourers directly employed in the coffee sector. In the 1999/2000 
coffee season they totalled 750,000 people -  a full 21.5% of the country’s work force that 
year. In 2000/2001,20% of full-time direct jobs were lost, putting 63,461 people out of 
work, plus an additional 182,317 seasonal workers.'*^  ̂ That is one third of the previous 
year’s work force that disappeared, with a still uncalculated impact on indirect 
employment.
All estimates project a further reduction o f  employment in the sector by half in the 
2001/2002 season. This means another 250,000 direct full-time and seasonal jobs 
vanished. For the estimated quarter of a million workers that remain employed, they will 
see their wages and benefits drop even further, in spite of the increased minimum wage 
for agriculture put into law in 2001.
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The reduction of employment in coffee production and the general scaling back of 
operations intrinsically generates another cycle of problems. The reduction refers more 
to the elimination of parts of the cultivation cycle as opposed to the percentage of land 
being harvested. With the elimination of pre-harvest activities and other costly inputs in 
the production process, the quality of the coffee is reduced. With an enormous surplus of 
Tow quality’ coffee flooding the international market, high quality coffee (gourmet, 
organic, shade grown, fair trade, hard-bean) through greater production of arabica beans, 
as opposed to the more common, lower quality robusta bean, is the only profitable 
option."^^  ̂ While one third of Guatemala’s coffee production is already in specialty 
coffee, other countries are quickly moving to capitalize on this option as well."̂ ^̂
However, without the labour inputs to assure necessary certification and gourmet quality, 
these avenues of income, limited as they may be, are closed to Guatemalan producers. 
This further affects the ‘national brand’ of coffee, relegating all of national production to 
the low quality shelf. Only those with the marketing capital to promote their coffee as 
gourmet are able to tap these niche markets. Poor, small-scale peasant producers are 
notably lacking in these marketing networks.
The shift towards gourmet coffee production is sweeping the entirety of the worlds coffee 
producers and producing countries. Even if attempts at the International Coffee 
Organization are successful in reducing or eliminating global production, and hence glut, 
of low quality coffee, the same situation will still occur for gourmet coffee. Given that 
these specialty beans are more expensive to produce, what is occurring is simply an 
expansion of the crisis to a new area, rather than the resolution of a problem in the global 
economic structure. Or rather, it is only a problem for those producing the primary 
commodity.
Another complication involves the small producers themselves, on two different fronts. 
Given that prices fell so dramatically, there is a belief amongst them that prices cannot 
drop any further and therefore must start rising again. This belief has fuelled the 
expansion of production in some of the poorest areas of the country. While their belief
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has proved correct, the stabilization of the world coffee price at just over $0.50 a pound is 
hardly enough to cover production costs. The gross inequity of the coffee commodity 
chain means that for every pound of coffee, those who pick it receive 14 cents or less. 
Producers in general receive between 35 and 45 cents per pound. Those at the other end 
of the commodity chain, selling coffee by the cup, earn up to $9.00 for each pound.'*^*
The second factor is that most small producers are subsistence farmers whose only 
income is derived from modest coffee production on their marginal parcels of land. All 
of these factors mean that they have no direct links to market their coffee and therefore 
sell to the intermediaries known as coyotes. Given the lack of other outlets to sell their 
production in a limited time and with no storage capacity, in many cases combined with 
previous debt, these small producers are forced to sell at the price dictated by the coyote 
or earn nothing at all.
Finally, there is the issue of the distribution of labour in coffee production, between 
small, medium and larger producers. Most small producers are peasant families 
augmenting their income by cultivating coffee on what little land they do possess. This 
means that 80% of all labour in the coffee sector is on medium and large plantations. 
However, these medium and large producers represent a small fraction of all coffee 
producers in the country. Of the roughly 100,000 producers, more than 95% are small 
scale, more than 2425 are medium and over 1507 are large in size."̂ ^̂
In Chiquimula, these medium and large producers account for 96.4% of all production in 
that department, the highest proportion in the country. This is all the more pertinent as 
Chiquimula has become the fourth largest producer in the country, and the second largest 
employer. In 1999/2000 coffee cultivation provided 33,554 permanent jobs and 43,406 
seasonal ones — a total of 76,960 livelihoods'*^® in a department with a population of 
313,150. This is all the more significant considering the size of the rural population in 
the department (74.7%) and the size of the family that this implies (six members). On a 
per capita basis for the department, each family had 1.5 members directly employed in
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the coffee sector during this season, illustrating the overwhelming dependence of the 
population of Chiquimula on coffee.
The following harvest of 2000/2001 saw permanent and seasonal employment in the 
department drop to 22,559,29,181 respectively, for a total of 51,740 johs.'*^  ̂ This gives 
us a household dependency ratio of 0.97 for this season. With employment cut in half for 
the 2001/2002 harvest, it is entirely impossible that coffee production was able to provide 
labour incomes to anywhere near all of the families in need of employment, even after 
disregarding the fiction of dependence per family. With only 7020 formal sector jobs in 
the entirety of the department,"*^  ̂absolutely none of which exist in the municipalities of 
Olopa or San Juan Ermita,"^^  ̂the importance of coffee to the livelihoods of Chiquimulans 
cannot be overstated.
Economic Recession
Global economic trends easily and deeply affect vulnerable economies like Guatemala’s. 
The Asian Economic Crisis in 1998/99 combined with the economic impact of Hurricane 
Mitch reduced overall projections for real growth from 4.8% to 4.6% in 1998 and from 
5.1% to 3.6% in 1999. Actual GDP growth for these two years was 5.0% (including 
foreign aid and loans for Mitch recovery) and 3.8%, respectively. This reduction in 
growth continued into 2000, with a 3.3% rise in the GDP, while the rate for the year 2001 
was 2.3%.'^^
This macroeconomic data is significant because it represents the susceptibility of the 
Guatemalan economy to changes in international commodity prices for primary 
agricultural products and its vulnerability to climatic and natural phenomena affecting 
those crops. In fact, production of many export crops have still not reached pre-Mitch 
levels, while international prices have fallen drastically for coffee, sugar, cardamom and 
sesame, with lesser decreases in banana prices. Given that 22% of Guatemala’s GDP is 
derived directly from agricultural production, this is more than relevant to both 
government finances, its social and development spending, and private sector 
employment.
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The global economic recession of the last two years is thought to have affected 
Guatemala in a number of ways. Apart from the coffee crisis, only one of those impacts 
listed above as exacerbating the famine is manifestly evident. There was a clear drop in 
the level of maquila employment during the crisis. The evidence for the reduction in 
tourism and remittances, at least at the aggregate level, is eontradictory for the first and 
simply not apparent with the second. All three are discussed below in greater detail.
Maquila Contraction
While statistics from the maquila and textile manufacturing industry vary greatly 
according to their source, all agree that there were significant job losses in 2001. In spite 
of all the problems already noted with the maquilas, these jobs still represent livelihoods 
for those women and their families. As will be explained below at the end of the section 
on remittances, the loss of these 7000 jobs in 2001 had implications for the entire 
country, including Chiquimula.
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Reduction of Remittances
There are an estimated one million Guatemalans living in the United States, of whom 
some 20-27% are without documents. This makes them the third largest immigrant 
population in the country, after Mexicans and El Salvadorans. The vital economic link to
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Guatemala that is provided by these emigrants, discussed in chapter 4, rivals coffee, 
maquilas and tourism for providing income in the national economy. It is of perhaps 
even greater importance than any other source of national income because this money 
goes directly and almost completely"*^  ̂into the hands of Guatemalan families. As such, 
this informal subsidy actually outstrips the annual disbursements ($67.3 million) of the 
Guatemalan Social Security Institute (IGSS), its annual revenues ($152.5 million) and 
even its total reserves ($432 million)."*^^
While remittances were thought to have decreased during the famine event in 2001, the 
statistics of the central bank indicate that they had increased over the previous year by 
roughly 10%, to $571.3 million. However, while the aggregate amount of money 
remitted to the country increased, there is no data, nor any way of knowing with 
certainty, to whom this money was remitted. Another aspect of the distribution of 
remittances is whether or not they actually reach their intended recipients, it not being an 
uncommon occurrence that the remittances ‘fail’ to arrive.'^^  ̂ Without knowing the 
distribution of this more than half a billion dollars, it is difficult to analyze its exact 
impact. Although it was undoubtedly important for families throughout the country, the 
best attempt we can make at understanding its distribution is to assume that it 
corresponds with the department of origin of Guatemalan migrants to the United States.
If this equal distribution were the case, then Chiquimula would have received 9% of 
those international fimds sent home -  roughly $51.4 million. Even if this optimism did 
bear out, there is also the issue of who the international emigrants are themselves. Given 
both their capacity and resources to make their way out of the country, it is highly 
unlikely that any of these individuals, or their families, are the poorest, the most 
vulnerable or the most marginalized. To begin, these emigrants would have to at least 
speak Spanish, automatically making them less vulnerable than indigenous peoples that 
speak only their native language.
The final dimension of remittances is concerned with those from within the country itself. 
The high level of internal migration, principally to Guatemala City and El Peten, is
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economically motivated. As Guatemala is the centre of virtually all industry (95%) in the 
country, including the maquilas, it is the principal source of internal remittances. El 
Peten still offers agricultural land for those wishing to settle, so livelihoods there are 
more oriented to subsistence than the wage based ones in the capital that provide money 
to remit. In spite of the meagre level of those wages, people do manage to save some to 
send to their families still living in ‘the interior’.
Decline of Tourism
Tourism has been of increasing importance to the Guatemalan economy, growing rapidly 
since the signing of the Peace Accords in 1996, when it earned over US $238 million for 
the country According to the Guatemalan Institute of Tourism (INGUAT), in 2000, 
some 826,240 tourists came to Guatemala, leaving behind over $535 million, making it 
the second largest source of income for the country, after coffee. Income from tourism 
for 2001 was down 8% to $492 million, while the number of tourists was actually up by 
1.1% to 835,000."*^  ̂ As noted earlier, BANGUAT shows the opposite trend and 
significantly different financial figures - $300 million in 2000 and 365 million in 2001. 
The principal nations from which tourists come to Guatemala, firstly El Salvador and 
then the United States, Honduras and Mexico, saw significant reductions -  75,000 fewer 
Salvadorans and over 9000 fewer Americans visitors arrived.
What can be deduced is that tourism, like international emigration, is of little significance 
to the most vulnerable and marginalized. Tourism is limited to a handful of departments 
in Guatemala, and a restricted number of municipalities within those few departments. 
Generally, the majority of the poor are geographically removed from tourist areas. Those 
that are in the correct areas to profit from tourism are generally without the means to 
enter the cash-nexus that lubricates the tourism industry.
Land
The IMF estimates that 12% of Guatemala’s total area is arable land and that 42% of the 
total national area is in fact used for agriculture."*"̂  ̂ According to the International Union 
for the Conservation of Nature (UICN), 48% of Guatemala’s surface area is natural dense
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forest while another 25% is natural light forest, with 8% being jungle swamp. In 1960 
the actual forest cover totalled 77% of the country’s 108,889 km2, but massive 
deforestation since then, averaging up to 285,000 hectares per year in the Peten alone, has 
reduced that forest cover to a mere 26%. As most of this deforestation has been fuelled 
by expansion of cultivated land, it serves as an indicator of inappropriate land use, in 
addition to being a massive misuse of a natural resource. The change in the use of the 
soil with deforestation has increased the level of erosion by simply astounding 
proportions. In non-deforested regions, normal soil erosion ranges between 20 and 300 
tonnes, per hectare, per year (t/ha/a), but in deforested areas this rate jumps to between 
700 and 1100 t/ha/a. Thanks to deforestation, erosion has jumped by an average of 740 
t/ha/a in some 3 million hectares of Guatemala. It is exactly this situation of 
deforestation and vulnerability to erosion that made Hurricane Mitch so destructive.
Another issue in the destruction of soils has been the overuse of fertilizers and pesticides, 
particularly in the Peten, as part of the policy of colonization and development of the 
jungle. This chemical burning of the topsoil has also affected both surface and 
subterranean water supplies, adding to the urban and industrial contamination through 
effluvial discharge already present. The issue of water is far greater and much more 
complex than simple contamination, as the very water cycle itself is being changed, with 
increased hydrological phenomena such as flooding and drought. Urban development 
and deforestation in areas of watershed recharging are also reducing water supplies by 
reducing both the area and capacity of the earth to absorb water.
All of these factors are contributing to the destruction of Guatemala’s great biodiversity 
while at the same time threatening the human population by putting them at greater risk 
to natural disasters and reducing the soils productive capacity, heightening food 
insecurity. According to the UICN, the total area of environmental degradation in 
Guatemala, understood as “the physical, chemical and biological alterations of flora and 
fauna and the loss of soil through erosion thereby reducing the original conditions of a 
resource” is 31.5% of the country -  34,270 km2. According to this same report a full 
1608 km2 (67.7%) of Chiquimula’s complete extension of 2376 km2 is classified as
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degraded. This is the highest proportion in the country, with the exception of the 
department of El Progreso. In Chiquimula, only 347 km2 of forest cover remain. Both 
UNICEF and the World Food Programme also classify a number of municipalities in 
Chiquimula as suffering from extreme environmental degradation. UNICEF calculates 
that six of Chiquimula’s eleven municipalities have more than 80% of their area degraded 
-  Chiquimula (83%), San Jose La Arada (90%), San Juan Ermita (96%), Jocotan (85%), 
Olopa (92%) and San Jacinto (93%).̂ "̂ ^
This destruction of the environment is all entirely based on its exploitation, for profit and 
for survival. Each of these motives is representative of the actors at the poles of the land 
concentration spectrum. The wealthy agrarian and agro-industrial elite control and 
misuse the best agricultural land (e.g. grazing cattle where crops should be grown) while 
the poor infra-subsistence peasants with insufficient land super-exploit that to which they 
have access. These are two sides of the same process that is creating vulnerability both 
directly and indirectly. From the land concentration and degradation data presented for 
Chiquimula, it is clear that the land issue is at the heart of the famine.
Early Warning and Emergency Response
In the lead up to the declaration of the famine, the early warning indicators were 
highlighting a number of areas, including Chiquimula. As already noted, immediate 
action was only taken in six affected departments, with Chiquimula identified as a source 
of food for shipment to these areas receiving the emergency response.
Thus, Chiquimula was entirely excluded from initial emergency response, through what 
can only be conceived as a total failure to interpret the early warning signs. The rainfall 
levels presented above are taken directly from the August 1st MAGA/WFP Technical 
Report on the irregular rains."*"*̂  The WFP/MAGA Evaluation of Affected Areas'*"*̂  
includes vulnerability maps which clearly indicate that four municipalities in Chiquimula 
are ‘normally’ extremely vulnerable to food insecurity, plus a map and table 
highlighting the six municipalities that suffer from extreme environmental degradation.'*''^ 
This latter report even includes the WFP VAM map showing that the entirety of
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Chiquimula was the area of the country most affected by the camcula. Yet no action was 
taken in Chiquimula until the last day of August, after media reports of a famine outbreak 
in that department spread through the national press.
This failure of early warning systems, and to connect those systems with emergency 
response, allows us to make two further conclusions. First, as is obvious, the early 
warning systems and indicators are suffering fi*om a number of problems and 
inaccuracies. Stemming from this is the second, that ‘the famine’ was undoubtedly 
affecting and claiming lives in other areas of the country, entirely ignored by both the 
media and relief agencies. As marginal as Chiquimula is, it is practically a cosmopolitan 
core and centre of the country when compared with other regions, such as the Verapaces, 
and especially Huehuetenango, Totonicapan, San Marcos and El Quiche. The indicators 
and conditions of vulnerability outlined in the previous chapter should make this, if 
nothing else, absolutely clear.
Flowing directly out of the failure of early warning systems is the second failure of 
emergency response. Most of this blame can be squarely laid upon the Government of 
Guatemala and the ministries and agencies responsible for the well-being of its citizens. I 
focus this blame on the state, as opposed to the international and multilateral agencies for 
whom it is their mission to detect and respond to humanitarian emergencies, because the 
state has clear, fundamental and primary legal responsibility for the well-being of its 
citizens. For the case in point, the Guatemalan state is specifically charged, by two 
articles of the country’s constitution, with the provision of sufficient food and health for 
the population, including the guarantee of the right to food and public health.'*'̂ ^
The specific failures of the government’s response to the emergency has been a 
continuing process of failure and neglect over the last two years. The initial response to 
the famine consisted primarily of seeds and fertilizers, which were inappropriate and 
delivered too late for the second season’s planting in any case. This is without 
considering the weakened condition of the population and difficulty of the intervening 
months that they would have to wait before availing themselves of the fruit of this aid.
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The ongoing response failure that continues to the present day is that of the school 
breakfasts and lunches mentioned above. Even the extremely limited National 
Emergency Plan has yet to be implemented. While a complete issue unto itself, the 
principal activity of the Portillo administration, and certainly the one at which it has been 
most efficient, has been outright pillaging of the national treasury, which the Prensa Libre 
now estimates to total 3.6 billion quetzales -  roughly US $500 million.
If and when the government’s Rural Poverty Reduction Strategy and National Emergency 
Plan are actually implemented, there is one unforeseen bright spot. As they are targeting 
the 102 poorest municipalities in the country, they are focusing on areas that were not 
seemingly targeted by famine, and therefore other relief efforts. While these 
municipalities were ‘ignored’ by the current crisis, these other poorer areas are all 
suffering from the same conjunction of disastrous factors.
THE CONSTANT DISASTER OF THE FAMINE PROCESS
The ‘famine event’ of 2001 has lead to the ‘rediscovery’ of hunger in Guatemala. In 
2002 an estimated 2.5 million Guatemalans were considered ‘food insecure’. In the 
spring of 2003, that number was 2.8 million. Chronic undemutrition rates were found to 
have absolutely increased across the country (although with an overall relative decrease). 
Acute malnutrition in excess of emergency thresholds was found in 48 municipalities in 
12 different departments of the c o u n t r y . T h e  ‘famine event’ has grown and continued.
In the first four months of 2003,22 children in the municipality of Santa Maria Cahabon, 
in Alta Verapaz died from hunger related illnesses. This is attributed to the coffee crisis 
and the collapse of the price of cardamom in the last two years. Both the aid, and the 
information available, is limited to communities that are readily accessible by the road 
network. Thus only 65 of the 166 communities in the municipality are actually being 
targeted by relief efforts and are included in this information.'*'^  ̂ In the opposite part of 
the coimtry, near the Pacific coast, an emergency nutrition centre in Coatepeque has been 
attending malnourished infants and children since July of 2002.*** This feeding centre 
was not even established until a year after the ‘famine event’ began!
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The reason for this continuation and expansion"̂ "̂  ̂is because famine is not an event, but a 
process. As the WHO clearly recognizes, “In the majority of cases, a food emergency is 
not an acute situation, but rather one that develops over time.”'*̂® This evolution of a 
disaster over time is the construction of vulnerability. Poverty and vulnerability are not 
the causes of the famine process -  they are a part of it. They are the destitution and 
desperation that sap assets and reduce resilience, heightening food insecurity. They are 
the underlying conditions that expose people to hazards; the latent disaster that those 
shocks and threats trigger.
The underlying conditions of vulnerability have been clearly detailed in the previous 
chapters, as have the processes leading to those conditions. This chapter has presented 
the interaction of all those conditions with the more proximate triggers that have 
unleashed a disaster. All that remains is to remind the gentle reader that the only thing 
unleashed by the drought and famine event of 2001 were perceptions. The vulnerability, 
the exposure, the latent disaster were all present long before the disaster ‘occurred’. 
Further, they have continued in both their presence and impact to this very day. The 
endemic hunger of an impoverished population has been slowly and less dramatically, 
and therefore less obviously, killing the rural and indigenous people of Guatemala for 
decades and centuries. An aspect of their marginalization is the very fact that this 
systematic immiseration is never ‘noticed’.
Thus, while there certainly was a crisis in Guatemala, and continues to be one, it is 
nothing new. It is the silent and unrecognized disaster that is the daily life for millions in 
that country. The question, then, is not ‘if a tree falls... ’ but rather, ‘if a person goes 
hungry, is it a famine?’ The answer is ‘yes’.
One o f the problems with relying on hazards and triggers is that they, just as the disasters 
they are considered to unveil, can also be less than spectacular events that go unnoticed.
A large part of this problem stems from convictions as to what constitutes valid 
knowledge. For instance, the name (famine versus malnutrition or endemic hunger) 
matters, as the label -  the definition -  dictates the policy and action for the situation. One
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of the great problems with policy and programming is, given its grounding in Newtonian 
science with its linear model for interpreting reality, is that it sees things in black and 
white, with clear categories. This failure to recognize the complexity of a reality often 
means that action is inherently limited, due to the limited understanding that guides it.
This problem becomes patently clear when we see the Guatemalan minister responsible 
for MAGA, the lead agency in dealing with the famine and food insecurity in the country, 
stating publicly that this year’s deaths in Cahabon were due to ‘malnutrition’ and not 
famine."^^  ̂ People are suffering and ultimately dying from the same causes, as a result of 
the same processes, regardless of what they are called. As such, the fight for accurate 
language and understanding is a fight against both intellectual foolishness and the 
criminal behaviour that such thought, and speech, both tolerates and masks.
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Chapter VII
The Recipe for Hunger
" The modern conservative is engaged in one o f man's oldest exercises in moral 
philosophy: that is the search for a superior moral justification for selfishness. "
- John Kenneth Galbraith
INTRODUCTION
This study began with a number of declared goals and positions, which all revolve around 
the thesis advanced. Two of them were that disasters are not natural and that famine is a 
process, which is not separate from the issue of endemic hunger. Another point was that 
hunger, poverty and vulnerability are not ‘naturally’ occurring conditions, but are socially 
constructed ones. These positions are all part of the argument presented in this thesis in 
answer to the question ‘why did a famine occur in Guatemala in 2001?’ The explanation 
is that the famine is a structural one. Further, the famine was not simply an event, but is a 
process that extends much further back then 2001, with its roots in the very colonial 
history of the country. The structure is the nation’s political economy, itself the dynamic 
product of history and its actors. In this case, the actors are the Guatemalan elite who 
enjoy the wealth of the country through their participation in the expansion of the global 
capitalist system. This incorporation into the global economic system is based on the 
elites orienting Guatemala’s political economy as a dependant supplier and consumer in 
the world market. They achieve this national economic orientation through their control 
of production, exchange, the state and the resources, or wealth, of the country itself. This 
wealth, principally the land of the country, is overwhelmingly concentrated in their 
hands, to make use of as they please.
The previous chapters have demonstrated each of these different elements and their 
evolution. They have shown the incredible concentration of wealth and power in the 
country’s oligarchy. They have shown how Guatemala is dependent on global supply 
and demand, and who is made and maintained vulnerable by that dependency. This 
chapter begins with a review of the other goals laid out in the first chapter, before
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discussing their relevance, and that of the thesis, in two different sections. The first 
concentrates on the findings and key observations regarding the case itself. The second 
summarizes the conclusions that we can draw from this case, regarding the three fields of 
disaster studies, hunger / famine/ food security and the political economy of 
development. The next chapter then closes the study with an overall conclusion.
Among the other goal stated in chapter one was to include Central America amongst the 
list of regions affected by famine. This seemingly trivial point, which I believe has been 
satisfactorily substantiated, is relevant in terms of its significance for the international 
humanitarian agenda. Whether you define famines as a process or a discrete event, it is 
undeniable that there has been a famine in Guatemala. The levels and extent of 
famishment, destitution, social breakdown and mortality satisfy all agencies’ and 
viewpoints’ criteria for identifying a famine. Thus, the generally recognized situation of 
hunger throughout Latin America can no longer be used as the sole category to classify 
the nutritional crisis in the region. This categorization is crucial in terms of focusing the 
international and development agenda on the problem of famine both in Latin America 
and as a process rather than an event. Acknowledged famine crises are significantly less 
tolerable than generalized poverty and endemic hunger. Therefore this classification is a 
political issue, with a substantial range and depth of implications. Apart from 
humanitarian activities, this classification affects development policy generally, as it calls 
into question development itself as a factor in disaster creation. Any cause for critical 
reflection on the trajectory of human ‘progress’ should be welcome.
THE ARGUMENT
This thesis advanced an interpretation of the famine disaster in Guatemala as the result of 
the structure of the political economy. In chapter three it summarized the historical 
development of the political economy, whose structure it detailed in chapter four.
Chapter five illustrated the extent of the poverty, hunger and vulnerability that this 
history and structure have created. Chapter six demonstrated how the ‘famine event’ 
itself evolved as merely the observable impact of the famine process. It also showed how 
the causal factors of endemic hunger and famine are the same.
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Guatemala’s economic history is undeniably agrarian, dependent and peripheral. From 
the active colonial underdevelopment of Latin America, the entire region has had its 
economy oriented towards the export of primary commodities and the import of 
manufactured goods. Since 1870, coffee has been ‘king’ in Guatemala. It has been the 
leading export at the centre of all elements of the economy -  employment, services, 
infrastructure development, capital accumulation, foreign currency earnings, banking and 
finance, government revenue and ownership of the means of production. Initial industrial 
production in the country was based on coffee processing. Practically all other local 
production was artesanal and for subsistence, until roughly the middle of the twentieth 
century.
Until the coup of 1954, Guatemala was self-sufficient in its food production. Since then, 
it has become increasingly dependent on both food aid and food imports. Yet the food 
supply is still insufficient to feed the people of the country and has been declining (on a 
per capita basis) for the last fifteen years. While producing traditional and non-traditional 
agricultural export crops to earn foreign currency in order to import food, the terms of 
trade between these goods has been most unfavourable for Guatemala. The value of its 
products has been stagnant for the last four decades, while the food that it imports has 
almost tripled in index value. Then there are the costs of increased debt and even more 
unfavourable trade terms for the agro-industrial inputs that are imported for the 
production of Guatemala’s cash crops.
This period is also when agricultural production diversified, into cattle, cotton and sugar, 
while the manufacture of non-durable consumer goods also arose. However, all of this 
economic growth came through international, which is to say US, intervention, in the 
form of credit for development, the provision of market quotas, investment in and 
outright ownership of local industries. Structural adjustment in the 1980s and 1990s saw 
an intensification of these trends, through the loss of what little economic sovereignty 
Guatemala’s military rulers had preserved during their international isolation. Over all, 
the 1990s, while still registering growth, saw an increase in the concentration of land, and 
the deprivation of the populace, in spite of certain rising social indicators.
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The resulting political economic structure is characterized by its integration into the 
global economy system, a process facilitated by national elite domination. There are two 
central aspects to this integration -  export oriented production and external dependence, 
for markets, industrial inputs and consumer goods. There are four elements to the 
oligarchy’s domination of the country -  their control of production, exchange, the state 
and resources, particularly land. We have seen that the empirical evidence supports each 
of these points.
The empirical reality generated by this historic structure is one of hunger, poverty and 
vulnerability. The indigenous peoples and rural population have been, historically and 
presently, the most marginalized by the process of ‘development’. The social and 
economic indicators of development, such as poverty, chronic undemutrition, education, 
life expectancy, infant and child mortality, satisfaction of basic needs and provision of 
services are all lower for them than their non-indigenous and non-rural counterparts.
They have been the victims of open and direct violence, as well as silent and indirect 
structural violence. The famine process is their progressive daily destitution and hunger. 
While not consistent, given the seasonality of so many aspects of survival, the process is 
constant. This case, examining this process of immiseration is a lesson on the 
consequences of socio-economic and political inequality within a system.
THE FINDINGS
It is difficult to accurately identify exact and reliable trends in many areas of Guatemala’s 
human development. While indicative of many things, including the volatility of 
conditions for Guatemalans, it is primarily because of the unreliability, incompleteness 
and incomparability of much of the data that is available. It seems clear that a number of 
social indicators are in fact improving, or at least were until the end of the last century. 
Life expectancy, infant and child mortality, levels o f  education and literacy are, or at least 
were, all improving. In spite of these positive trends, there is still a seemingly 
insurmountable distance between the people of Guatemala and their human security. The 
situation in is best summarized by Coordinadora Nacional de Indigenas y  Campesinos 
CONIC, the Indigenous and Campesino National Coordinating Committee:
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“The hunger suffered by two-thirds of the Guatemalan population is the direct 
result of the concentration of land ownership and wealth in a few hands, the low 
salaries, and the inability of the government to put into practice the legal 
framework to protect the people, to guarantee justice, security, peace and 
development”^̂ ^
The single most important underlying issue affecting everything examined in this study is 
land. While it is well known that “the uneven distribution of land is the primary cause of 
extreme poverty in rural areas in Central A m e r i c a . T h e  degree of concentration of 
land ownership in Guatemala is simply unprecedented in the world, with Gini Coefficient 
of 0.85, and 0.15% of landowners controlling 70% of the country’s land. The obverse of 
this super-concentration of land is the dramatic increase in micro-parcelization of land 
amongst infra-subsistence smallholders.
Land lies at the heart of the explanation for why the famine happened in Chiquimula, 
even though it is not the poorest or most likely candidate for disaster and famine in the 
country. The combination of causal factors, in addition to the land ownership situation, 
also emphasizes the importance of environmental degradation in creating vulnerability. 
The role of coffee and the dependence of peasants, both landless and landed, on the jobs 
that it provides is enormous. The collapse of the international price of coffee is without 
doubt the single most important proximate cause of the crisis presently affecting 
Guatemala. However, it is only exacerbating the untenable conditions of poverty and 
hunger that exist there as a result of the political economic history and structure of the 
country’s development.
The issue o f  land cannot be repeated enough as the centrepiece o f  Guatemala’s political 
economy. Land is the wealth owned by the elite. It is land that is the basis of production 
for the agro-industrial crops that form the majority of Guatemala’s exports. It is land that 
is the source of wealth and subsistence for the coimtry and its people. It is productive 
land that is not being used to feed the people of Guatemala. It is land that is being
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degraded by human exploitation. It is land (the environment), in turn, that is making the 
country, its people, products and infrastructure vulnerable to disasters. It is also the 
dispossession of the rural population of land that is fuelling urbanization and providing 
the surplus supply of labour that ensures that the labour market remains ‘flexible’.
The government has systematically, repeatedly and continuously failed to respond to the 
problems facing the country and its people. There has been a general failure to meet the 
needs of the people, and even a role in exacerbating the situation generally, in spite of the 
clear constitutional imperative for doing so. The previous administrations of Ramiro de 
Leon Carpio and Alvaro Arzu Irigoyen were significant improvements over the previous 
four decades of de jure and de facto military rule. However, they were certainly 
insufficient in both time and quality to establish both functional democracy and an 
effective civilian bureaucracy. The FRG regime of Alfonso Portillo has undone any 
progress that may have been made after the Peace Accords, moving the country back into 
situations reminiscent of the dark years of the civil war in terms of corruption, insecurity 
and violence. The situation of hunger and famine is perhaps more comparable with the 
cacao famines of the 1570s.
Given that the state is an object of elite competition, its work as a modernizing agent has 
always been in favour of the dominant elite fraction. The only points of unity between 
the traditional landed elites, and the agro-industrial, financial, manufacturing, military 
elites is their collective opposition to the subordinate classes and their general abhorrence 
of taxation. This elite unity and collective intransigence on the issue of taxes has 
continually forced the government into externally oriented policies in order to finance 
itself. International credit, foreign aid and structural adjustment have all come with the 
condition of greater export production. This has further increased the role and power of 
the US in Guatemala, a generally unintended and ironic consequence o f  nationalist elite 
unity. It has also increased foreign dependence for both consumer goods and inputs for 
production.
1 6 0
There are other problems arising from the externally oriented economy. The increasingly 
service oriented formal economy has grown out of the destruction of the previous 
substantive (i.e. subsistence) one without developing a new substantive base to support 
the majority of Guatemalans. This top-down orientation has made Guatemala a country 
with a formal economy but with only a marginal substantive one. That which exists 
revolves around nothing more than extraction through ‘export led development’. As we 
have seen, this export-led development has left an enormous sector of the Guatemalan 
population behind. While certainly contested by those promoting export production, such 
an externally oriented political economy is ‘all take and no give’. It actively undermines 
self-reliance and self-provisioning, while ignoring the development of internal markets, 
treating them as inconsequential sectors, except when it comes to distributing imported 
consumer goods.
Herein lies the problem of the structural inequality of the global political economy, which 
is oriented towards centre countries and core actors, through the grossly unequal terms of 
trade. While food imports may be cheaper in the strictest of neo-classical economic 
senses, there are a number of human ‘externalities’ -  like actual survival -  that it fails to 
account for. The obverse of food dependency, is the ‘food power’ that is granted to the 
supplying country. Food power has been a less than glamorous yet hugely important 
pillar of US foreign policy since the 1970s. Since the 1950s, food aid itself has been a 
very successful marketing tool in the openly espoused US effort to transform the world’s 
diet.'*̂ '̂  Thus, given the ulterior motives of those promoting export led growth at the 
expense of any kind of food autonomy or independence, let alone self-sufficiency, one 
has to doubt the kind of food security that this development engenders.
The military are the main obstacle to democracy in Guatemala, and were the main source 
of stability. They effectively countered the instability created by elite competition for 
dominance and exploitation of the country’s resources. However, this stabilizing 
influence seems to be rapidly dissipating. Furthermore, the military obstacle to 
democracy does not to imply that the rest of the elite fractions are that interested in it 
either. Limited democracy is acceptable only as long as it does not interfere with their
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primary interests of wealth, domination and themselves. At the same time, the culture of 
systemic violence has inhibited the ‘dialectic of revolution’ from expressing itself.
This is to say that the general population, including contrary thinking members of the 
elite, are so thoroughly suppressed and repressed that they have been pacified as a force 
of resistance to the status quo. The result is disaster. Instead of ‘rising up’ in revolution 
and possibly dying for a cause, the people simply die, slowly and silently from hunger 
and poverty or as victims of the increasing violence and human insecurity.
CONCLUSIONS
In this study I have attempted to connect and combine a number of concrete fields and 
approaches, and apply them to one case. This theoretical synthesis is in large part a 
reflection of the complexity of the problem being addressed. The interdisciplinary nature 
of the problematic has dictated the diversity of theoretical approach(es) required to 
examine it. The issue is structural hunger, the observable phenomenon was the disaster 
of famine, and its causes lay in political economic structure. Shared processes are what 
link the three different areas of literature to each other, and to the problematic itself.
This central theme that arises from the various literatures was vulnerability. The general 
consensus from both famine and disaster studies is that there are no constant factors other 
than that vulnerability. Triggers and hazards, while generally necessary, are particular, 
whereas vulnerability is more homogenous and apt to generalization. This does not mean 
that vulnerability cannot be disaggregated, simply that conditions of vulnerability to one 
threat are often common to various other hazards, as is illustrated by the ‘global 
vulnerability’ model. The model enables us to grasp the multiple facets of vulnerability. 
Similarly, political economy is concerned with the relationships, particularly the 
vulnerability that stems from dependence and interdependence.
In keeping with the critical epistemological foundations that underlie the analytical 
framework used in this thesis, the analysis has at every stage been concerned with 
deconstructing that which is reified and revealing the underlying processes and 
connections between elements. Famines, like all disasters, do not simply occur on their
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own, ‘naturally’. They are ‘made’ -  socially constructed, in the same way that the 
economy and the market are social institutions built and maintained by human actors. 
Similarly, events do not just occur, they evolve, just as famine is a process that develops. 
In this light, famines are clearly a part of the material economy, as a substantive 
economic process par excellence, concerned with the production and availability of food 
and people’s access to it. This latter measure (access) is one of power, which clearly 
demonstrates the inseparability of the political from the economic.
The discussion continues with epistemological issues, before turning to issues specific to 
political economy and the food security literature. The chapter concludes with discussion 
revolving around the synthesis of the three fields of knowledge. The general findings and 
conclusions of the study are summarized in the following final chapter.
Complexity and Complex Systems Theory
The interdisciplinary complexity of famine has been repeatedly noted throughout both 
this study and the literature that has guided it. The global vulnerability model, with its 
dynamic consideration of multiple interacting factors, is an example of a specific 
analytical framework based on complex systems theory. It is useful in that it reflects and 
emphasizes the complex nature of development and disaster issues. It illuminates the 
multitude of variables involved in famine and disasters and the interaction between 
conditions of vulnerability and hazards. Complex systems theory accurately reflects the 
uniqueness of each famine and the particular combination of elements and time in the 
process of that disasters evolution. However, all this representivity means that complex 
systems theory does not explain, it simply describes, albeit with great detail, what is 
present or occurring. This means it can detail the interaction of elements, but it never 
explains why those elements are present, or why the react and interact they way they do.
While seemingly ‘objective’, human judgments are present at all levels of analysis using 
complex systems theory, as they are with all other theory. The theory is a ‘way of 
thinking’, it is not thought itself. What complex systems theory does is promote holistic 
thinking that does not divorce issues, like hunger or vulnerability from development.
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Compartmentalized thinking ean ends up killing people beeause the issues it sees are 
inextricably linked to the realities it does not, given their ‘theoretical’ or conceptual 
separation. The dangers of ‘false’ objectivity and theoretical ‘blindness’ are discussed in 
this next section.
The Politics of Theory and Knowledge
Theory is political. This is not an assertion but an observation. In political economy, 
nothing is apolitical, despite the claims of technocrats, scientists or managers to the 
contrary. Questions are political and so are their answers. These apolitical answers 
usually serve the status quo, and always serve the powers that be. As Susan George 
observes, "All social scientists are neutral, but they are more neutral towards some social 
groups than towards others.""*^  ̂ Jenny Edkins echoes this position in her attack on the 
technologizing of knowledge, and hence responses to problems, through the 
epistemological nature of modernity
The use of terminology and language in development is also supremely political. As 
demonstrated by the comments of Edin Barrientos, the Guatemalan Minister if 
Agriculture, famine is the ‘F’-word of the humanitarian community. It is the key to both 
international condemnation and wondrous quantities of aid. It is the code that unlocks 
programmatic action and that dictates policy responses.
To demonstrate that it is not simply tautological to ‘play’ with definitions, or that those 
definitions are themselves ‘apolitical’ we have this observation from Viola:
“.. .poverty has lost its essentially political character (inseparable from an unequal 
correlation of local and global forces) to convert itself into a technical problem, of 
assigning resources or of ‘deficiencies’ in nutrition, education and sanitation of a 
sector of the population. What is constructed as the object of analysis and for 
intervention, as the problem to eradicate, is no longer inequality, but rather the 
poor.”̂ ^̂
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This show how the citizens of the world, particularly the affluent ones, seem to forget, or 
not realize in the first place, exactly what the real costs of our society are, who in fact is 
paying for them and how. This is a lesson, as obvious as it may be, that cannot be 
ignored.
This apolitical ‘theoretical blindness’ is what underlies effective demand and its 
discovery. Similarly, the domestic economy does not produce for the domestic 
population or the poor because the political economy does not even consider them. ‘It’ -  
the economic and political powers that be, the impersonal structures, administrators and 
bureaucracies that mechanically serve their interests -  is, due its own self-definition and 
perspective of the world (its theory), completely incapable of ever seeing them.
Where their existence is noted, they are ignored as unimportant and inconsequential.
This is because, through the simple outlook of effective demand, they are inconsequential 
and unimportant. They do not matter because they are poor. To ‘the market’ they do not 
exist because they do not have the means -  the money -  to act as consumers, and in a 
market there is only buyers and sellers, consumers and producers. No market freedom or 
consumer rights will make any difference to someone that cannot exercise those rights 
and freedoms. In the reified market, cash-nexus economy, only money matters. 
Humanity, human life, does not, unless there is a dollar value attached to it.
This is all relevant to development because development is supremely positivistic in its 
epistemology -  identifying problems and searching for answers to them. The concept of 
transformation inherent in development cannot but be positivist. If nothing else critical 
theory admonishes us regarding the shortcomings of positivism. This is particularly and 
directly related to the importance of tangibility to ‘positivist’ thinking in the dichotomy 
between prevention and response. The entire concept o f  prevention is a ‘positive’ 
impossibility in that, when successftd, it effectively negates its object. This is one of the 
obstacles to disaster prevention, which is structurally oriented in its transformative 
efforts, and therefore can only work indirectly and not directly with the objects with 
which it is concerned. Thus apart from being political, this structural approach is a
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challenge to policy makers and programmers in terms of being beyond tbeir scope for 
action. Prevention is infinitely less appealing than emergency response in that it is less 
tangible, and hence less ‘obviously humanitarian’ than emergency aid. The hesitation to 
prevent is indicative of both ulterior motives that supercede any moral obligation, and the 
limitations of positivist thinking.
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT
This study shares the perspective that development is a project that has been advanced by 
specific actors who have been constructing a world order. The Global Division of 
Labour and Power model thus provides the specific analytical tools and categories, in 
keeping with the positions advanced by the Post-Development and structural thinkers, to 
examine the particular and evolving situation of international political economy. Further, 
it elaborates in greater detail the simplistic categorization of the international division of 
labour and the ‘new international division of labour’ (NIDL). This has been seen in the 
regional integration of Central America itself, and its regional participation in 
successively larger international blocs. The model draws attention to the reality of the 
spread of services throughout the globe, and their supplanting production as the most 
important sector of the formal eeonomy. It also accepts the duality of informal and 
formal sectors side by side in a national economy, and the role of the state in servieing 
the interests of monopoly capital, as opposed to those of its people.
The two theories of international political economy -  interdependence and dependence -  
have also been useful in identifying aspects of the system and their consequences. While 
not clarified earlier, there is qualitative difference between the two, in that 
interdependenee, as the product of political science, is much more politically oriented, 
while dependency, with its Marxist origins, is notably economistic. Similarly, 
interdependence is complex in its consideration o f multiple actors, issues and interactions 
simultaneously. Dependency is dualistic, focusing on the relations between two actors or 
surroimding one issue, examining each independently. This makes them eomplementary 
tools in examining issues of power and material reality in the politieal economy.
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There is a reason why dependency theory emerged from Latin America. The context of 
export dependency to a metropolitan power is an incontrovertible and defining aspect of 
the regions historic development. However, as we see with Guatemala, the primacy of 
that centre country has been diminishing with time and the increased complexity of 
trading relations. While the complexity of the global division of labour may in fact mean 
that ultimately and indirectly that trade all flows back to the United States, this is merely 
speculation that is quite beyond the domain of this study. That said, the critical role of 
the US as an export destination leaves Guatemala extremely vulnerable to any 
fluctuations in the US economy. As its two main exports -  60% of coffee and virtually 
all textiles and clothing -  are directed overwhelmingly to the US, Guatemala is doubly 
exposed, to a single market and to extreme international competition, oversupply and 
price fluctuations.
The negative aspects of this dependency displayed themselves fully in 2001, when 
exports to the US fell by $317 million, and the value of coffee exports fell by $268 
million. That Guatemala’s total export reduction was only $243 million is testament to 
its restructuring of importance of exports and export partners, as opposed to an increasing 
diversification of each. The actual number of export partners decreased by 7 between 
2000 and 2001, to 122.
Import dependence has only grown since 1986, excepting minor yet significant decreases 
in 1992 and 1999, all the while outstripping export growth. This trade deficit grew to 
more than $3 billion in 2001, which is all the more alarming considering the deficit is 
actually higher than the level of exports ($2.47 billion) and the growing national debt 
($2.76 billion). Guatemala is an economy importing what it cannot afford and also what 
it absolutely requires. As chapter four illustrated, Guatemala now depends on the United 
States for fully one third o f  its basic grain supply. And this is still not enough to feed the 
population. With the maquilas importing materials worth three quarters of their export 
value, before considering imported capital costs, no element of the Guatemalan economy 
displays anything but general vulnerability.
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The only conclusion that can be drawn from the state of the Guatemalan political 
economy, is that is not serving the interests of its populace. Its exports are of interest to 
Northern consumers and the transnationals that manage their marketing and distribution 
and therefore capture the real value of the export. In the case of coffee, the vendor of a 
cup of that Guatemalan product receives up 64 times more, per pound, than the person 
that picked it. The import of food, consumer goods (durable, non-durable and luxury), 
primary and intermediary materials, combustibles, construction materials and capital 
goods are all benefiting the foreign importer. Given the overwhelming poverty of the 
majority of Guatemalans, they are not even able to avail themselves of the benefits these 
foreign products may offer. Such a structure, with so small and insufficient a substantive 
base cannot address or reduce poverty, but only increase it. The global immiseration that 
we are currently seeing is testament to the equally brutal nature of ‘savage capitalism’ 
that comes after the pain of incorporation into that system, discussed in the following two 
sections.
Immiseration
The dismissal of Marx’s thesis of immiseration by liberals was somewhat precipitous.
The limiting of thinking about capitalism to the unit of the nation state would seem to 
explain the question of ‘where is the immiseration’. It had and has been externalized into 
the environment and the so-called Third World. Only with the full expansion of the 
capitalist system to encompass the entire earth can costs no longer be externalized, such 
that their socialization, or distribution amongst the poor, can be observed. The proverbial 
buck, from the privatization of profits, particularly those stemming from the exploitation 
of ‘the commons’, can no longer be passed. The bill for capitalist growth and expansion 
is being paid in full through the impact on the environment and the Third World. 
Immiseration is the ‘underdevelopment’ of the South, and also, as is being increasingly 
noticed, elements of the North. While not stated as such, this is the mutual vulnerability 
that underlies human insecurity. In a global system, all are affected. We can thank 
complex systems for showing us how that is indeed the case.
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In the light of immiseration and mutual vulnerability, ‘environmental refugees’ are a 
coneept that needs greater examination and disaggregation. Behind the name, these 
people are in fact economic refugees, in that they can no longer exploit their 
environment, or survive upon the substantive economic base that it provides. There are 
various, mainly economic causes for this environmental destruction, but in terms of the 
human disaster facing people because of environmental degradation, it is imperative to 
understand that the environment is the basis upon which the human economy is 
constructed. The economy is society’s relationship with nature, in the project of survival 
and creation of wealth. Failing to recognize this relationship, and to blithely continue 
‘externalizing’ costs to the environment are the foundations of unsustainable 
development, which increases vulnerability and therefore the impact of disaster.
Proletarizanization
Depeasantization and proletarianization are two of the coincident systemic processes that 
accompany immiseration in the spread of capitalism. As processes of transformation 
aimed at incorporating the subsistence population into the capitalist economic system, 
they serve as mechanisms for the production of vulnerability. More than simply an 
economic process, however, the systematic destruction of the peasantry is also a social, 
cultural and political phenomenon, which erodes the institutions and relationships within 
all of these spheres. Thus, in addition to systematically denying people the material 
means of subsistence, proletarianziation is also concerned with denying them their other 
‘entitlements’ to security and well-being. This is the ‘incentive’ in a system that seeks to 
create a pool of wage labour; people are driven to work for others out of hunger.
The problems inherent in any development paradigm that use marginalization and 
dispossession to promote advancement cast long shadows on the nature of that 
development. Modernization’s need to ‘break’ feudal socio-economic structures in the 
name of development and to force the ‘tied’ labour force of the previous system into 
industry has costs. It is an outright disaster when there is no such industry (substantive 
economy) to ‘absorb’ these people. This modernization is not a ‘technical’ issue and 
must be ‘re-humanized’ and understood as a process of human suffering and coercion
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and not a clinical, efficient and painless recipe for progress. The proeess of 
proletarianisation of the peasantry is not simply an abstract concept, but a painful human 
process of transition adopted out of necessity. It is a process fueled by hunger itself. Far 
from being a reified process itself, proletarianization has concrete actors and 
mechanisms. In Guatemala those actors have primarily been the state and the military 
acting on behalf of the oligarchy, through such mechanisms as the Vagrancy Laws and 
the suppression of ‘subversives’ promoting subsistence and self-sufficiency. It has not 
been the state alone, but also ineludes the private masters of debt bondage.
At any single moment there are only two ways in which such a socio-economic system 
accounts for people -  as producers or as consumers (recognizing that at different times 
they can be one or the other). Because, by definition, the poor are what they are named, 
their lack of effective demand makes them invisible to the ‘reified market’ as consumers. 
However, people like Praleihad are indeed looking for effeetive ways to adapt the ‘market 
to these unseen consumers and ‘serve the poor, profitably’
On the supply side of the economic equation, the poor are useful for pushing down wages 
in the labour market. The more desperate people are to survive, and the more of those 
desperate people there are, the lower the wages they will aeeept -  or rather, can be forced 
to accept. The poor are not simply a ‘reserve army of labour’ -  rather they are an 
économie force that, by its very existence and mass, suppresses wages. This reduction of 
the wage bill serves the profit interests of owners and capital. Labour in any sector can 
be ‘disciplined’ when it exists in surplus. This is especially the case for semi- or 
unskilled labour, whieh is always available and, thanks to industrial deskilling (even 
under flexible specialization where it is the maehine or system that is adjusted to a 
different job while the workers perform essentially the same tasks) can be treated 
flexibly. Workers are readily replaceable under such production regimes. That is what 
‘flexibility’ means -  low wages and replaeeability, which concentrates power in the 
hands of buyers on the labour market -  employers. This is a problem inherent in a soeio- 
economie system where the main determinant of value is scarcity.
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For this ‘flexible’ labour force to exist, its members carmot have any other options for 
survival or subsistence. They are forced into the labour market through their alienation 
from any other means of production. Land is the simplest, most basic of these means. As 
such, subsistence and self-sufficiency are anathema to the ‘reified market’ and free 
market dogma, i.e. capitalism, especially in its current stage of neoliberal globalization. 
Therefore, subsistence and self-reliance must be destroyed so that people are dependent 
on ‘the market’. Once this dependency is cultivated, there is no ‘going back’"̂ ®̂ -  
incorporation into the system is a one time event. Once you are dependent on the market 
for your survival you have no other option than to serve ‘the market’. This is mainly 
done by selling your labour power, but survival or coping can first occur through the 
selling of assets. ‘Disasters’ are notorious for their impact in exhausting the assets of 
vulnerable people, trapping them in inescapable poverty and adding them to the ‘surplus 
army of labour’.
With the resulting eash-nexus as the medium for relations, we see that modernity and 
post-modemity have freed people from all other social obligations. This is particularly 
the case for ‘mutual aid’ and communal work that have been the traditional systems of 
support and obligation for subsistence communities. Cooperation is based on reciprocity 
whereas the cash-nexus is essentially alienation from responsibility. While traditional 
cultures can certainly be problematic and discriminatory in themselves, the social 
obligations, the mores, norms and taboos of a society, are the social glue that holds 
communities together. The cash-nexus is hardly any less discriminatory than traditional 
social structures -  it just discriminates in a different way, as does any social system. 
Regulation of the economy, and the welfare state, provide some mitigation against the 
effects of ‘free competition’ and the losers that it produces when other social networks 
and entitlements by this one dimensional system of exchange.
Trade
Trade is not synonymous with capitalism. The latter is only indirectly related to the 
former, both living quite independent existences and the former predating the latter by 
thousands of years. Furthermore, trade is, at some levels, a necessary act, depending on
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the ends, but in all cases, it is a means to an end. For globalization, trade, or what is 
called (free) trade, has become an end in and of itself. Those claiming that trade is an end 
and nothing more are leaving unsaid how it is that they benefit from that trade. While 
trade can be beneficial, and even mutually beneficially, it is not necessarily so.
Guatemala is a clear example of how the benefits of trade can be limited and enjoyed by 
a very few, to the actual detriment of the majority. This problem extends beyond just the 
orientation of the economy towards agricultural exports, traditional and non-traditional, 
as well as the maquilas and EPZ sector. Rather this orientation, and the policies and 
measures pursued to advance this orientation have destroyed pre-existing livelihoods and 
subsistence. Capitalism disrupts social, economic and cultural patterns that evolved over 
time, in which there was a balance (however inequitable) and real coping mechanisms 
were developed and capacities for adjustment had evolved. The pace of globalization, 
and the absolute lack of integral planning and the resources for their implementation to 
mitigate the side affects of that globalization, rends the socio-economic fabric before it 
can evolve, without supplementing it with anything to absorb the social costs. Rather, 
desperate attempts at adaptation and ultimately disaster are what remain for those 
excluded by the globalization project. Global exchange can be good for everyone, in that 
it serves their interests and improves, or at least does not harm, their well being.
However, the current model and its basis on short term profits, long-run equilibrium and 
effective demand is not beneficial to anyone other than a small, wealthy, mainly northern, 
corporate minority.
Excess Liquidity
One of the problems arising from the super-coneentration of wealth in Guatemala, 
illustrative of the inherent contradictions of capitalism and its tendency towards 
monopoly, is the problem of excess liquidity. The concentrated accumulation of money 
acts as en enormous, volatile and distortional economic pressure. This results from 
financial capital, or rather its owners, search for profitable invest of that capital. When 
potential sources of profit are identified, they generate an uncontrollable flow of capital, 
which entirely distorts the ‘market mechanism’ and in fact unbalances it. By 
overemphasizing certain and often very speculative areas of the eeonomy, excess
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liquidity works to the direct detriment of the essential, substantive or productive sectors 
of the economy. This is because the speculative capital is driven by the profit motive that 
is not satisfied by the returns prevailing in the productive sector. In Guatemala, the most 
damaging speculation is in land, which simultaneously increases concentration, while 
robbing smallholders and peasants of the opportunity to acquire land, either directly or 
through land redistribution efforts.
One of the factors leading to this excess liquidity is that there is no redistribution of this 
wealth, through taxation of income by the state, to prevent its concentration and 
encourage its productive reinvestment. Furthermore, this super concentration of wealth, 
in addition to fuelling speculation, limits demand generally and specifically focuses it on 
luxury goods. This general reduction of demand is because the level of liquidity is too 
great to actually be used on consumption, particularly given the limits of luxury 
consumption. At the same time the mere existence of excess liquidity in super­
concentrated form acts as an inflationary pressure. This is related to effective demand, 
in that the ‘reified market’ sees an oversupply of money. This creates a situation wherein 
the rich can either watch their wealth devalue of invest it.
Given the greater profitability to be found in speculative rather than productive 
investment, and the greater stability of both abroad, there therefore exists great ineentive 
for exporting capital, which further destabilizes the national accounts, exacerbating the 
current accounts deficit, which luxury consumption has already boosted. To correct and 
prevent this flight of capital and to hold hack domestic inflation, governments raise 
interest rates (Guatemala’s has averaged 19.5% for the last six years) and sells bonds at 
rates competitive with speculative returns, in what amounts to guaranteed speculation, 
which is in fact now even more attractive for investment. This in turn further increases 
liquidity by increasing domestic wealth for those that had it concentrated in their hands to 
begin and attracting additional international capital.
This ‘wealth trap’ is an ultimately destabilizing cycle not unlike the debt trap, to which it 
is intrinsically related. Excess liquidity is the supply side of the debt trap. The example
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of petro-dollars in the 1970s is the best example of this. An excess supply of money 
creates cheap credit that needs to be sold. As noted, the excess liquidity also creates 
inflation, which eventually makes credit scarcer and therefore more expensive, fuelling 
the debt trap. The other consequence is that excess liquidity compounds volatility. It 
creates the effect of a financial herd mentality, where, even if it is only one person 
shifting their investment, the impact can be enormous. These distortions caused by the 
movement of monopoly capital can then set off the stampede, as speculation is a game of 
nerves.
Finally, excess liquidity serves as an illustration of how inflation operates as the market 
mechanism (the aggregate realization) of collective greed. This is particularly notable as 
it relates to speculation, where money attracts other money, inflating values. A more 
daily illustration, coming from Guatemala, is the differential price ranges that market 
vendors have for nationals, ‘gringos’ and the group of Japanese tourists off the tour bus. 
The perception of money or wealth inflates prices. More specifically, the perception of 
the price that can effectively be charged for an item is the issue because there is not 
constant or foundational theory of value at work in dominant neo-classical economics. 
Prices are determined by the market, which, according to the intersection of supply and 
demand, is the equilibrium of perceived value, or greed. Prices are not purely, entirely or 
even generally based on the cost of production, in spite of the fact that profits are based 
on the cost of production. The entire complexity of this ‘wealth trap’ requires greater 
investigation.
HUNGER -  FAMINE -  FOOD SECURITY
Having examined the case of famine in Guatemala, and the technical aspects of hunger, 
famine and food security, it is now easier to clearly illustrate the cleavage in analysis 
between the dominant policy school and the critical approaches, including the New  
Famine School. For the first, the problem is formulated as a negative -  there is a lack of 
food, there is a lack of entitlement, there is a lack of utility of the food available -  to 
which there is the immediate and positivist answer of filling that absence. The problem is 
then a technical or managerial one that can be addressed ‘apolitically’ because it is a
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tautology. The critical thinkers, on the other hand, ask the dreaded question ‘why?’ Why 
is there insufficient food? Why do people not have access? Why is the food incorrect? 
And then they search for the root, and hence structural, causes that place people in these 
situations of vulnerability in the first place.
The first approach is nothing more than remedial. The second is oriented towards 
transformation; to not only remedy the problem but to ensure that it does not arise anew.
It is this issue of recurrence that is the failure of remedial approaches. Given that famine 
is a process, that the crisis it evoked developed from a dynamic of complex causality, 
none of which is in any way addressed by the remedy, then there is nothing to prevent the 
disaster situation from returning. As has been learned from aid mistakes, which have 
been repeated to the point of seeming willfully committed, the provision of what is 
missing actually unleashes an entire chain of reactions that compound the problem. It is 
clearly understood the way food aid distorts local markets, hurts local producers and 
reduces production. Similar chains of problems have emerged with virtually all 
‘technical’ solutions. The green revolution required greater inputs and therefore capital, 
damaged the soil and both depleted and contaminated water supplies. Irrigation depletes 
water supplies, creates water-rights conflicts, inherently favour the wealthy or large 
producer, and result in the salinization of the soil, even leading to desertification. Similar 
examples from apolitical ‘technical’ solutions abound.
The reality of famine is not as ‘clean’ and ordered as the models and theories that attempt 
describe and explain it. In ‘real life’ famine does not follow their (the models) 
progression and is not uniform. Nonetheless, Walker’s definition of famine is an entirely 
apt description of what has transpired in Guatemala. The elements of the process and 
their ‘progressive’ interaction are clear. While the three stages of famine development 
that Rangasami proposes are not appropriate, they do reflect aspects of the process, which 
she more appropriately identifies as social, political and economic. Her three stages are 
useful when not taken as linear, but, rather, as De Waal considers them -  “co-present 
aspects of famine, with complex interactions.”"̂ *̂
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After questioning the separation of famine from endemic hunger at the outset, I have 
demonstrated the sufficiency of their inseparability. However, I am not convinced that I 
have shown the necessity of their unity. To a large degree, this is mitigated by Walker’s 
definition of famine as “a socio economic process which causes the accelerated 
destitution of the most vulnerable, marginal and least powerful groups in a community, to 
a point where they can no longer, as a group, maintain a sustainable livelihood.” With 
famine a process, hunger becomes a condition -  one element or state of being belonging 
to that process.
As has been demonstrated by this thesis, immiseration is a famine process. However, 
while immiserating, not all famine processes are based on the normal working of the 
socio economic system, i.e. not all famines are the result of immiseration. It is similar to 
the relationship between poverty and vulnerability -  all who are poor are vulnerable, but 
not all who are vulnerable are poor. As such, it presents us with another type of famine 
to add to the list of typologies. However, this structural famine shares aspects of the 
hidden famine (of both Brunei and Garenne), and combines elements of De Waal’s 
agrarian/smallholder and class based/occupational famine types. None of Gazdar’s pre-, 
post-, and modem famine types seem entirely appropriate, the entitlement failure of 
modem famine ringing hollow considering the deeper stmctural causation of that loss of 
entitlement, and the effective absence of “functioning modem institutions”. When it is 
the politieal economy, in its normal operation that is marginalizing people and putting 
them “at risk” of acute nutritional crisis, any typology based on failure seems 
inappropriate. This is the particular point made by Susan George'*^  ̂when discussing the 
negative impacts of neo-liberalism -  they are not evidence of failure, but rather that the 
agenda is working as intended. Therefore, the Guatemalan famine was and continues to 
be a human-made disaster.
THE DISASTER OF HUNGER/FAMINE IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
Taking a moment to compare Guatemala’s social and economic indicators with those of 
Honduras and Nicaragua should be sufficient to demonstrate that the simple formula of 
growth is not the answer to poverty and hunger. The case of Guatemala presents solid
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ground for arguing that growth is in fact a cause of poverty and hunger. Clearly, both 
issues are more complicated than these simple statements. However, this complexity and 
the inherent qualifications do not dissipate the underlying truths they express.
As such, this doubting of the growth as development formula brings into question the 
dominant policies affecting development, food security and disasters. Structural 
adjustment, or Poverty Reduction Strategies as they have been rechristened, hold the 
capitalist growth mantra at their heart. The ‘participatory growth process’ that Dreze and 
Sen propose in their Hunger and Public Action seems intrinsically naïve in its ignoring of 
structural inequalities that seemingly never fail to reproduce themselves with growth.
The ‘management’ of problems that addresses symptoms rather than causes, inherent in 
both of these mainstream approaches to development and hunger, are also present in the 
area of disasters. Given that all three fields, in their respective mainstreams, have this 
technical solution approach
Having shown that the famine in Guatemala was in fact ‘structural’ -  man-made -  then 
there are a number of implications regarding responsibility and culpability. When ideas 
are owned, so too can systems. It is therefore with that ownership that responsibility lies. 
This is a technical legal discussion that is quite beyond the scope of both this thesis and 
its author, however, the implications and trends are clear. Extending the analysis of 
disaggregating systems according to their social construction, we can only conclude that 
people are responsible for the outcomes of their actions, including collective and 
systemic action, even where they are unaware of those outcomes, and where they are not 
intended. Neither intention nor awareness changes ‘the facts’ of material reality. 
However, they do certainly affect perception of those facts. Unfortunately, the common 
and collective perception, particularly in the North and amongst those that are ultimately 
responsible according to the web of complex causality, requires that these linkages 
constantly be demonstrated. The collective culpability that in indicates is simply 
overwhelming, in addition to be a threat to the entire ‘system’ that provides so well for 
‘us’. As the common wisdom goes, none will fight so hard for their privilege as those 
threatened with losing it.
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De Waal’s position that famines should be and are best defined by those that experience 
them, rather than ‘outsiders’, has many implications. The first of these is that famine can 
occur without resulting in death, and hence, that there are different kinds of famine. 
Combining this broader perspective, and hence broader definition of what is a famine, 
with Edkins’ position that famine are perpetrated crimes, for which specific persons are 
responsible and should be tried as criminals, presents us with the truly sobering need to 




“Neither the nonrecognition of the obvious nor the advocacy of the futile is a 
serviceable expedient. There remains a third choice... to accept the decline of the 
market. ” - John Kenneth Galbraith
Guatemala’s participation and insertion into the global system began with the conquest 
and colonization by the Spanish in 1520s. Since it’s beginning, right up to the present, it 
has been an economically oriented process, that has served to the enormous benefit of a 
very few while exploiting and marginalizing the many to inhuman extremes. Although 
the details and mechanisms of this extremely exploitative system, in both the economic 
and the abusive sense, have changed, the essential structure of the political economy has 
not in fact changed except to become more extreme in its polarization and inequity.
Liberalism and modernization have gone hand in hand with Guatemala’s increasing (and 
increasingly more complex) insertion into the global economic system, particularly since 
the Liberal Revolution of the 1870s. This context of the extreme and racially based 
socio-economic inequality has resulted in a constant and silent disaster for the vast 
majority, who are rural and indigenous.
Modernity and industrialization have only been for the few and have either entirely 
excluded the rural poor by systematically expropriating their lands and exploiting their 
labour. The need for labour has fallen, particularly in the agricultural sector, where it has 
been reduced for many crops thanks to agro-industrial mechanization. The peasantry 
(including both the rural proletariat and semi-proletariat) has seen its options reduced to 
the bare minimum of labouring for the few remaining traditional export cash crops.
Bereft of land, and hence their traditional means of subsistence, and with no substantive 
industrial growth creating labour demand {maquilas simply feminize the labour force 
without a necessary aggregate impact on family incomes and livelihoods, excepting the 
double work day facing these women) the political economy, oriented around primary
179
agricultural commodity exporting, non-durable consumer goods and assembly of light 
industrial products, has in fact created an enormous ‘surplus population’.
The resulting danger of thinking that allows for the concept of a ‘surplus population’ has 
been clearly shown in Guatemala’s history and present experience. By dispensing with 
people as being ‘surplus’, as ‘other’, as uncivilized and as useless, they can be utterly de­
humanized. The brutality of the 36 years of civil war and the anything put peaceful 
years since it formally ended clearly illustrate the real human consequences of dismissing 
people as redundant. In a political economy that reduces relations to the cash-nexus, 
people without ‘value’ can be and are treated as valueless.
There is effectively no redistribution of wealth in the country, given the elite’s quashing 
of that state’s efforts to extract taxes from them. With the elimination of land reform 
from the realm of the politically conceivable, the continued concentration of wealth and 
above all land further ensures that no substantial internal market is created. This is 
because those few that do indeed have ‘unskilled’ employment in the formal sector are 
not provided with the reasonable wages required to support significant internal demand. 
When millions more are without even subsistence levels of income, the possibility of 
developing internal demand, and the benefits of servicing it, are negated. Without 
anything resembling the Fordist compact with the welfare state, the only value 
represented by the ‘surplus population’ is as cheap labour. The systematic 
impoverishment and misery created by this normal working of the Guatemalan political 
economy is clear.
The result of a political and economic system that constructs vulnerability on the one 
hand, and acts as a hazard on the other, can only result in disaster. By stripping the 
majority of the population of its means of survival, and eontinuously eroding their few 
and meager mechanisms for coping and adapting, the Guatemalan political economy and 
those that benefit from it are making the rural poor, and those that have been forced to 
migrate to urban centers, vulnerable to a wide range of economic, political and even 
‘natural’ shocks. At the same time, given the political and economic dependence of the
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country on a limited number of sectors and, de facto, one external market, the entire 
nation is thus made susceptible to a plethora of external shocks. These external shocks 
reverberate even more intensely within the dependent economy than their magnitude on 
the international level would seem to warrant, given the overwhelming importance of 
those markets or sectors to the country. There is no doubting that the peasants of 
Guatemala are dependent on coffee production for their livelihoods. That very 
dependence is not simply one of choice, but was manufactured through the historic 
process of ‘development’.
Thus, the absolute dependence of the economy on coffee, sugar, maquilas, tourism and 
remittances from abroad for income, foreign exchange and employment mean that 
Guatemala is entirely dependent on external factors (markets, demand and supply) that 
are beyond its control. Without any kind of substantive internal market, there is, at the 
same time, no functioning economy without exports, and no self-reliant production of 
basic necessities, particularly with regards to food, much of which is imported. This 
double conundrum -  on exporting to earn for the import of basic needs, while not 
producing basic needs domestically because of the emphasis on exports -  leaves the 
entire economy vulnerable to any external shocks. It is effectively without any (or 
sufficient) domestic reserves or even capacity to substitute for lost imports. When it 
comes to food in what is, for the majority of people, a subsistence economy, this means 
hunger and death.
RESULTS
Examining the case of Guatemala shows us a number of things, in their very stark and 
harsh reality. To begin, there simply is not enough food present in Guatemala to feed its 
population. According to F AO statistics, there has not been enough food for the at least 
the last half-century. This is a testament to the fact that the reified market does not — 
cannot -  distribute to the poor, because it does not recognize their existence, because they 
do not exercise the necessary effective demand to be considered. When considering that 
the market is a network of social institutions and interactions, it means that those with
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power in and over those networks are not concerned with the hunger or survival of the 
poor.
The situation of indigenous peoples, and the rural population -  not precisely the same, 
but with significant overlap -  is the worst in the country. These two sectors of the 
population are the most marginalized and vulnerable, according to all social and 
development indicators. It is they that are the victims of this ongoing famine. For them, 
that famine process defines their daily life as a constant struggle to cope and survive, 
balancing present needs with future ones.
Humanitarian aid agencies successfully and incalculably averted greater acute 
malnutrition and mortality -  open crisis -  in various areas of the country. However, there 
was a near total failure, by both aid agencies and the government, to detect and address 
the emergency situation in Chiquimula. The state has continued to be negligent since the 
famine came to its, and public, attention. In this way, the press has had a significant role 
in responding to the crisis.
The state of the environment is a clear factor of vulnerability to disasters, of most all 
sorts. It is also an indicator of the dispossession and marginalization of the peasantry in 
the face of land concentration in the hands of the rich. Chiquimula is a microcosm of this 
polarization and the two types of inappropriate and unsustainable exploitation of the land. 
The finca owners and ranchers of the department are directly and indirectly complicit 
with the peasants living on marginal hillsides and slopes in degrading the environment.
In terms of the emergence of the acute crisis, the drought was the key trigger agent in 
bringing attention to bear on the situation. The canicula caused enormous localized 
losses in certain specific areas, and significantly affected maize production at the national 
level. However, neither of these impacts were felt or directly relevant to those 
experiencing the acute crisis in various departments, including, according to MAGA and 
the WFP, Chiquimula. While we know firom other sources that Chiquimula’s crops were
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indeed affected by the lack of rain, this food availability decline explanation is neither 
sufficient nor necessary to defining the wider disaster.
This is because the single most important proximate cause of the disaster is the 
international coffee crisis. The global recession generally did have specific impacts, 
particularly on employment in the maquila sector, but other overall affects are not readily 
apparent at the macro level. Similarly, claims of reductions in tourism and remittances 
are not supported, or unquestionably supported at the macro level. However, particular 
micro level impacts are a certainty.
What is clear is that the total reduction of exports can be attributed to the United States 
and coffee. Each of these saw a total reduction, from the previous year’s levels, of over 
100% the total export decrease experienced by Guatemala. The consequences of this 
‘dependency’ is that even exceptional growth in other sectors and with other export 
partners are not enough to offset losses to these pillars of the national economy.
The causes and processes behind underlying vulnerability are clear. The political 
economic processes of the country are direct mechanisms of impoverishment and 
marginalization. They create and maintain situations of poverty, hunger and 
vulnerability. Through various forms of dependence, on exports and the import industrial 
inputs and food, the country and its people are exposed to a series of external threats that 
are entirely beyond their control. The situation of ‘global vulnerability’, while varying 
throughout the country in its exact details, is extreme, given the generalized poverty, 
endemic hunger and social, economic and political exclusion.
The result is that the Guatemalan famine is a socially constructed disaster. It is a man- 
made famine, resulting from the normal working of the political socio-economic system. 
The basis of this grossly inequitable political economy and the disaster that it produces is 
elite control of the land and all that flows from that control, including the country’s 
insertion into the global economic system. The empirical net result of this disaster is the
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disappearance and displacement of half a million people, who have emigrated, died, or 
not been bom.
CONCLUSIONS
First, famine is not the result of drought, of market failure, or of any other single cause. 
They are all but triggers or elements of the complex process of the construction of 
vulnerability. Because vulnerability is a social condition -  anthropogenic and 
anthropocentric -  simple ‘act of god’ explanations for why people starve are insufficient 
or even pointedly false. People are made to starve by the social, economic, 
environmental and political reality that they face. They are allowed to starve by the 
failure of social, economic and political actors to react. Some argue that not only do real 
human actors fail to react to avert crisis, but are in fact responsible for the vulnerability to 
the crisis in the first place -  that famine is an event of forced mass starvation.
It is worth exploring the avenue of legal culpability that Edkins proposes for the case of 
famines. With the apparent failure of accountability through other avenues, the path of 
international criminal justice for famine and disasters is in keeping with the current 
development of that multilateral sphere. While certain to elicit opposition from virtually 
all comers, particularly those closer to ‘power’ in the global hierarchy, in the absence of 
other mechanisms for ensuring responsibility and accountability, we must seize those that 
are available.
Secondly, we can draw several conclusions related to the analytical framework. The 
difference between famine and hunger is that the first is a process while the second is a 
condition. As such, they are inextricably bound, with hunger being a function of the 
famine process. Vulnerability, like poverty, to which it is so closely linked, is not a 
reified condition. It is one that is socially constructed, by human processes and human 
actors. Further, vulnerability has empirical measures, as do the aspects of poverty, that 
can be considered. As such, both are issues that we can always address.
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Triggers, threats or hazards are all different in their complexity and import to disaster 
causation. Some are truly beyond the power of humanity to control -  all that we can do 
is reduce or eliminate our exposure to them. Other threats are entirely or partially of our 
own making, and these too can be addressed directly. When the problem is the control 
and use of resources, it is an entirely social issue that is constructed and, therefore, that 
can be dealt with.
Third, any patently unequal political economy that serves as a producer for the global 
system before, or particularly without, concern for its domestic needs will result in 
disaster. Any such unequal political economy that is not regulated and redistributive, so 
as to ameliorate the concentration of wealth and rise of monopoly capital inherent in the 
capitalist system, will regularly and with time absolutely immiserate the majority of its 
population. The immiseration can be clearly seen as there is no longer anywhere left to 
‘externalize’ these costs. This effective process of systematic impoverishment ultimately 
is the process of famine that leads finally to death, by starvation and hunger related 
illnesses.
The global capitalist system has now moved from a mass production and consumption 
society, to one of mass marketing and consumption. This disappearance, at least in terms 
of relative importance, of production in the global division of labour and power has very 
serious implications for the substantive economy. Humanity itself depends on the 
production of a substantive economy to meet its material needs. The non-essential nature 
of services, including areas like tourism, makes the sector extremely vulnerable to 
economic conditions. The same holds true for all wage and contract labour, generally, as 
well as luxury goods, although the line between what is now considered a luxury and 
what is a necessity has certainly been raised. In the global capitalist system they all 
depend on growth, or growthmania,'*^  ̂to sustain them. Without the eonstant inflation o f  
the economic balloon, the entire system collapses.
Many of the multiple dimensions of the unsustainability inherent in this crisis prone 
‘development’ have been detailed throughout this study. The link between this specific
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case and the global political economy is that this famine occurred within, rather than 
outside of, that international political economy. A disaster in the so-called Third World 
is not just ‘their’ problem and only ‘our’ concern due to moral sentiment. Through the 
mutual vulnerability of increasing complex global interdependence, the expanding global 
economic system has made it a shared disaster, with common global causes and 
consequences. There are no longer barriers between the parts of the system, between 
what affects ‘us’ and ‘them’.'*^
Modernity and post-modemity have freed us from all social obligations. Unless we can 
be legally held accountable for something, there is no concrete incentive, and therefore 
rational economic reason, for being responsible. The emerging international legal 
framework is a reflection of this fact, and of exactly where the priorities lie in terms of 
the promotion and defense of rights. The actual legal mechanisms for the enforcement of 
human rights, such as the right to food, pale by comparison -  when and where they 
actually exist -  with the real legal instruments that exist to defend so-called ‘free-trade’.
Through the holistic application of the political economy approach, the human 
constraction of disaster is clearly laid out. In this manner, we see that the Guatemalan 
famine of 2001 was in fact merely the observable symptom of a permanent famine 
process that is produced by the domination of the national political economy by elites, 
with their orientation towards integration into the global economic system. These are the 
mechanics of disaster, where natural hazards are little more than triggers or focal events 
that bring the crisis situation to our attention. It was not the 123 ‘excess’ deaths in 2001 
that were the famine, but the real structural processes that put 2.8 million people at risk of 
food shortage, that leaves 43.4% of the Guatemalan children suffering from ehronic 
malnutrition, 56% of the population in poverty and 23% in extreme poverty.
This shows us how famines and disasters are necessarily neither events nor exceptions. 
They can be the product of ‘normality’. These are the hidden famines and disasters that 




This all presents a major challenge to development thinking. When disasters are no 
longer seen as the antithesis of development, but as the products of it, the unresolved 
problems of development, they act as a thermometer of its sustainability. Disasters are 
the most reliable indicators of the unsustainability of development."^^  ̂ As Allan Lavell 
puts it, “the problem, ultimately, is not the disaster but rather the development” 
because “at the end of the day what happens is that the historic profit based on the 
creation of vulnerability is, in general, privatized, while the vulnerability, the risk and 
the losses suffered during disasters are socialized.”̂ ^̂
In Guatemala, poverty, and many of the other aspects of vulnerability, ultimately come 
down to the issue of land. It is ownership and the control of its productive use that place 
land at the heart of immiseration, poverty, hunger and disaster. The history of Guatemala 
is one of disasters, caused by the distribution of wealth and power, and the processes that 
reproduce that dynamic structure. It is this history and these results that the chapters of 
this study have brought together.
The resolution of such a constant and continuing crisis involves real structural reform. It 
demands the redistribution of wealth, the prioritization of the domestic market and the 
substantive economy, with the creation of employment and paying of living wages to 
workers. It means the elites and their companies, as well as the transnational 
corporations they represent, paying taxes. It means ending government corruption, 
militarization, and general insecurity. It means diversifying foreign markets. It means 
greater domestic production of basic grains for the domestic market. It means land 
redistribution to peasants. It means massive reforestation and the end of deforestation. It 
means sustainable development that puts the economy to work for the people and not 
people to work for the eeonomy -  feeding human beings and not the reified market.
To reiterate, this evolution of a disaster over time is the famine process. Poverty and 
vulnerability are not the causes of this process -  they are a part of it. They are the 
destitution and desperation that sap assets and reduce resilience, heightening food
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insecurity. They are the underlying conditions that expose people to hazards; the latent 
disaster that those shocks and threats trigger.
In Guatemala, the processes of the political economy are systematically denying people 
access to land, while also destroying it, through both the act of denial and the outright 
‘abuse’ of the earth caused by ‘normal’ activity. In this way, famine can be traced 
directly back to the land and our use of it. This constant, silent and unrecognized disaster 
is, in the words of John Twigg, “nature’s judgement on what humans have wrought.”
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Annex 1
Selected Glossary of Disaster Terminology from ISDR^
Hazard -  A potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon or human activity, which 
may cause the loss of life or injury, property damage social or economic disruption or 
environmental degradation. Hazards include latent conditions that may represent future 
threats and can have different origins: natural (geological, hydrometeorological and 
biological) and/or induced by human processes (environmental degradation and 
technological hazards). Hazards can be single, sequential or combined in their origin and 
effects. Each hazard is characterized by its location, intensity and probability.
Vulnerability -  A set of conditions and processes resulting from physical, social, 
economical and environmental factors, which increase the susceptibility of a community 
to the impact of hazards. Positive factors, that increase the ability of people and the 
society they live in, to cope effectively with hazards, that increase their resilience, or that 
otherwise reduce their susceptibility, are considered as capacities.
Risk -  The probability of harmful consequences, or expected loss (of lives, people 
injured, property, livelihoods, economic activity disrupted or environment damaged) 
resulting from interactions between natural or human induced hazards and 
vulnerable/capable conditions. Conventionally risk is expressed by the equation Risk = 
Hazard x Vulnerability/Capacity
Beyond expressing a probability o f physical harm, it is crucial to appreciate that risks 
are always created or exist within social systems. It is important to consider the social 
contexts in which risks occur and that people therefore do not necessarily share the same 
perceptions o f risk and their underlying causes.
Disaster - A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society causing 
widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses which exceed the ability 
of the affected community/society to cope using its own resources.
A disaster is a function o f the risk process. It results from the combination o f hazards, 
conditions o f vulnerability and insufficient capacity or measures to reduce the potential 
negative consequences o f  risk.
Resilience/resilient - The capacity of a system, community or society to resist or to 
change in order that it may obtain an acceptable level in functioning and structure. This is 
determined by the degree to which the social system is capable of organizing itself, and 
the ability to increase its capacity for learning and adaptation, including the capacity to 
recover from a disaster.
* From Intemational Strategy for Disaster Reduction, ISDR. 2002. Living with Risk: A 
Global Review o f Disaster Reduction Initiatives. United Nations Inter-Agency 
Secretariat, Intemational Strategy for Disaster Reduction, UN/ISDR. Geneva.
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Coping Capabilities/Capacity - The manner in which people and organizations use 
existing resources to achieve various beneficial ends during unusual, abnormal, and 
adverse conditions of a disaster event or process.
The strengthening o f coping capacities usually builds resilience to withstand the effects o f  
natural and other hazards.
Risk Assessment/analysis - A process to determine the nature and extent of risk by 
analysing potential hazards and evaluating existing conditions of vulnerability/ capacity 
that could pose a potential threat or harm to people, property, livelihoods and the 
environment on which they depend.
The process o f conducting a risk assessment is based on a review o f both technical 
features o f hazards such as their location, intensity and probability, and also the analysis 
o f the physical, social and economic dimensions o f vulnerability, while taking particular 
account o f the coping capabilities pertinent to the risk scenarios.
Risk Management - The systematic management of administrative decisions, 
organisation, operational skills and responsibilities to apply policies, strategies and 
practices for disaster risk reduction.
Disaster Risk Reduetion - The systematic development and application of policies, 
strategies and practices to minimize vulnerabilities and disaster risks throughout a 
society, to avoid (prevention) or to limit (mitigation and preparedness) adverse impact of 
hazards, within the broad context of sustainable development.
Prevention - Activities to provide outright avoidance of the adverse impact of hazards 
and related environmental, technological and biological disasters.
Depending on social and technical feasibility and cost/benefit considerations, investing 
in preventive measures is justified in areas frequently affected by disaster. In the context 
o f public awareness raising and education, prevention refers to attitude and behaviour 
leading towards a “culture o f prevention ”.
Mitigation - Structural and non-structural measures undertaken to limit the adverse 
impact of natural hazards, environmental degradation and technological hazards.
Preparedness - Activities and measures taken in advance to ensure effective response to 
the impact of disasters, including the issuance of timely and effective early warnings and 
the temporary removal of people and property from a threatened location.
Early Warning - The provision of timely and effective information, through identified 
institutions, that allow individuals at risk of a disaster, to take action to avoid or reduce 
their risk and prepare for effective response.
Early warning systems consist o f three elements (i) forecasting and prediction o f 
impending events, (ii) processing and dissemination o f warnings to political authorities 
and population, and (in) undertaking appropriate reaction to warnings.
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